CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13217 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PW36-82XR-G6RW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:55SeaCMS V12.9 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file write vulnerability via the component admin_weixin.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-44172"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T15:19:38Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "SeaCMS V12.9 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file write vulnerability via the component admin_weixin.php.",
"id": "GHSA-pw36-82xr-g6rw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:55:34Z",
"published": "2023-09-27T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/H3ppo/vulnerabilities/blob/main/SeaCMS%20V12.9%20Arbitrary%20file%20write%20vulnerability.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW38-42W8-QM8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-24 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:39In JetBrains Ktor before 2.3.0 path traversal in the resolveResource method was possible
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48476"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-35"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-24T13:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In JetBrains Ktor before 2.3.0 path traversal in the `resolveResource` method was possible\n",
"id": "GHSA-pw38-42w8-qm8m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:39:08Z",
"published": "2023-04-24T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW4J-XHWF-VGMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-02-27 06:31A weakness has been identified in Sanluan PublicCMS 6.202506.d. This impacts the function saveMetadata of the file TemplateCacheComponent.java of the component Template Cache Generation. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T05:18:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in Sanluan PublicCMS 6.202506.d. This impacts the function saveMetadata of the file TemplateCacheComponent.java of the component Template Cache Generation. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-pw4j-xhwf-vgmr",
"modified": "2026-02-27T06:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T06:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.348017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.348017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.759109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.yuque.com/la12138/pa2fpb/wdggytgi4vhl93zd?singleDoc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW4V-X838-W5PG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 16:43 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:33Summary
The HLS streaming endpoint (view/hls.php) is vulnerable to a path traversal attack that allows an unauthenticated attacker to stream any private or paid video on the platform. The videoDirectory GET parameter is used in two divergent code paths — one for authorization (which truncates at the first / segment) and one for file access (which preserves .. traversal sequences) — creating a split-oracle condition where authorization is checked against one video while content is served from another.
Details
The vulnerability is a split-oracle between the authorization lookup and the filesystem path construction. When hls.php receives a request, it processes $_GET['videoDirectory'] through two independent functions that interpret the input differently.
Step 1 — Authorization lookup truncates at first path segment (objects/video.php:1685-1688):
public static function getVideoFromFileName($fileName, $ignoreGroup = false, $ignoreTags = false)
{
// ...
$parts = explode("/", $fileName);
if (!empty($parts[0])) {
$fileName = $parts[0]; // Only takes first segment
}
$fileName = self::getCleanFilenameFromFile($fileName);
// ...
$sql = "SELECT id FROM videos WHERE filename = ? LIMIT 1";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "s", [$fileName]);
For input public_video/../private_video, explode("/", ...) yields ["public_video", "..", "private_video"] and only public_video is used for the DB query. The authorization check at hls.php:73 then runs against this public video:
if (isAVideoUserAgent() || ... || User::canWatchVideo($video['id']) || ...) {
Step 2 — File path construction preserves the traversal (objects/video.php:4622-4638):
public static function getPathToFile($videoFilename, $createDir = false)
{
$videosDir = self::getStoragePath();
$videoFilename = str_replace($videosDir, '', $videoFilename);
$paths = Video::getPaths($videoFilename, $createDir);
if (preg_match('/index(_offline)?.(m3u8|mp4|mp3)$/', $videoFilename)) {
$paths['path'] = rtrim($paths['path'], DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR);
$paths['path'] = rtrim($paths['path'], '/');
$videoFilename = str_replace($paths['relative'], '', $videoFilename);
$videoFilename = str_replace($paths['filename'], '', $videoFilename);
}
$newPath = addLastSlash($paths['path']) . "{$videoFilename}";
$newPath = str_replace('//', '/', $newPath);
return $newPath;
}
getPaths extracts the clean filename (e.g., public_video) to build the base path /videos/public_video/. Then str_replace($paths['filename'], '', $videoFilename) replaces only the clean name from the full input, leaving the traversal intact: /../private_video/index.m3u8. The concatenation at line 4634 produces /videos/public_video/../private_video/index.m3u8, which the OS resolves to /videos/private_video/index.m3u8.
No mitigations exist in the path:
- fixPath() (objects/functionsFile.php:1116) only normalizes slashes, does not filter ..
- No realpath() call anywhere in the chain
- No .. filtering on the videoDirectory parameter
- The traversal is in a query parameter, not the URL path, so web server path normalization does not apply
PoC
Prerequisites: An AVideo instance with at least one public video (filename: public_video) and one private/paid video (filename: private_video).
