WID-SEC-W-2023-0908
Vulnerability from csaf_certbund - Published: 2023-04-10 22:00 - Updated: 2023-04-10 22:00Eine Schwachstelle für die Einschleusung von Befehlen besteht in mehreren Firmware-Versionen von Siemens SICAM A8000-Geräten. Die Geräte sind über den Webserver-Port 443/tcp verwundbar, wenn der Parameter "Remote Operation" aktiviert ist, der standardmäßig deaktiviert ist. Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann diese Schwachstelle ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.
{
"document": {
"aggregate_severity": {
"text": "hoch"
},
"category": "csaf_base",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE",
"url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
}
},
"lang": "de-DE",
"notes": [
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "Das BSI ist als Anbieter f\u00fcr die eigenen, zur Nutzung bereitgestellten Inhalte nach den allgemeinen Gesetzen verantwortlich. Nutzerinnen und Nutzer sind jedoch daf\u00fcr verantwortlich, die Verwendung und/oder die Umsetzung der mit den Inhalten bereitgestellten Informationen sorgf\u00e4ltig im Einzelfall zu pr\u00fcfen."
},
{
"category": "description",
"text": "Siemens SICAM ist eine Produktfamilie von SCADA-Systemen f\u00fcr den Betrieb von industriellen Prozessen.",
"title": "Produktbeschreibung"
},
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Siemens SICAM A8000 Ger\u00e4ten ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuf\u00fchren.",
"title": "Angriff"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "- Appliance",
"title": "Betroffene Betriebssysteme"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "other",
"contact_details": "csaf-provider@cert-bund.de",
"name": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
"namespace": "https://www.bsi.bund.de"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0908 - CSAF Version",
"url": "https://wid.cert-bund.de/.well-known/csaf/white/2023/wid-sec-w-2023-0908.json"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "WID-SEC-2023-0908 - Portal Version",
"url": "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/wid/securityadvisory?name=WID-SEC-2023-0908"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Siemens Security Advisory vom 2023-04-10",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-472454.html"
}
],
"source_lang": "en-US",
"title": "Siemens SICAM A8000 Ger\u00e4te: Schwachstelle erm\u00f6glicht Codeausf\u00fchrung",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2023-04-10T22:00:00.000+00:00",
"generator": {
"date": "2024-08-15T17:48:25.395+00:00",
"engine": {
"name": "BSI-WID",
"version": "1.3.5"
}
},
"id": "WID-SEC-W-2023-0908",
"initial_release_date": "2023-04-10T22:00:00.000+00:00",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2023-04-10T22:00:00.000+00:00",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Initiale Fassung"
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_name",
"name": "Siemens SICAM A8000 \u003c CP-8031_CPCI85 V05",
"product": {
"name": "Siemens SICAM A8000 \u003c CP-8031_CPCI85 V05",
"product_id": "T027144",
"product_identification_helper": {
"cpe": "cpe:/h:siemens:sicam:a8000_cp-8031_cpci85_v05"
}
}
},
{
"category": "product_name",
"name": "Siemens SICAM A8000 \u003c CP-8050_CPCI85 V05",
"product": {
"name": "Siemens SICAM A8000 \u003c CP-8050_CPCI85 V05",
"product_id": "T027145",
"product_identification_helper": {
"cpe": "cpe:/h:siemens:sicam:a8000_cp-8050_cpci85_v05"
}
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SICAM"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Siemens"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2023-28489",
"notes": [
{
"category": "description",
"text": "Eine Schwachstelle f\u00fcr die Einschleusung von Befehlen besteht in mehreren Firmware-Versionen von Siemens SICAM A8000-Ger\u00e4ten. Die Ger\u00e4te sind \u00fcber den Webserver-Port 443/tcp verwundbar, wenn der Parameter \"Remote Operation\" aktiviert ist, der standardm\u00e4\u00dfig deaktiviert ist. Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann diese Schwachstelle ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuf\u00fchren."
}
],
"release_date": "2023-04-10T22:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2023-28489"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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