CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
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updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16059 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JPH2-4993-V6WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:34 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:34Directory traversal vulnerability in the Shared Folders feature for VMWare ACE 1.0.2 and 2.0.2, Player 1.0.4 and 2.0.2, and Workstation 5.5.4 and 6.0.2 allows guest OS users to read and write arbitrary files on the host OS via a multibyte string that produces a wide character string containing .. (dot dot) sequences, which bypasses the protection mechanism, as demonstrated using a "%c0%2e%c0%2e" string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-02-26T00:44:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Shared Folders feature for VMWare ACE 1.0.2 and 2.0.2, Player 1.0.4 and 2.0.2, and Workstation 5.5.4 and 6.0.2 allows guest OS users to read and write arbitrary files on the host OS via a multibyte string that produces a wide character string containing .. (dot dot) sequences, which bypasses the protection mechanism, as demonstrated using a \"%c0%2e%c0%2e\" string.",
"id": "GHSA-jph2-4993-v6wc",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:34:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:34:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/40837"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search.do?language=en_US\u0026cmd=displayKC\u0026externalId=1004034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2008-February/060457.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.vmware.com/pipermail/security-announce/2008/000008.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.coresecurity.com/?action=item\u0026id=2129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/488725/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/489739/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27944"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1019493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2008-0005.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/support/ace2/doc/releasenotes_ace2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/support/player/doc/releasenotes_player.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/support/player2/doc/releasenotes_player2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/support/ws55/doc/releasenotes_ws55.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vmware.com/support/ws6/doc/releasenotes_ws6.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/0679"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/0905/references"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JPH2-X4QR-27HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:52 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:52ProjectSend (formerly cFTP) r582 allows directory traversal via file=../ in the process-zip-download.php query string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10733"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-10-29T12:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "ProjectSend (formerly cFTP) r582 allows directory traversal via file=../ in the process-zip-download.php query string.",
"id": "GHSA-jph2-x4qr-27hc",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:52:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:52:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10733"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sandboxescape/ProjectSend-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JPHM-G89M-V42P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-02 21:59 – Updated: 2021-08-30 23:21An issue was discovered in Grafana Cortex through 1.9.0. The header value X-Scope-OrgID is used to construct file paths for rules files, and if crafted to conduct directory traversal such as ae ../../sensitive/path/in/deployment pathname, then Cortex will attempt to parse a rules file at that location and include some of the contents in the error message. (Other Cortex API requests can also be sent a malicious OrgID header, e.g., tricking the ingester into writing metrics to a different location, but the effect is nuisance rather than information disclosure.)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cortexproject/cortex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-36157"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-04T18:31:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-03T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Grafana Cortex through 1.9.0. The header value X-Scope-OrgID is used to construct file paths for rules files, and if crafted to conduct directory traversal such as ae ../../sensitive/path/in/deployment pathname, then Cortex will attempt to parse a rules file at that location and include some of the contents in the error message. (Other Cortex API requests can also be sent a malicious OrgID header, e.g., tricking the ingester into writing metrics to a different location, but the effect is nuisance rather than information disclosure.)",
"id": "GHSA-jphm-g89m-v42p",
"modified": "2021-08-30T23:21:48Z",
"published": "2021-09-02T21:59:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36157"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex/pull/4375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex/commit/d9e1f81f40c607b9e97c2fc6db70ae54679917c4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cortexproject/cortex"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Path traversal in Grafana Cortex"
}
GHSA-JPJP-VXV6-59HM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-23 20:41 – Updated: 2023-09-11 23:12Affected versions of open-device resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "open-device"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16187"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:44:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `open-device` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-jpjp-vxv6-59hm",
"modified": "2023-09-11T23:12:30Z",
"published": "2018-07-23T20:41:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/open-device"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jpjp-vxv6-59hm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/447"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in open-device"
}
GHSA-JPQC-C443-HW5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-25 21:31 – Updated: 2024-06-25 21:31In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1.3, an unauthenticated Path Traversal vulnerability exists Wug.UI.Areas.Wug.Controllers.SessionController.LoadNMScript. This allows allows reading of any file from the applications web-root directory .