Step 1 — Confirm the private video is inaccessible directly:
curl -s "https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=private_video" \
| head -5
# Expected: "HLS.php Can not see video [ID] (private_video) cannot watch (ID)"
Step 2 — Exploit the split-oracle to stream the private video:
curl -s "https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.apple.mpegurl"
# Expected: Valid M3U8 playlist containing private_video's HLS segments
Step 3 — Stream the private video content using the returned playlist:
# The M3U8 response contains segment URLs; use ffmpeg or any HLS player:
ffmpeg -i "https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video" \
-c copy stolen_video.mp4
The authorization check passes because it resolves public_video (the public video), while the file system serves private_video's HLS stream.
Impact
- Any unauthenticated user can stream any private, unlisted, or paid video on the platform by knowing or guessing its filename directory.
- Paid content bypass: Monetized videos protected by pay-per-view or subscription gates can be streamed for free.
- Privacy violation: Videos marked as private or restricted to specific user groups are fully accessible.
- Content theft at scale: Video filenames follow predictable patterns (e.g.,
video_YYYYMMDD_XXXXX), enabling enumeration. An attacker only needs one publicly accessible video to pivot to any other video on the instance. - This affects all AVideo instances with at least one public video, which is the default configuration for any content platform.
Recommended Fix
Sanitize the videoDirectory parameter to reject path traversal sequences before any processing occurs. Apply this fix at the top of view/hls.php:
// view/hls.php — after line 16, before line 17
if (empty($_GET['videoDirectory'])) {
forbiddenPage("No directory set");
}
// ADD: Reject path traversal attempts
$_GET['videoDirectory'] = str_replace('\\', '/', $_GET['videoDirectory']);
if (preg_match('/\.\./', $_GET['videoDirectory'])) {
forbiddenPage("Invalid directory");
}
// Normalize: strip leading/trailing slashes, collapse multiples
$_GET['videoDirectory'] = trim($_GET['videoDirectory'], '/');
$_GET['videoDirectory'] = preg_replace('#/+#', '/', $_GET['videoDirectory']);
Additionally, add a realpath() check in getPathToFile as defense-in-depth (objects/video.php:4636):
$newPath = str_replace('//', '/', $newPath);
// ADD: Verify resolved path stays within videos directory
$realPath = realpath($newPath);
$realVideosDir = realpath($videosDir);
if ($realPath === false || strpos($realPath, $realVideosDir) !== 0) {
return false;
}
return $newPath;
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T16:43:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T17:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe HLS streaming endpoint (`view/hls.php`) is vulnerable to a path traversal attack that allows an unauthenticated attacker to stream any private or paid video on the platform. The `videoDirectory` GET parameter is used in two divergent code paths \u2014 one for authorization (which truncates at the first `/` segment) and one for file access (which preserves `..` traversal sequences) \u2014 creating a split-oracle condition where authorization is checked against one video while content is served from another.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is a split-oracle between the authorization lookup and the filesystem path construction. When `hls.php` receives a request, it processes `$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]` through two independent functions that interpret the input differently.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authorization lookup truncates at first path segment** (`objects/video.php:1685-1688`):\n\n```php\npublic static function getVideoFromFileName($fileName, $ignoreGroup = false, $ignoreTags = false)\n{\n // ...\n $parts = explode(\"/\", $fileName);\n if (!empty($parts[0])) {\n $fileName = $parts[0]; // Only takes first segment\n }\n $fileName = self::getCleanFilenameFromFile($fileName);\n // ...\n $sql = \"SELECT id FROM videos WHERE filename = ? LIMIT 1\";\n $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"s\", [$fileName]);\n```\n\nFor input `public_video/../private_video`, `explode(\"/\", ...)` yields `[\"public_video\", \"..\", \"private_video\"]` and only `public_video` is used for the DB query. The authorization check at `hls.php:73` then runs against this public video:\n\n```php\nif (isAVideoUserAgent() || ... || User::canWatchVideo($video[\u0027id\u0027]) || ...) {\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 File path construction preserves the traversal** (`objects/video.php:4622-4638`):\n\n```php\npublic static function getPathToFile($videoFilename, $createDir = false)\n{\n $videosDir = self::getStoragePath();\n $videoFilename = str_replace($videosDir, \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n $paths = Video::getPaths($videoFilename, $createDir);\n if (preg_match(\u0027/index(_offline)?.(m3u8|mp4|mp3)$/\u0027, $videoFilename)) {\n $paths[\u0027path\u0027] = rtrim($paths[\u0027path\u0027], DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR);\n $paths[\u0027path\u0027] = rtrim($paths[\u0027path\u0027], \u0027/\u0027);\n $videoFilename = str_replace($paths[\u0027relative\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n $videoFilename = str_replace($paths[\u0027filename\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename);\n }\n $newPath = addLastSlash($paths[\u0027path\u0027]) . \"{$videoFilename}\";\n $newPath = str_replace(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $newPath);\n return $newPath;\n}\n```\n\n`getPaths` extracts the clean filename (e.g., `public_video`) to build the base path `/videos/public_video/`. Then `str_replace($paths[\u0027filename\u0027], \u0027\u0027, $videoFilename)` replaces only the clean name from the full input, leaving the traversal intact: `/../private_video/index.m3u8`. The concatenation at line 4634 produces `/videos/public_video/../private_video/index.m3u8`, which the OS resolves to `/videos/private_video/index.m3u8`.\n\n**No mitigations exist in the path:**\n- `fixPath()` (`objects/functionsFile.php:1116`) only normalizes slashes, does not filter `..