CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
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updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16104 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2PRV-MJPR-4QPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 09:31 – Updated: 2024-05-17 09:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Justin Silver Remote Content Shortcode allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Remote Content Shortcode: from n/a through 1.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45652"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T09:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Justin Silver Remote Content Shortcode allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Remote Content Shortcode: from n/a through 1.5.",
"id": "GHSA-2prv-mjpr-4qpj",
"modified": "2024-05-17T09:31:01Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T09:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45652"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/remote-content-shortcode/wordpress-remote-content-shortcode-plugin-1-5-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2PV6-5VVF-VV7F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:53 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:53MiniCMS 1.10 allows full path disclosure via /mc-admin/post.php?state=delete&delete= with an invalid filename.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-18890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-01T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MiniCMS 1.10 allows full path disclosure via /mc-admin/post.php?state=delete\u0026delete= with an invalid filename.",
"id": "GHSA-2pv6-5vvf-vv7f",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:53:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:53:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AvaterXXX/MiniCms/blob/master/Authentication%20and%20Information%20Exposure.md#information-exposure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.patec.cn/newsshow.php?cid=24\u0026id=135"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q42-4Q24-7RGV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:31Summary
The @typespec/openapi3 emitter retains the value of a @versioned enum member and interpolates it into the output filename as {version} without sanitizing path separators or traversal components. The completed path reaches the compiler's emitFile(), which creates the parent directory and writes the file without verifying containment under emitterOutputDir.
A crafted declarative .tsp input can therefore create or overwrite an OpenAPI-formatted .yaml or .json file outside the configured output tree, subject to the compiler process's filesystem permissions. No executable TypeSpec extension or attacker-controlled JavaScript is required.
Affected version
Confirmed on:
@typespec/compiler1.15.0@typespec/openapi31.15.0@typespec/http1.15.0@typespec/versioning0.85.0- release tag commit
f30cd352f93997e04c75d48c7ace6947a1d5d07a
The critical openapi.ts and emitter-utils.ts blobs are unchanged on main commit 365ec52b50b82cd9e1e037de4c6fcd5de7e32e90 as checked on 2026-08-19. No patched version was identified.
Root cause
The value originates at packages/openapi3/src/openapi.ts:592-608:
serviceRecord.versions.push({
service,
version: snapshot.version!.value,
document: document[0],
diagnostics: document[1],
});
It is interpolated without path validation at openapi.ts:629-641:
return interpolatePath(options.outputFile, {
"openapi-version": specVersion,
"service-name-if-multiple": multipleService ? getNamespaceFullName(service.type) : undefined,
"service-name": getNamespaceFullName(service.type),
"file-type": fileType,
version,
});
The path reaches emitFile() at openapi.ts:392-401. The sink at packages/compiler/src/core/emitter-utils.ts:29-39 performs no output-root containment check:
const outputFolder = getDirectoryPath(options.path);
await program.host.mkdirp(outputFolder);
return await program.host.writeFile(options.path, content);
resolvePath() joins the template to emitterOutputDir before {version} is interpolated, so it does not see the attacker-controlled .. components.
Proof of concept
The relevant input in poc/main.tsp is:
@versioned(Versions) namespace Svc;
enum Versions { v1: "../../../../../../../../../../tmp/TYPESPEC_PWNED/pwn" }
Run from PowerShell:
cd poc
.\run-revalidation.ps1
The supplied Docker runner uses a digest-pinned Node base, a committed npm integrity lock, disabled runtime networking, a benign control, a 90-second timeout, and cleanup enforcement.
Observed in the preserved identity-locked replay (1/1 attack and 1/1 negative control):
negative_before=02dc7d056c2f773e56e2c1849947888b039f127ddd630c0bd76a5d7a9ca29cbd
negative_after=02dc7d056c2f773e56e2c1849947888b039f127ddd630c0bd76a5d7a9ca29cbd
attack_before=7a8067bc04e42a025de90fd7aff9be4df59f005d192f2116eecfb107d7bffd78
attack_after=2992b399c1573c9bd2130794f8554c4026bf425861f74e78b5d89ae0324b5e38
outside_file_head=openapi: 3.0.0
inside_attack_files=
The benign version preserved the outside canary. The crafted version replaced it with emitted OpenAPI content, and no attack output file remained under tsp-output.