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5018"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-25T21:16:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1.3, an unauthenticated Path Traversal vulnerability exists Wug.UI.Areas.Wug.Controllers.SessionController.LoadNMScript. This allows allows reading of any file from the applications web-root directory .",
"id": "GHSA-jpqc-c443-hw5c",
"modified": "2024-06-25T21:31:18Z",
"published": "2024-06-25T21:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WhatsUp-Gold-Security-Bulletin-June-2024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JPQM-4942-9WPM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:11 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:11Directory Traversal in Skycaiji v1.3 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via the component 'index.php?m=admin&c=Tool&a=log&file=D%3A%5CphpStudy%5CWWW%5Cindex.php'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-18878"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-20T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal in Skycaiji v1.3 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via the component \u0027index.php?m=admin\u0026c=Tool\u0026a=log\u0026file=D%3A%5CphpStudy%5CWWW%5Cindex.php\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-jpqm-4942-9wpm",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:11:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:11:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-18878"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zorlan/skycaiji/issues/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JPRG-RPPQ-7HJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-09 18:31ColdFusion versions 2025.3, 2023.15, 2021.21 and earlier are affected by an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Scope is changed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54261"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T17:15:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "ColdFusion versions 2025.3, 2023.15, 2021.21 and earlier are affected by an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution by an attacker. Scope is changed.",
"id": "GHSA-jprg-rppq-7hjg",
"modified": "2025-09-09T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion/apsb25-93.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JPVW-P8PR-9G2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-28 21:30 – Updated: 2024-12-06 18:06An absolute path traversal attack exists in the Ansible automation platform. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious Ansible role and make the victim execute the role. A symlink can be used to overwrite a file outside of the extraction path.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-36"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-29T18:19:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-18T14:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An absolute path traversal attack exists in the Ansible automation platform. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious Ansible role and make the victim execute the role. A symlink can be used to overwrite a file outside of the extraction path.",
"id": "GHSA-jpvw-p8pr-9g2x",
"modified": "2024-12-06T18:06:32Z",
"published": "2023-12-28T21:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/1e930684bc0a76ec3d094cd326738ad26416541c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-5115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2233810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible-community/ansible-build-data/blob/16d36538b96c65d9e0e28d89781361b69857ac0e/8/CHANGELOG-v8.rst#L221"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/12/msg00018.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ansible symlink attack vulnerability"
}
GHSA-JPW9-MHJF-P23H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:27 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:27Directory traversal vulnerability in error.php in Uebimiau Webmail 2.7.10 and 2.7.2 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the selected_theme parameter, a different vector than CVE-2007-3172.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-08T19:46:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in error.php in Uebimiau Webmail 2.7.10 and 2.7.2 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the selected_theme parameter, a different vector than CVE-2007-3172.",
"id": "GHSA-jpw9-mhjf-p23h",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:27:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:27:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2008-January/001867.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27154"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JQ29-C7V8-RG55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:34 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:34Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() allows an authenticated user with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files on the server. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename using Utils::checkFilename(), while the directory path (which may contain ../ sequences) is preserved and passed unvalidated to unlink(). This enables directory escape from the intended media storage path.
Severity
High (8.1) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Details
In system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php, the deleteFile() method (lines 332-365) performs filename validation only on the basename, not the full path:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Line 339-340: Only the BASENAME is validated
$basename = $filesystem->basename($filename); // e.g. "evil.jpg" from "../../evil.jpg"
if (!Utils::checkFilename($basename)) { // passes - no traversal in basename
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
$path = $settings['destination'] ?? $this->getPath();
// ...
// Line 353: Full pathname (with traversal) is preserved
$pathname = $filesystem->pathname($filename); // "../../"
// Line 356-357: Traversal path reconstructed
[$base, $ext,,] = $this->getFileParts($basename);
$name = "{$pathname}{$base}.{$ext}"; // "../../evil.jpg"
// Line 360: Passed to doRemove()
$this->doRemove($name, $path);
}
doRemove() (line 521-582) then calls:
// Line 538
unlink("{$folder}/{$filename}");
// e.g. unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../config/system.yaml")
Utils::checkFilename() (lines 1022-1044) properly checks for /, \, and .., but it is applied to $filesystem->basename($filename) (the last path component only), so traversal sequences in the directory portion are never validated.
