CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13220 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PJX3-2523-W68G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:28The specific function in ASUS BMC’s firmware Web management page (Delete SOL video file function) does not filter the specific parameter. As obtaining the administrator permission, remote attackers can use the means of path traversal to access system files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-28205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-06T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The specific function in ASUS BMC\u2019s firmware Web management page (Delete SOL video file function) does not filter the specific parameter. As obtaining the administrator permission, remote attackers can use the means of path traversal to access system files.",
"id": "GHSA-pjx3-2523-w68g",
"modified": "2022-05-24T22:28:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:28:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-28205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/content/ASUS-Product-Security-Advisory"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/tw/support/callus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-4575-2e32d-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PJX5-JJH7-W9HW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-03 03:30 – Updated: 2023-01-03 03:30ChangingTec ServiSign component has a path traversal vulnerability due to insufficient filtering for special characters in the DLL file path. An unauthenticated remote attacker can host a malicious website for the component user to access, which triggers the component to load malicious DLL files under arbitrary file path and allows the attacker to perform arbitrary system operation and disrupt of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-46306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-03T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ChangingTec ServiSign component has a path traversal vulnerability due to insufficient filtering for special characters in the DLL file path. An unauthenticated remote attacker can host a malicious website for the component user to access, which triggers the component to load malicious DLL files under arbitrary file path and allows the attacker to perform arbitrary system operation and disrupt of service.",
"id": "GHSA-pjx5-jjh7-w9hw",
"modified": "2023-01-03T03:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-01-03T03:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-6802-4341b-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PJXV-W3QJ-J8M3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-09 20:42 – Updated: 2021-08-31 21:00This affects the package elFinder.AspNet before 1.1.1. The user-controlled file name is not properly sanitized before it is used to create a file system path.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "elFinder.AspNet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-23415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-02T18:41:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-28T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects the package elFinder.AspNet before 1.1.1.\n The user-controlled file name is not properly sanitized before it is used to create a file system path.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-pjxv-w3qj-j8m3",
"modified": "2021-08-31T21:00:58Z",
"published": "2021-08-09T20:42:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mguinness/elFinder.AspNet/commit/675049b39284a9e84f0915c71d688da8ebc7d720"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mguinness/elFinder.AspNet"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-DOTNET-ELFINDERASPNET-1315153"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in elFinder.AspNet"
}
GHSA-PM44-7GW9-6G8P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:28 – Updated: 2023-09-12 19:32Affected versions of uekw1511server resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "uekw1511server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:23:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `uekw1511server` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-pm44-7gw9-6g8p",
"modified": "2023-09-12T19:32:31Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:28:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/uekw1511server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/450"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in uekw1511server"
}
GHSA-PM5W-373F-PQMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:16 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:16Directory traversal vulnerability in Air Traffic in Apple iOS before 8.4.1 allows attackers to access arbitrary filesystem locations via vectors related to asset handling.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-5766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-08-17T00:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Air Traffic in Apple iOS before 8.4.1 allows attackers to access arbitrary filesystem locations via vectors related to asset handling.",
"id": "GHSA-pm5w-373f-pqmv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:16:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:16:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT205030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2015/Aug/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1033275"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PM6Q-6J5F-2HJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 04:01 – Updated: 2022-05-14 04:01Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in dpkg-source in dpkg-dev 1.3.0 allow remote attackers to modify files outside of the intended directories via a source package with a crafted Index: pseudo-header in conjunction with (1) missing --- and +++ header lines or (2) a +++ header line with a blank pathname.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-3865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-05-30T18:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in dpkg-source in dpkg-dev 1.3.0 allow remote attackers to modify files outside of the intended directories via a source package with a crafted Index: pseudo-header in conjunction with (1) missing --- and +++ header lines or (2) a +++ header line with a blank pathname.",
"id": "GHSA-pm6q-6j5f-2hj8",
"modified": "2022-05-14T04:01:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T04:01:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=749183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/05/25/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2014/dsa-2953"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/67727"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2242-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PM6V-2H4W-4RP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 23:40 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:17Vulnerability type: Path Traversal
Impact: DoS
Exploitation prerequisite: authorized user
Description: As an authorized user, an intruder can dictate the value which is passed to the git diff command which, together with bypassing the filtering of the passed value, allows the user to bypass the target directory and write the result of the comparison to any arbitrary path.