`\n- No `realpath()` call anywhere in the chain\n- No `..` filtering on the `videoDirectory` parameter\n- The traversal is in a query parameter, not the URL path, so web server path normalization does not apply\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An AVideo instance with at least one public video (filename: `public_video`) and one private/paid video (filename: `private_video`).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm the private video is inaccessible directly:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=private_video\" \\\n | head -5\n# Expected: \"HLS.php Can not see video [ID] (private_video) cannot watch (ID)\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Exploit the split-oracle to stream the private video:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video\" \\\n -H \"Accept: application/vnd.apple.mpegurl\"\n# Expected: Valid M3U8 playlist containing private_video\u0027s HLS segments\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Stream the private video content using the returned playlist:**\n\n```bash\n# The M3U8 response contains segment URLs; use ffmpeg or any HLS player:\nffmpeg -i \"https://target.com/view/hls.php?videoDirectory=public_video/../private_video\" \\\n -c copy stolen_video.mp4\n```\n\nThe authorization check passes because it resolves `public_video` (the public video), while the file system serves `private_video`\u0027s HLS stream.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Any unauthenticated user** can stream any private, unlisted, or paid video on the platform by knowing or guessing its filename directory.\n- **Paid content bypass:** Monetized videos protected by pay-per-view or subscription gates can be streamed for free.\n- **Privacy violation:** Videos marked as private or restricted to specific user groups are fully accessible.\n- **Content theft at scale:** Video filenames follow predictable patterns (e.g., `video_YYYYMMDD_XXXXX`), enabling enumeration. An attacker only needs one publicly accessible video to pivot to any other video on the instance.\n- This affects all AVideo instances with at least one public video, which is the default configuration for any content platform.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize the `videoDirectory` parameter to reject path traversal sequences before any processing occurs. Apply this fix at the top of `view/hls.php`:\n\n```php\n// view/hls.php \u2014 after line 16, before line 17\nif (empty($_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027])) {\n forbiddenPage(\"No directory set\");\n}\n\n// ADD: Reject path traversal attempts\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = str_replace(\u0027\\\\\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]);\nif (preg_match(\u0027/\\.\\./\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027])) {\n forbiddenPage(\"Invalid directory\");\n}\n// Normalize: strip leading/trailing slashes, collapse multiples\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = trim($_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027], \u0027/\u0027);\n$_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027] = preg_replace(\u0027#/+#\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $_GET[\u0027videoDirectory\u0027]);\n```\n\nAdditionally, add a `realpath()` check in `getPathToFile` as defense-in-depth (`objects/video.php:4636`):\n\n```php\n$newPath = str_replace(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027, $newPath);\n// ADD: Verify resolved path stays within videos directory\n$realPath = realpath($newPath);\n$realVideosDir = realpath($videosDir);\nif ($realPath === false || strpos($realPath, $realVideosDir) !== 0) {\n return false;\n}\nreturn $newPath;\n```",
"id": "GHSA-pw4v-x838-w5pg",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:33:42Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T16:43:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-pw4v-x838-w5pg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bc034066281085af00e64b0d7b81d8a025a928c4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an Authorization Bypass via Path Traversal in HLS Endpoint Allows Streaming Private/Paid Videos"
}
GHSA-PW5V-23MC-8W39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:31Path Traversal in Ivanti Avalanche before version 6.4.7 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information. This CVE addresses incomplete fixes from CVE-2024-47011.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T17:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Path Traversal in Ivanti Avalanche before version 6.4.7 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information. This CVE addresses incomplete fixes from CVE-2024-47011.",
"id": "GHSA-pw5v-23mc-8w39",
"modified": "2025-01-14T18:31:59Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T18:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Avalanche-6-4-7-Multiple-CVEs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW5V-J24X-GVJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:11Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco Enterprise Content Delivery System (ECDS) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted URL, aka Bug ID CSCuo90148.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-8019"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-20T00:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco Enterprise Content Delivery System (ECDS) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted URL, aka Bug ID CSCuo90148.",
"id": "GHSA-pw5v-j24x-gvj8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:11:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:11:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityNotice/CVE-2014-8019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1031417"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PW74-PGQ8-HRJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:46 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:36Directory traversal vulnerability in unzip/extract feature in eXtplorer 2.1.9 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in an archive file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-4313"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-24T18:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in unzip/extract feature in eXtplorer 2.1.9 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in an archive file.",
