CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
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updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
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updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
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updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16154 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C9RH-2QQ3-FRXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-02 09:30 – Updated: 2026-02-23 09:31A vulnerability has been found in yeqifu carRental up to 3fabb7eae93d209426638863980301d6f99866b3. This vulnerability affects the function downloadShowFile of the file /file/downloadShowFile.action of the component com.yeqifu.sys.controller.FileController. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-15432"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-02T07:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in yeqifu carRental up to 3fabb7eae93d209426638863980301d6f99866b3. This vulnerability affects the function downloadShowFile of the file /file/downloadShowFile.action of the component com.yeqifu.sys.controller.FileController. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-c9rh-2qq3-frxv",
"modified": "2026-02-23T09:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-01-02T09:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15432"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yeqifu/carRental/issues/46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yeqifu/carRental"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.339354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.339354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.723220"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9V4-5376-3JJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-25 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-29 21:30An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in MangoOS before 5.1.4 and Mango API before 4.5.5 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37847"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T19:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in MangoOS before 5.1.4 and Mango API before 4.5.5 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.",
"id": "GHSA-c9v4-5376-3jjw",
"modified": "2024-10-29T21:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-10-25T21:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/herombey/Disclosures/blob/main/CVE-2024-37847%20File%20Upload%20Path%20Traversal.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/herombey/Disclosures/tree/main"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9VJ-5WX9-69PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-17 15:31A vulnerability was found in prasathmani TinyFileManager up to 2.6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /filemanager.php of the component POST Parameter Handler. The manipulation of the argument file[] results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6496"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T15:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in prasathmani TinyFileManager up to 2.6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /filemanager.php of the component POST Parameter Handler. The manipulation of the argument file[] results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-c9vj-5wx9-69pj",
"modified": "2026-04-17T15:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T15:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14taA8w3e5z3gl4WttpB4_CquwQdz1i6r/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/787942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358039"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358039/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9W5-439R-97P7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-03 03:30 – Updated: 2025-06-03 15:31HCL DRYiCE MyXalytics is impacted by path traversal arbitrary file read vulnerability because it uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory. The product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Potential exploits can completely disrupt or take over the application.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-03T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HCL DRYiCE MyXalytics is impacted by path traversal arbitrary file read vulnerability because it uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory. \u00a0The product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Potential exploits can completely disrupt or take over the application.",
"id": "GHSA-c9w5-439r-97p7",
"modified": "2025-06-03T15:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-01-03T03:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hcltechsw.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0109608"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9X8-VR23-RM4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 06:30 – Updated: 2026-11-09 06:30A weakness has been identified in D-Link DIR-878 1.20B05. Affected by this issue is the function GetListDirectory of the file bin/prog.cgi of the component HNAP Handler. This manipulation of the argument ListDirectoryPath causes path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-124564"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-09T04:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in D-Link DIR-878 1.20B05. Affected by this issue is the function GetListDirectory of the file bin/prog.cgi of the component HNAP Handler. This manipulation of the argument ListDirectoryPath causes path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-c9x8-vr23-rm4c",
"modified": "2026-11-09T06:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T06:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-124564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Zimo-666/DIR-878-cves/tree/main/06-getlistdirectory-path-traversal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-124564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/1035620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/432896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/432896/cti"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9XG-64P9-F2JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 17:55 – Updated: 2026-07-13 17:55Summary
Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., config.php) by injecting a crafted attach parameter, rendering the application inoperable.
Affected Component
modules/comment/admin/edit.php
Root Cause
In the vulnerable version, the attach parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed:
// Vulnerable code (before fix)
$attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true);
if (!empty($attach)) {
$attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/'));
}
substr() strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for /nukeviet/uploads/comment/). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store ../../<target> directly into the database.
When the comment is subsequently deleted, del.php reads attach from the database and calls:
nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']);
nv_deletefile() resolves the path via realpath() and only verifies the result is within NV_ROOTDIR — it does not restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an administrator and navigate to Admin → Comment Management.
- Select any comment and open the Edit form.
- Intercept the POST request and set the
attachparameter to:
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php
(26 padding characters + traversal path)
- Submit the request. The value
../../config.phpis now stored in the database. - Delete the comment.
config.phpis deleted from the application root. - The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed.
Impact
- Any file readable by the web server process within
NV_ROOTDIRcan be permanently deleted. - Deleting
config.phpcauses a full application outage and exposes the install wizard.
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | High (Admin required) |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Changed |
| Confidentiality | None |
| Integrity | High |
| Availability | High |
Fix
Added nv_is_file() validation before processing the attach value. This function uses realpath() and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts.