Researcher: Artyom Kulakov (Positive Technologies)
Mitigation:
1. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/b7372b1f32cd0bb40984debfb049e3fc04efaee4/internal/route/repo/editor.go#L307 — on this line, instead of the treePath variable, which comes directly from the user unchanged, we should first filter and then pass the entry variable.
2. To filter the treePath variable, it is better to use the preexisting pathutil.Clean function instead of path.Clean from the standard Go library.
Exploitation
A Positive Technologies researcher discovered that the user has the ability to preview their changes when editing a file in the repository. The POST /:user/:repo/_preview/:branch/:path_to_file method is responsible for displaying the changes. The problem is how the POST /:user/:repo/_preview/:branch/:path_to_file method processes the value passed to the :path_to_file (see Listing 1).
Listing 1. _preview method processor
func DiffPreviewPost(c *context.Context, f form.EditPreviewDiff) {
// В treePath попадает значение из :path_to_file
treePath := c.Repo.TreePath
// Проверка, что файл существует в репозитории
entry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(treePath)
-cut-
// Значение, полученное от пользователя, передается в функцию в обход фильтра
diff, err := c.Repo.Repository.GetDiffPreview(c.Repo.BranchName, treePath, f.Content)
-cut-
The first problem to solve is to make the TreeEntry function think that the value passed in is a file that actually exists in the repository. To do this, we must consider how the TreeEntry function actually makes this decision (see Listing 2).
Listing 2. Path checking and cleaning function
func (t *Tree) TreeEntry(subpath string, opts ...LsTreeOptions) (*TreeEntry, error) {
-cut-
// Очистка пути от “.” И “/”
subpath = path.Clean(subpath)
// Разбиение результата на компоненты для их последующей верификации в цикле
paths := strings.Split(subpath, "/")
-cut-
for i, name := range paths {
-cut-
}
Thus, we have a two-level path verification system. At the first stage, extra characters are removed, and at the second stage the resulting path is divided into components, each of which is then checked to be present in the repository. If the TreeEntry function receives a path that has the format of ../../../../../../etc/passwd, it will be transformed into an [.., .., .., .., .., .., etc, passwd] array. The first element of this array will fail further validation and an error will be returned. This problem can be bypassed if the path is directly from the root directory and the corresponding directory hierarchy is present in the repository. A path in the format of /etc/passwd will turn into an [, etc, passwd] array and successfully pass through the filter (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Example of filter bypass
The resulting value will be passed unchanged to the GetDiffPreview function, which will execute the git diff /etc/passwd command in the current repository (see Listing 3).
Listing 3. Change comparison function
func (repo *Repository) GetDiffPreview(branch, treePath, content string) (diff *gitutil.Diff, err error) {
-cut-
cmd := exec.Command("git", "diff", treePath)
cmd.Dir = localPath
cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
-cut-
}
However, we will not get any results because such a command will exit early with an error stating that the /etc/passwd is outside the repository boundaries. Because of the specifics of the exec.Command function, there is no way to embed commands or insert spaces to separate the arguments. So, we get one controllable command parameter diff.
Then a second task arises: to select a parameter which allows us to perform malicious actions. Such a parameter is --output=<file>. This option allows the result of the comparison to be written over the passed path. The malicious command looks like this: git diff —output=/data/gogs.db. It overwrites the database file with garbage, which leads to denial of service. Instead of a database file, we could also overwrite a app.ini configuration file.
The final challenge is to bypass the filter in order to pass the payload. This is possible through the use of some peculiarities in the library function path.Clean. By entering a specific sequence of characters, the path.Clean function discards everything that came before this sequence and the sequence itself, leaving only the remains. This behavior is best demonstrated by the following table (see Table 1).
Table 1. Results of the path.Clean function operation
| Input data | Result |
|---|---|
| any ../../target | target |
| any1/…/any2/../any3/../target | target |
| ./target | target |
| /../target | /target |
| a/b/../../../../target | ../../target |
So, the payload that will bypass the filters and do as we wish, will look like this: —output=/../data/gogs.db.