Impact and constraints
Proven impact is out-of-directory YAML/JSON creation or overwrite. The attacker can influence the traversal, final basename, and many strings in the OpenAPI-structured content. The extension is constrained to the selected emitter format, content is not arbitrary bytes, and the target must be writable.
This report demonstrates file corruption. Denial of service is a potential impact when a writable critical file is targeted. It does not claim file disclosure, arbitrary-byte write, deployment takeover, or code execution by a downstream consumer.
Suggested remediation
After every filename token has been interpolated, resolve the completed destination against emitterOutputDir and reject any non-descendant using path-component-aware comparison. Reject or slugify absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in spec-derived filename tokens. Add regression cases for POSIX and Windows separators, absolute values, sibling-prefix paths, and benign semantic versions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@typespec/openapi3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@typespec/compiler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:31:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `@typespec/openapi3` emitter retains the value of a `@versioned` enum member and interpolates it into the output filename as `{version}` without sanitizing path separators or traversal components. The completed path reaches the compiler\u0027s `emitFile()`, which creates the parent directory and writes the file without verifying containment under `emitterOutputDir`.\n\nA crafted declarative `.tsp` input can therefore create or overwrite an OpenAPI-formatted `.yaml` or `.json` file outside the configured output tree, subject to the compiler process\u0027s filesystem permissions. No executable TypeSpec extension or attacker-controlled JavaScript is required.\n\n### Affected version\n\nConfirmed on:\n\n- `@typespec/compiler` `1.15.0`\n- `@typespec/openapi3` `1.15.0`\n- `@typespec/http` `1.15.0`\n- `@typespec/versioning` `0.85.0`\n- release tag commit `f30cd352f93997e04c75d48c7ace6947a1d5d07a`\n\nThe critical `openapi.ts` and `emitter-utils.ts` blobs are unchanged on main commit `365ec52b50b82cd9e1e037de4c6fcd5de7e32e90` as checked on 2026-08-19. No patched version was identified.\n\n### Root cause\n\nThe value originates at `packages/openapi3/src/openapi.ts:592-608`:\n\n```ts\nserviceRecord.versions.push({\n service,\n version: snapshot.version!.value,\n document: document[0],\n diagnostics: document[1],\n});\n```\n\nIt is interpolated without path validation at `openapi.ts:629-641`:\n\n```ts\nreturn interpolatePath(options.outputFile, {\n \"openapi-version\": specVersion,\n \"service-name-if-multiple\": multipleService ? getNamespaceFullName(service.type) : undefined,\n \"service-name\": getNamespaceFullName(service.type),\n \"file-type\": fileType,\n version,\n});\n```\n\nThe path reaches `emitFile()` at `openapi.ts:392-401`. The sink at `packages/compiler/src/core/emitter-utils.ts:29-39` performs no output-root containment check:\n\n```ts\nconst outputFolder = getDirectoryPath(options.path);\nawait program.host.mkdirp(outputFolder);\nreturn await program.host.writeFile(options.path, content);\n```\n\n`resolvePath()` joins the template to `emitterOutputDir` before `{version}` is interpolated, so it does not see the attacker-controlled `..` components.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nThe relevant input in `poc/main.tsp` is:\n\n```tsp\n@versioned(Versions) namespace Svc;\nenum Versions { v1: \"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/TYPESPEC_PWNED/pwn\" }\n```\n\nRun from PowerShell:\n\n```powershell\ncd poc\n.\\run-revalidation.ps1\n```\n\nThe supplied Docker runner uses a digest-pinned Node base, a committed npm integrity lock, disabled runtime networking, a benign control, a 90-second timeout, and cleanup enforcement.