Data flow from user input
The vulnerability is reachable through the Flex media handling pipeline:
FlexMediaTrait::setUpdatedMedia()(line 386) iterates form flash data where$filenameis the array key - user-controlled- For file deletions (
$fileis null, line 396), NO upload validation is performed (thecheckUploadedFile()call at line 401 only executes when$fileis truthy) - The raw filename is stored in
$this->_uploadsat line 414 saveUpdatedMedia()(line 499) calls$media->deleteFile($filename, $settings)with the unsanitized filename
Sibling: renameFile()
The same pattern exists in renameFile() (lines 374-405) which has even weaker validation - it performs NO checkFilename() call at all. While renameFile() currently has no callers in the core codebase, it is part of the public MediaUploadInterface and should be fixed as defense-in-depth.
Proof of Concept
Environment: Grav CMS 2.0.16 with admin plugin
The attack requires an authenticated admin user with page/media editing permissions (not super-admin).
- Create a target file:
echo "DELETE_ME" > /var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt
- Submit a Flex object form (e.g. page edit) with a crafted media deletion where the filename key contains path traversal:
POST /admin/pages/mypage/task:save
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
# The form flash data includes a media deletion entry with key:
# "../../data/target.txt" -> null (deletion marker)
- When
saveUpdatedMedia()processes the deletion queue: $filename=../../data/target.txtdeleteFile("../../data/target.txt")is called$basename=target.txt(passescheckFilename())$pathname=../../data/$name=../../data/target.txtdoRemove()callsunlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../data/target.txt")-
Which resolves to
unlink("/var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt") -
The file is deleted outside the intended media directory.
Impact
An authenticated user with media management permissions can:
- Delete configuration files (user/config/system.yaml, user/config/security.yaml)
- Delete other pages' content files
- Delete authentication-related files (user account YAML files)
- Cause denial of service by removing critical application files
- Potentially escalate privileges by removing security configuration
Suggested Fix
Apply Utils::checkFilename() to the full $filename parameter before decomposing it, or reject any filename containing directory separators or .. sequences:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Validate the FULL filename, not just the basename
if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) {
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
// ... rest unchanged
}
The same fix should be applied to renameFile() for both $from and $to parameters.
References
- Vulnerable file:
system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.phplines 332-365, 521-582 - Caller:
system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/Traits/FlexMediaTrait.phplines 386-414, 490-499 - Sibling:
system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.phplines 374-405 (renameFile) - Related GHSA: GHSA-g6j3-8jv9-ch5f (path traversal in PagesController::batchCopy - different file, same bug class)
Disclosure
This vulnerability was discovered using AI-assisted security research tools.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:34:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion\n\n## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in `MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile()` allows an authenticated user with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files on the server. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename using `Utils::checkFilename()`, while the directory path (which may contain `../` sequences) is preserved and passed unvalidated to `unlink()`. This enables directory escape from the intended media storage path.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High (8.1)** - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H\n\n## CWE\n\nCWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\n## Details\n\nIn `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php`, the `deleteFile()` method (lines 332-365) performs filename validation only on the basename, not the full path:\n\n```php\npublic function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void\n{\n $settings = $this-\u003egetUploadSettings($settings);\n $filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);\n\n // Line 339-340: Only the BASENAME is validated\n $basename = $filesystem-\u003ebasename($filename); // e.g. \"evil.jpg\" from \"../../evil.jpg\"\n if (!Utils::checkFilename($basename)) { // passes - no traversal in basename\n throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);\n }\n\n $path = $settings[\u0027destination\u0027] ?? $this-\u003egetPath();\n // ...