Attack steps:
1. Create a data directory in the repository and an empty gogs.db file in that directory.
2. Send a payload request and check that the code returned is a 200 OK (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Example of a successful attack
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.13.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52797"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T23:40:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T21:16:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Vulnerability type:** Path Traversal\n**Impact:** DoS\n**Exploitation prerequisite:** authorized user\n**Description:** As an authorized user, an intruder can dictate the value which is passed to the `git diff` command which, together with bypassing the filtering of the passed value, allows the user to bypass the target directory and write the result of the comparison to any arbitrary path.\n**Researcher:** Artyom Kulakov (Positive Technologies)\n**Mitigation:**\n1. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/b7372b1f32cd0bb40984debfb049e3fc04efaee4/internal/route/repo/editor.go#L307 \u2014 on this line, instead of the `treePath` variable, which comes directly from the user unchanged, we should first filter and then pass the `entry` variable.\n2. To filter the `treePath` variable, it is better to use the preexisting `pathutil.Clean` function instead of `path.Clean` from the standard Go library.\n### Exploitation\nA Positive Technologies researcher discovered that the user has the ability to preview their changes when editing a file in the repository. The `POST /:user/:repo/_preview/:branch/:path_to_file` method is responsible for displaying the changes. The problem is how the `POST /:user/:repo/_preview/:branch/:path_to_file` method processes the value passed to the `:path_to_file` (see Listing 1).\n###### Listing 1. _preview method processor\n```Go\nfunc DiffPreviewPost(c *context.Context, f form.EditPreviewDiff) {\n\t// \u0412 treePath \u043f\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u0437 :path_to_file\n\ttreePath := c.Repo.TreePath\n\n // \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b \u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0438\n\tentry, err := c.Repo.Commit.TreeEntry(treePath)\n\n\t-cut-\n\n\t// \u0417\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f, \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044e \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u0444\u0438\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0440\u0430\n\tdiff, err := c.Repo.Repository.GetDiffPreview(c.Repo.BranchName, treePath, f.Content)\n\n\t-cut-\n```\nThe first problem to solve is to make the `TreeEntry` function think that the value passed in is a file that actually exists in the repository. To do this, we must consider how the `TreeEntry` function actually makes this decision (see Listing 2).\n###### Listing 2. Path checking and cleaning function\n```Go\nfunc (t *Tree) TreeEntry(subpath string, opts ...LsTreeOptions) (*TreeEntry, error) {\n\t\n\t-cut-\n\t// \u041e\u0447\u0438\u0441\u0442\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0442 \u201c.\u201d \u0418 \u201c/\u201d\n\tsubpath = path.Clean(subpath)\n\t\n\t// \u0420\u0430\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0443\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u044b \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0439 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0432 \u0446\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0435\n\tpaths := strings.Split(subpath, \"/\")\n\t\n\t-cut-\n\t\n\tfor i, name := range paths {\n\t\t-cut-\n\t}\n```\nThus, we have a two-level path verification system. At the first stage, extra characters are removed, and at the second stage the resulting path is divided into components, each of which is then checked to be present in the repository. If the `TreeEntry` function receives a path that has the format of `../../../../../../etc/passwd`, it will be transformed into an `[.., .., .., .., .., .., etc, passwd]` array. The first element of this array will fail further validation and an error will be returned. This problem can be bypassed if the path is directly from the root directory and the corresponding directory hierarchy is present in the repository. A path in the format of `/etc/passwd` will turn into an `[, etc, passwd]` array and successfully pass through the filter (see Figure 1).\n###### Figure 1. Example of filter bypass\n\nThe resulting value will be passed unchanged to the `GetDiffPreview` function, which will execute the `git diff /etc/passwd` command in the current repository (see Listing 3).\n###### Listing 3. Change comparison function\n```Go\nfunc (repo *Repository) GetDiffPreview(branch, treePath, content string) (diff *gitutil.Diff, err error) {\n\t-cut-\n\n\tcmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"diff\", treePath)\n\tcmd.Dir = localPath\n\tcmd.Stderr = os.Stderr\n\n\t-cut-\n}\n```\nHowever, we will not get any results because such a command will exit early with an error stating that the `/etc/passwd` is outside the repository boundaries. Because of the specifics of the `exec.Command` function, there is no way to embed commands or insert spaces to separate the arguments. So, we get one controllable command parameter `diff`.