\n\nObserved in the preserved identity-locked replay (`1/1` attack and `1/1` negative control):\n\n```text\nnegative_before=02dc7d056c2f773e56e2c1849947888b039f127ddd630c0bd76a5d7a9ca29cbd\nnegative_after=02dc7d056c2f773e56e2c1849947888b039f127ddd630c0bd76a5d7a9ca29cbd\nattack_before=7a8067bc04e42a025de90fd7aff9be4df59f005d192f2116eecfb107d7bffd78\nattack_after=2992b399c1573c9bd2130794f8554c4026bf425861f74e78b5d89ae0324b5e38\noutside_file_head=openapi: 3.0.0\ninside_attack_files=\n```\n\nThe benign version preserved the outside canary. The crafted version replaced it with emitted OpenAPI content, and no attack output file remained under `tsp-output`.\n\n### Impact and constraints\n\nProven impact is out-of-directory YAML/JSON creation or overwrite. The attacker can influence the traversal, final basename, and many strings in the OpenAPI-structured content. The extension is constrained to the selected emitter format, content is not arbitrary bytes, and the target must be writable.\n\nThis report demonstrates file corruption. Denial of service is a potential impact when a writable critical file is targeted. It does not claim file disclosure, arbitrary-byte write, deployment takeover, or code execution by a downstream consumer.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nAfter every filename token has been interpolated, resolve the completed destination against `emitterOutputDir` and reject any non-descendant using path-component-aware comparison. Reject or slugify absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in spec-derived filename tokens. Add regression cases for POSIX and Windows separators, absolute values, sibling-prefix paths, and benign semantic versions.",
"id": "GHSA-2q42-4q24-7rgv",
"modified": "2026-09-08T21:31:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T21:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/security/advisories/GHSA-2q42-4q24-7rgv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/pull/11777"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/e0f67bdf3c5a0875dfa98b475648af37caac71a6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenAPI3 version value escapes `emitterOutputDir` and overwrites YAML/JSON outside the output tree"
}
GHSA-2Q4P-F6GF-MQR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 20:53 – Updated: 2023-08-31 18:52A partial path traversal vulnerability exists in Graylog's Support Bundle feature. The vulnerability is caused by incorrect user input validation in an HTTP API resource.
Thanks to weiweiwei9811 for reporting this vulnerability and providing detailed information.
Impact
Graylog's Support Bundle feature allows an attacker with valid Admin role credentials to download or delete files in sibling directories of the support bundle directory.
The default data_dir in operating system packages (DEB, RPM) is set to /var/lib/graylog-server. The data directory for the Support Bundle feature is always <data_dir>/support-bundle.
Due to the partial path traversal vulnerability, an attacker with valid Admin role credentials can read or delete files in directories that start with a /var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundle directory name.
The vulnerability would allow the download or deletion of files in the following example directories.
/var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundle-test/var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundlesdirectory
For the Graylog and Graylog Enterprise Docker images, the data_dir is set to /usr/share/graylog/data by default.
Patches
The vulnerability is fixed in Graylog version 5.1.3 and later.
Workarounds
Block all HTTP requests to the following HTTP API endpoints by using a reverse proxy server in front of Graylog.