"id": "GHSA-pw74-pgq8-hrj7",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:36:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:46:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4313"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39816"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/EXTPLORER-ARCHIVE-PATH-TRAVERSAL.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/137031/eXtplorer-2.1.9-Path-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/538386/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98069"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW78-8HH6-2H2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:48 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:58An issue was discovered on Vera VeraEdge 1.7.19 and Veralite 1.7.481 devices. The device provides UPnP services that are available on port 3480 and can also be accessed via port 80 using the url "/port_3480". It seems that the UPnP services provide "file" as one of the service actions for a normal user to read a file that is stored under the /etc/cmh-lu folder. It retrieves the value from the "parameters" query string variable and then passes it to an internal function "FileUtils::ReadFileIntoBuffer" which is a library function that does not perform any sanitization on the value submitted and this allows an attacker to use directory traversal characters "../" and read files from other folders within the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-9382"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-17T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on Vera VeraEdge 1.7.19 and Veralite 1.7.481 devices. The device provides UPnP services that are available on port 3480 and can also be accessed via port 80 using the url \"/port_3480\". It seems that the UPnP services provide \"file\" as one of the service actions for a normal user to read a file that is stored under the /etc/cmh-lu folder. It retrieves the value from the \"parameters\" query string variable and then passes it to an internal function \"FileUtils::ReadFileIntoBuffer\" which is a library function that does not perform any sanitization on the value submitted and this allows an attacker to use directory traversal characters \"../\" and read files from other folders within the device.",
"id": "GHSA-pw78-8hh6-2h2j",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:58:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:48:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9382"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Vera_sec_issues.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153242/Veralite-Veraedge-Router-XSS-Command-Injection-CSRF-Traversal.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PWF5-HG39-G9G9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 09:30 – Updated: 2026-06-26 09:30An unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability exists in get_fcont.cgi in GeoVision GV-LPC2011 and GV-LPC2211 V1.12 and earlier. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of user-supplied file path input before the requested file is accessed by the CGI component. A remote attacker may exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to read arbitrary files accessible to the affected process, resulting in information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57872"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T08:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated\ndirectory traversal vulnerability exists in get_fcont.cgi in GeoVision\nGV-LPC2011 and GV-LPC2211 V1.12 and earlier. The vulnerability is caused by\ninsufficient validation of user-supplied file path input before the requested\nfile is accessed by the CGI component. A remote attacker may exploit this\nvulnerability by sending a crafted request to read arbitrary files accessible\nto the affected process, resulting in information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-pwf5-hg39-g9g9",
"modified": "2026-06-26T09:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T09:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.geovision.com.tw/cyber_security.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PWFC-QM9R-P6H4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 00:31Hermes WebUI contains an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the /api/session/delete endpoint that allows authenticated attackers to delete files outside the session directory by supplying an absolute path or path traversal payload in the session_id parameter. Attackers can exploit unvalidated session identifiers to construct paths that bypass the SESSION_DIR boundary and delete writable JSON files on the host system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6832"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hermes WebUI contains an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the /api/session/delete endpoint that allows authenticated attackers to delete files outside the session directory by supplying an absolute path or path traversal payload in the session_id parameter. Attackers can exploit unvalidated session identifiers to construct paths that bypass the SESSION_DIR boundary and delete writable JSON files on the host system.",
"id": "GHSA-pwfc-qm9r-p6h4",
"modified": "2026-04-22T00:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T00:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/pull/409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/pull/412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/commit/3cc5839bf303fa6758bfdac538507407a2929655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/releases/tag/v0.50.132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui/releases/tag/v0.50.32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nesquena-hermes-webui-arbitrary-file-deletion-via-unvalidated-session-id"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.