\n\nThen a second task arises: to select a parameter which allows us to perform malicious actions. Such a parameter is `--output=\u003cfile\u003e`. This option allows the result of the comparison to be written over the passed path. The malicious command looks like this: `git diff \u2014output=/data/gogs.db`. It overwrites the database file with garbage, which leads to denial of service. Instead of a database file, we could also overwrite a `app.ini` configuration file.\n\nThe final challenge is to bypass the filter in order to pass the payload. This is possible through the use of some peculiarities in the library function `path.Clean`. By entering a specific sequence of characters, the `path.Clean` function discards everything that came before this sequence and the sequence itself, leaving only the remains. This behavior is best demonstrated by the following table (see Table 1).\n###### Table 1. Results of the `path.Clean` function operation\n| Input data | Result |\n| ----------- | ----------- |\n| any ../../target | target |\n| any1/\u2026/any2/../any3/../target | target |\n| ./target | target |\n| /../target | /target |\n| a/b/../../../../target | ../../target |\n\nSo, the payload that will bypass the filters and do as we wish, will look like this: `\u2014output=/../data/gogs.db`.\n**Attack steps:**\n1. Create a data directory in the repository and an empty `gogs.db` file in that directory.\n2. Send a payload request and check that the code returned is a 200 OK (see Figure 2).\n###### Figure 2. Example of a successful attack\n",
"id": "GHSA-pm6v-2h4w-4rp2",
"modified": "2026-07-21T13:17:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T23:40:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-pm6v-2h4w-4rp2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52797"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs: Overwriting critical files results in a denial of service"
}
GHSA-PM7F-9XJ6-R2JH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:54Relative path traversal vulnerability in Shihonkanri Plus Ver9.0.3 and earlier allows a local attacker to execute an arbitrary code by having a legitimate user import a specially crafted backup file of the product..
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43825"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T15:19:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Relative path traversal vulnerability in Shihonkanri Plus Ver9.0.3 and earlier allows a local attacker to execute an arbitrary code by having a legitimate user import a specially crafted backup file of the product..",
"id": "GHSA-pm7f-9xj6-r2jh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:54:54Z",
"published": "2023-09-27T15:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43825"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN17434995"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ekakin.la.coocan.jp/index.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PM7Q-CGMF-6XV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-30 12:30 – Updated: 2023-01-09 18:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in aerouk imageserve. Affected is an unknown function of the file public/viewer.php of the component File Handler. The manipulation of the argument filelocation leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The name of the patch is bd23c784f0e5cb12f66d15c100248449f87d72e2. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217056.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-20152"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-30T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in aerouk imageserve. Affected is an unknown function of the file public/viewer.php of the component File Handler. The manipulation of the argument filelocation leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The name of the patch is bd23c784f0e5cb12f66d15c100248449f87d72e2. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217056.",
"id": "GHSA-pm7q-cgmf-6xv7",
"modified": "2023-01-09T18:30:18Z",
"published": "2022-12-30T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-20152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aerouk/imageserve/pull/27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aerouk/imageserve/commit/bd23c784f0e5cb12f66d15c100248449f87d72e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.217056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.217056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PM8C-8WXV-392P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-07 03:30 – Updated: 2025-08-07 03:30: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in TAGFREE X-Free Uploader XFU allows Path Traversal.This issue affects X-Free Uploader: from 1.0.1.0084 before 1.0.1.0085, from 2.0.1.0034 before 2.0.1.0035.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-29865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-07T02:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": ": Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in TAGFREE X-Free Uploader XFU allows Path Traversal.This issue affects X-Free Uploader: from 1.0.1.0084 before 1.0.1.0085, from 2.0.1.0034 before 2.0.1.0035.",
"id": "GHSA-pm8c-8wxv-392p",
"modified": "2025-08-07T03:30:35Z",
"published": "2025-08-07T03:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.boho.or.kr/kr/bbs/view.do?searchCnd=\u0026bbsId=B0000302\u0026searchWrd=\u0026menuNo=205023\u0026pageIndex=1\u0026categoryCode=\u0026nttId=71825"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.