// Fixed code
$attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '');
if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) {
$attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/'));
} else {
$attach = '';
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "nukeviet/nukeviet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.00"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T17:55:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nPath Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`modules/comment/admin/edit.php`\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed:\n\n```php\n// Vulnerable code (before fix)\n$attach = $nv_Request-\u003eget_string(\u0027attach\u0027, \u0027post\u0027, \u0027\u0027, true);\nif (!empty($attach)) {\n $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . \u0027/\u0027 . $module_upload . \u0027/\u0027));\n}\n```\n\n`substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../\u003ctarget\u003e` directly into the database.\n\nWhen the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls:\n\n```php\nnv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . \u0027/\u0027 . $module_upload . \u0027/\u0027 . $row[\u0027attach\u0027]);\n```\n\n`nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` \u2014 it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory \u2014 allowing deletion of any file in the installation root.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin \u2192 Comment Management**.\n2. Select any comment and open the Edit form.\n3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to:\n\n```\naaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php\n```\n\n*(26 padding characters + traversal path)*\n\n4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database.\n5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root.\n6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted.\n- Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard.\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)**\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H\n```\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|--------|-------|\n| Attack Vector | Network |\n| Attack Complexity | Low |\n| Privileges Required | High (Admin required) |\n| User Interaction | None |\n| Scope | Changed |\n| Confidentiality | None |\n| Integrity | High |\n| Availability | High |\n\n## Fix\n\nAdded `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts.\n\n```php\n// Fixed code\n$attach = $nv_Request-\u003eget_string(\u0027attach\u0027, \u0027post\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\nif (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . \u0027/\u0027 . $module_upload)) {\n $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . \u0027/\u0027 . $module_upload . \u0027/\u0027));\n} else {\n $attach = \u0027\u0027;\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-c9xg-64p9-f2jj",
"modified": "2026-07-13T17:55:48Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T17:55:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-c9xg-64p9-f2jj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NukeViet: Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in Edit Comment Function"
}
GHSA-CC2G-GQ8C-R332
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 19:15 – Updated: 2026-08-19 19:15Summary
Several grok-faf-mcp MCP tools accept a caller-controlled path argument and resolve it (~ expansion + path.resolve()) straight into a filesystem read without confining it to a trusted project directory. An absolute path or ../ traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended .faf project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.
Affected tools
refresh_faf, faf_score, faf_get_orchestration_policy, refresh_blend (and the shared getProjectPath() chokepoint feeding the .faf tools), plus the general-purpose faf_read / faf_write file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and faf_write could write outside the project). refresh_faf echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as "fresh DNA"; faf_get_orchestration_policy reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path — confirming the read.
Impact
An MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or .faf) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cloud credentials (~/.aws/credentials), .env files, source, /etc/passwd. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared .faf project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).
Patches
Fixed in 1.5.3 by confining every caller-supplied path before any filesystem access (safe-path.ts):
- Reads are restricted to .faf / .fafm context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.
- General file ops (faf_read / faf_write) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS).
- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and ../ escapes are rejected.
Upgrade: npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3 (or bunx grok-faf-mcp).
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.
Credits
Discovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by Zhihao Zhang (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "grok-faf-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-19T19:15:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSeveral `grok-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.\n\n### Affected tools\n`refresh_faf`, `faf_score`, `faf_get_orchestration_policy`, `refresh_blend` (and the shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint feeding the `.faf` tools), plus the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project). `refresh_faf` echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as \"fresh DNA\"; `faf_get_orchestration_policy` reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path \u2014 confirming the read.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client \u2014 or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call \u2014 can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.5.3** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):\n- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.\n- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).\n- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected.\n\nUpgrade: `npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3` (or `bunx grok-faf-mcp`).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).",
"id": "GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332",
"modified": "2026-08-19T19:15:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T19:15:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/releases/tag/v1.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools"
}
GHSA-CC2P-F3QF-3FR6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-12 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-01 21:31The Popup Builder WordPress plugin before 4.2.6 does not validate a parameter before making a request to it, which could allow users with the administrator role to perform SSRF attack in Multisite WordPress configurations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-12T16:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Popup Builder WordPress plugin before 4.2.6 does not validate a parameter before making a request to it, which could allow users with the administrator role to perform SSRF attack in Multisite WordPress configurations.",
"id": "GHSA-cc2p-f3qf-3fr6",
"modified": "2024-08-01T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2024-02-12T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/eaeb5706-b19c-4266-b7df-889558ee2614"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CC4M-MP48-X7QG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-06-30 16:50Spring AI's support for Anthropic's Skills API used LLM-influenced filenames unsanitized in Path.resolve before writing files to disk. This could allow a malicious user to write files outside the intended target directory, including restricted directories.
Affected versions: Spring AI: 1.1.0 through 1.1.7
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-anthropic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41863"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T16:50:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T07:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Spring AI\u0027s support for Anthropic\u0027s Skills API used LLM-influenced filenames unsanitized in Path.resolve before writing files to disk. This could allow a malicious user to write files outside the intended target directory, including restricted directories.\n\nAffected versions:\nSpring AI: 1.1.0 through 1.1.7",
"id": "GHSA-cc4m-mp48-x7qg",
"modified": "2026-06-30T16:50:37Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41863"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-ai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-41863"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Spring AI\u0027s support for Anthropic\u0027s Skills API used LLM-influenced filenames unsanitized in Path.resolve before writing files to disk"
}
GHSA-CC5H-2PWP-PVCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:34 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:34Summary
In the documented multi-user HTTP deployment (--transport streamable-http with global operator Atlassian credentials), sooperset/mcp-atlassian exposes all tools to unauthenticated network clients, and the upload_attachment tool reads an attacker-supplied file_path with no path validation. Chained, an unauthenticated network attacker reads arbitrary files on the MCP server host (e.g. /proc/self/environ → the operator's Atlassian API token + .env secrets, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/passwd) by uploading them to an attacker-chosen page/issue and reading them back.