\n\n // Line 353: Full pathname (with traversal) is preserved\n $pathname = $filesystem-\u003epathname($filename); // \"../../\"\n\n // Line 356-357: Traversal path reconstructed\n [$base, $ext,,] = $this-\u003egetFileParts($basename);\n $name = \"{$pathname}{$base}.{$ext}\"; // \"../../evil.jpg\"\n\n // Line 360: Passed to doRemove()\n $this-\u003edoRemove($name, $path);\n}\n```\n\n`doRemove()` (line 521-582) then calls:\n\n```php\n// Line 538\nunlink(\"{$folder}/{$filename}\");\n// e.g. unlink(\"/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../config/system.yaml\")\n```\n\n`Utils::checkFilename()` (lines 1022-1044) properly checks for `/`, `\\`, and `..`, but it is applied to `$filesystem-\u003ebasename($filename)` (the last path component only), so traversal sequences in the directory portion are never validated.\n\n### Data flow from user input\n\nThe vulnerability is reachable through the Flex media handling pipeline:\n\n1. `FlexMediaTrait::setUpdatedMedia()` (line 386) iterates form flash data where `$filename` is the array key - user-controlled\n2. For file deletions (`$file` is null, line 396), NO upload validation is performed (the `checkUploadedFile()` call at line 401 only executes when `$file` is truthy)\n3. The raw filename is stored in `$this-\u003e_uploads` at line 414\n4. `saveUpdatedMedia()` (line 499) calls `$media-\u003edeleteFile($filename, $settings)` with the unsanitized filename\n\n### Sibling: renameFile()\n\nThe same pattern exists in `renameFile()` (lines 374-405) which has even weaker validation - it performs NO `checkFilename()` call at all. While `renameFile()` currently has no callers in the core codebase, it is part of the public `MediaUploadInterface` and should be fixed as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Environment**: Grav CMS 2.0.16 with admin plugin\n\nThe attack requires an authenticated admin user with page/media editing permissions (not super-admin).\n\n1. Create a target file:\n```bash\necho \"DELETE_ME\" \u003e /var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt\n```\n\n2. Submit a Flex object form (e.g. page edit) with a crafted media deletion where the filename key contains path traversal:\n\n```\nPOST /admin/pages/mypage/task:save\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data\n\n# The form flash data includes a media deletion entry with key:\n# \"../../data/target.txt\" -\u003e null (deletion marker)\n```\n\n3. When `saveUpdatedMedia()` processes the deletion queue:\n - `$filename` = `../../data/target.txt`\n - `deleteFile(\"../../data/target.txt\")` is called\n - `$basename` = `target.txt` (passes `checkFilename()`)\n - `$pathname` = `../../data/`\n - `$name` = `../../data/target.txt`\n - `doRemove()` calls `unlink(\"/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../data/target.txt\")`\n - Which resolves to `unlink(\"/var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt\")`\n\n4. The file is deleted outside the intended media directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with media management permissions can:\n- Delete configuration files (`user/config/system.yaml`, `user/config/security.yaml`)\n- Delete other pages\u0027 content files\n- Delete authentication-related files (user account YAML files)\n- Cause denial of service by removing critical application files\n- Potentially escalate privileges by removing security configuration\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply `Utils::checkFilename()` to the full `$filename` parameter before decomposing it, or reject any filename containing directory separators or `..` sequences:\n\n```php\npublic function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void\n{\n $settings = $this-\u003egetUploadSettings($settings);\n $filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);\n\n // Validate the FULL filename, not just the basename\n if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) {\n throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);\n }\n\n // ... rest unchanged\n}\n```\n\nThe same fix should be applied to `renameFile()` for both `$from` and `$to` parameters.\n\n## References\n\n- Vulnerable file: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 332-365, 521-582\n- Caller: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/Traits/FlexMediaTrait.php` lines 386-414, 490-499\n- Sibling: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 374-405 (renameFile)\n- Related GHSA: GHSA-g6j3-8jv9-ch5f (path traversal in PagesController::batchCopy - different file, same bug class)\n\n## Disclosure\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered using AI-assisted security research tools.",
"id": "GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:34:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:34:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72695"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-path-traversal-via-mediauploadtrait-deletefile"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.