GET /api/system/debug/support/bundle/download/{filename}DELETE /api/system/debug/support/bundle/{filename}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41044"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-06T20:53:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A partial path traversal vulnerability exists in Graylog\u0027s [Support Bundle](https://go2docs.graylog.org/5-1/making_sense_of_your_log_data/cluster_support_bundle.htm) feature. The vulnerability is caused by incorrect user input validation in an HTTP API resource.\n\nThanks to weiweiwei9811 for reporting this vulnerability and providing detailed information.\n\n### Impact\n\nGraylog\u0027s Support Bundle feature allows an attacker with valid Admin role credentials to download or delete files in sibling directories of the support bundle directory.\n\nThe default `data_dir` in operating system packages (DEB, RPM) is set to `/var/lib/graylog-server`. The data directory for the Support Bundle feature is always `\u003cdata_dir\u003e/support-bundle`.\n\nDue to the partial path traversal vulnerability, an attacker with valid Admin role credentials can read or delete files in directories that start with a `/var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundle` directory name.\n\nThe vulnerability would allow the download or deletion of files in the following example directories.\n\n- `/var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundle-test`\n- `/var/lib/graylog-server/support-bundlesdirectory`\n\nFor the [Graylog](https://hub.docker.com/r/graylog/graylog) and [Graylog Enterprise](https://hub.docker.com/r/graylog/graylog-enterprise) Docker images, the `data_dir` is set to `/usr/share/graylog/data` by default.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed in Graylog version 5.1.3 and later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n\nBlock all HTTP requests to the following HTTP API endpoints by using a reverse proxy server in front of Graylog.\n\n- `GET /api/system/debug/support/bundle/download/{filename}`\n- `DELETE /api/system/debug/support/bundle/{filename}`\n",
"id": "GHSA-2q4p-f6gf-mqr5",
"modified": "2023-08-31T18:52:56Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T20:53:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-2q4p-f6gf-mqr5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/02b8792e6f4b829f0c1d87fcbf2d58b73458b938"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://go2docs.graylog.org/5-1/making_sense_of_your_log_data/cluster_support_bundle.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Graylog server has partial path traversal vulnerability in Support Bundle feature"
}
GHSA-2Q58-XP4P-XPQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-14 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:38IBM Security Directory Server 6.4.0 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially-crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 228582.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33165"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-14T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM Security Directory Server 6.4.0 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially-crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 228582.",
"id": "GHSA-2q58-xp4p-xpqc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:38:41Z",
"published": "2023-10-14T15:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/228582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7047116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7047428"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q5F-V38G-C39X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-04 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-04 15:32The WPvivid — Backup, Migration & Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.138 does not properly validate a backup storage directory path before using it to create directories and write files, allowing administrators to cause those directories and files to be created outside the intended backup location via path traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T06:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WPvivid \u2014 Backup, Migration \u0026 Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.138 does not properly validate a backup storage directory path before using it to create directories and write files, allowing administrators to cause those directories and files to be created outside the intended backup location via path traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-2q5f-v38g-c39x",
"modified": "2026-11-04T15:32:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-04T06:32:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/c12a6832-81c3-4bae-93a9-3a51ff986863"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q5G-F96X-5FQW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:33Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in Advanced Product Fields Extended for WooCommerce <= 3.1.6 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81789"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T15:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in Advanced Product Fields Extended for WooCommerce \u003c= 3.1.6 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-2q5g-f96x-5fqw",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:33:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T15:33:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81789"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/advanced-product-fields-for-woocommerce-extended/vulnerability/wordpress-advanced-product-fields-extended-for-woocommerce-plugin-3-1-6-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q5X-XFGF-96MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-15 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-17 06:30The Netic User Export add-on before 1.3.5 for Atlassian Confluence has the functionality to generate a list of users in the application, and export it. During export, the HTTP request has a fileName parameter that accepts any file on the system (e.g., an SSH private key) to be downloaded.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-15T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Netic User Export add-on before 1.3.5 for Atlassian Confluence has the functionality to generate a list of users in the application, and export it. During export, the HTTP request has a fileName parameter that accepts any file on the system (e.g., an SSH private key) to be downloaded.",
"id": "GHSA-2q5x-xfgf-96mf",
"modified": "2022-11-17T06:30:20Z",
"published": "2022-11-15T12:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/CveCt0r/34251664a511f1045ce6a5492e94eec1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q65-C69R-5V5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00The sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT repository before 2022-05-03 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT repository before 2022-05-03 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-2q65-c69r-5v5v",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT/pull/11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q6P-C398-62RM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:24In kerfuffle/jobs.cpp in KDE Ark before 20.08.0, a crafted archive can install files outside the extraction directory via ../ directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In kerfuffle/jobs.cpp in KDE Ark before 20.08.0, a crafted archive can install files outside the extraction directory via ../ directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-2q6p-c398-62rm",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:24:52Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:24:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/KDE/ark/commits/master"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://invent.kde.org/utilities/ark/-/commit/0df592524fed305d6fbe74ddf8a196bc9ffdb92f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kde.org/info/security/advisory-20200730-1.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/05/msg00026.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PMVXSQNCBILVSJLX32ODNU6KUY2X7HRM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PYRKQKUVU45ANH5TFYCYZN6HVP34N3UL"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202008-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4461-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-08/msg00023.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.