Details
Missing authentication (transport):
- streamable-http binds 0.0.0.0 by default (src/mcp_atlassian/__init__.py:151).
- The OAuth-proxy auth provider is opt-in (ATLASSIAN_OAUTH_PROXY_ENABLE, default false), so main_mcp is built with auth=None (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:724-731, 813-817).
- UserTokenMiddleware._parse_auth_header sets auth_validation_error only for a malformed Authorization header; a request with no Authorization header passes through (main.py:416-446, 582-595).
- _get_fetcher then falls through to the global credential fallback using the operator's .env Atlassian token (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:644-676). check_write_access gates only on read-only mode, not auth → read and write tools reachable.
Arbitrary file read (sink):
- upload_attachment's file_path flows unsanitized into open(file_path, 'rb') — Confluence src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477 (from servers/confluence.py:1294-1369); Jira src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py:386 (from servers/jira.py:1609-1673). No validate_safe_path / allowlist (contrast the download flow, hardened after CVE-2026-27825).
Proof of Concept
# unauthenticated (no Authorization header) against a default streamable-http deployment:
tools/call upload_attachment { "file_path": "/proc/self/environ", "page_id": "<attacker-chosen>" }
# then read it back:
tools/call download_attachment { ... } # returns the bytes (base64) -> operator's ATLASSIAN token + .env secrets
Impact
Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read on the MCP server host — including the operator's Atlassian API token and .env secrets — a boundary the Atlassian-scoped tool must not cross, plus unauthenticated use of every read/write Atlassian tool as the operator's (often admin) principal. Distinct from GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 (file write via download_path) and GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 (URL-header SSRF).
Suggested fix
Require authentication on the streamable-http transport by default (do not fall back to operator global credentials for unauthenticated requests); apply validate_safe_path/allowlist to file_path in upload_attachment as the download flow already does.
Affected
mcp-atlassian <= 0.21.1.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mcp-atlassian"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77248"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn the documented multi-user HTTP deployment (`--transport streamable-http` with global operator Atlassian credentials), sooperset/mcp-atlassian exposes all tools to **unauthenticated network clients**, and the `upload_attachment` tool reads an attacker-supplied `file_path` with **no path validation**. Chained, an unauthenticated network attacker reads arbitrary files on the MCP server host (e.g. `/proc/self/environ` \u2192 the operator\u0027s Atlassian API token + `.env` secrets, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/etc/passwd`) by uploading them to an attacker-chosen page/issue and reading them back.\n\n### Details\n**Missing authentication (transport):**\n- streamable-http binds `0.0.0.0` by default (`src/mcp_atlassian/__init__.py:151`).\n- The OAuth-proxy auth provider is opt-in (`ATLASSIAN_OAUTH_PROXY_ENABLE`, default false), so `main_mcp` is built with `auth=None` (`src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:724-731, 813-817`).\n- `UserTokenMiddleware._parse_auth_header` sets `auth_validation_error` only for a *malformed* Authorization header; a request with **no** Authorization header passes through (`main.py:416-446, 582-595`).\n- `_get_fetcher` then falls through to the global credential fallback using the operator\u0027s `.env` Atlassian token (`src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:644-676`). `check_write_access` gates only on read-only mode, not auth \u2192 read **and** write tools reachable.\n\n**Arbitrary file read (sink):**\n- `upload_attachment`\u0027s `file_path` flows unsanitized into `open(file_path, \u0027rb\u0027)` \u2014 Confluence `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477` (from `servers/confluence.py:1294-1369`); Jira `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py:386` (from `servers/jira.py:1609-1673`). No `validate_safe_path` / allowlist (contrast the download flow, hardened after CVE-2026-27825).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```\n# unauthenticated (no Authorization header) against a default streamable-http deployment:\ntools/call upload_attachment { \"file_path\": \"/proc/self/environ\", \"page_id\": \"\u003cattacker-chosen\u003e\" }\n# then read it back:\ntools/call download_attachment { ... } # returns the bytes (base64) -\u003e operator\u0027s ATLASSIAN token + .env secrets\n```\n\n### Impact\nUnauthenticated arbitrary local file read on the MCP server host \u2014 including the operator\u0027s Atlassian API token and `.env` secrets \u2014 a boundary the Atlassian-scoped tool must not cross, plus unauthenticated use of every read/write Atlassian tool as the operator\u0027s (often admin) principal. Distinct from GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 (file *write* via download_path) and GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 (URL-header SSRF). \n\n### Suggested fix\nRequire authentication on the streamable-http transport by default (do not fall back to operator global credentials for unauthenticated requests); apply `validate_safe_path`/allowlist to `file_path` in `upload_attachment` as the download flow already does.\n\n### Affected\n`mcp-atlassian` \u003c= 0.21.1.",
"id": "GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:34:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-cc5h-2pwp-pvcc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.