VAR-200909-0386
Vulnerability from variot - Updated: 2025-04-10 20:49Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco IOS 12.2XNA, 12.2XNB, 12.2XNC, 12.2XND, 12.4MD, 12.4T, 12.4XZ, and 12.4YA allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted NTPv4 packet, aka Bug IDs CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948. Cisco IOS Is NTPv4 Insufficient packet processing, causing service disruption (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948 It is a problem.Cleverly crafted NTPv4 Service disruption due to packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco IOS is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Network Time Protocol Packet Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090923-ntp
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2009 September 23
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
Cisco IOS\xae Software with support for Network Time Protocol (NTP) version (v4) contains a vulnerability processing specific NTP packets that will result in a reload of the device. This results in a remote denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available.
This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml
Note: The September 23, 2009, Cisco IOS Security Advisory bundled publication includes eleven Security Advisories. Each advisory lists the releases that correct the vulnerability or vulnerabilities detailed in the advisory. The following table lists releases that correct all Cisco IOS Software vulnerabilities that have been published on September 23, 2009, or earlier.
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-bundle.shtml
Individual publication links are in "Cisco Event Response: Semiannual Cisco IOS Software Advisory Bundled Publication" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/Cisco_ERP_sep09.html
Affected Products
Vulnerable Products +------------------
Cisco IOS Software devices are vulnerable if they support NTPv4 and are configured for NTP operations. NTP is not enabled in Cisco IOS Software by default.
To see if a device supports NTPv4, log into the device and via configuration mode of the command line interface (CLI), enter the command "ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?". If the output has the number "4" as an option, then the device supports NTPv4. The following example identifies a Cisco device that is running a Cisco IOS Software release that does support NTPv4:
Router#configure terminal
Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?
<2-4> NTP version number
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is running a Cisco IOS Software release that does not support NTPv4:
Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?
<1-3> NTP version number
To see if a device is configured with NTP, log into the device and issue the CLI command "show running-config | include ntp". If the output returns either of the following commands listed then the device is vulnerable:
ntp master <any following commands>
ntp peer <any following commands>
ntp server <any following commands>
ntp broadcast client
ntp multicast client
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is configured with NTP:
router#show running-config | include ntp
ntp peer 192.168.0.12
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is not configured with NTP:
router#show running-config | include ntp
router#
To determine the Cisco IOS Software release that is running on a Cisco product, administrators can log in to the device and issue the "show version" command to display the system banner. The system banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS Software by displaying text similar to "Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software" or "Cisco IOS Software." The image name displays in parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS Software release name. Other Cisco devices do not have the "show version" command or may provide different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product that is running Cisco IOS Software Release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Router#show version
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software
IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright \xa9) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih
<output truncated>
The following example shows a product that is running Cisco IOS Software release 12.4(20)T with an image name of C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M:
Router#show version
Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright \xa9) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team
<output truncated>
Additional information about Cisco IOS Software release naming conventions is available in "White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +--------------------------------
The following products and features are not affected by this vulnerability:
- Cisco IOS Software devices without support for NTPv4
- Cisco IOS Software devices configured with only Simple NTP (SNTP) feature
- Cisco IOS XE Software
- Cisco IOS XR Software
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol designed to time-synchronize a network of machines. NTP runs over UDP, which in turn runs over IP. NTPv3 is documented in RFC1305 leavingcisco.com . NTPv4 is a significant revision of the NTP standard, and is the current development version, but has not been formalized into an RFC at the time of publication of this advisory. NTPv4 is currently documented in draft-ietf-ntp-ntpv4-proto-11 leavingcisco.com
When a Cisco IOS Software device supporting NTPv4 receives a specific NTP packet it will crash while creating the NTP reply packet. The NTP packet can be sent from any remote device, and does not require authentication. Cisco IOS devices supporting NTPv4 and configured with NTP peer authentication are still vulnerable. The device does not have to be explicitly configured for NTPv4 peers. For example a device configured with all NTP peers being explicitly labeled as version 2 would still be vulnerable, as shown in the following example:
Router#show running-config | include ntp
ntp peer 192.168.0.254 version 2
ntp peer 192.168.0.1 version 2
Router#
For further information on the Cisco implementation of NTP, consult the configuration guide "Cisco IOS and NX-OS Software - Performing Basic System Management" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1001170
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2009-2869.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsu24505, CSCsv75948 - Cisco IOS Software NTP Packet Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in a reload of the device. The vulnerability could be repeatedly exploited to cause an extended DoS condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired Releases | | Release | | |------------+------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.0-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.0 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.1-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.1 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.2-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.2 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.3-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.3 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4 | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4GC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JDA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JDC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JDD | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JK | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JL | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JMA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JMB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4JX | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | | Releases prior to 12.4(22)MD are not | | | 12.4MD | vulnerable, vulnerability was first | 12.4(22)MD1 | | | introduced in 12.4(22)MD, first fixed | | | | in 12.4(22)MD1. | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4MDA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4MR | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4SW | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | | Releases prior to 12.4(20)T are not | | | | vulnerable. | | | | | 12.4(20)T4 | | | 12.4(20)T and 12.4(20)T1 are | | | | vulnerable, vulnerability is first | 12.4(22)T3 | | 12.4T | fixed in 12.4(20)T2. | | | | | 12.4(24)T2; | | | 12.4(22)T is vulnerable, | Available on | | | vulnerability is first fixed in 12.4 | 23-OCT-2009 | | | (22)T1 | | | | | | | | 12.4(24)T is not vulnerable. | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XD | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XE | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XF | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XG | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XJ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XK | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XL | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XM | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XN | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XP | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XQ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XR | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XT | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XV | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XW | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4XY | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | | | 12.4(20)T4 | | | | | | | | 12.4(22)T3 | | 12.4XZ | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | | | | | 12.4(24)T2; | | | | Available on | | | | 23-OCT-2009 | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | | | 12.4(20)T4 | | | | | | | | 12.4(22)T3 | | 12.4YA | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | | | | | 12.4(24)T2; | | | | Available on | | | | 23-OCT-2009 | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4YB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4YD | 12.4(22)YD1 | 12.4(22)YD1 | |------------+---------------------------------------+--------------| | 12.4YE | 12.4(22)YE1 | 12.4(22)YE1 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Workarounds
There are no workarounds other than disabling NTP on the device. The following mitigations have been identified for this vulnerability; only packets destined for any configured IP address on the device can exploit this vulnerability. Transit traffic will not exploit this vulnerability.
Note: NTP peer authentication is not a workaround and is still a vulnerable configuration.
NTP Access Group +---------------
Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses. Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.
!--- Configure trusted peers for allowed access
access-list 1 permit 171.70.173.55
!--- Apply ACE to the NTP configuration
ntp access-group 1
For additional information on NTP access control groups, consult the document titled "Performing Basic System Management" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1034942
Infrastructure Access Control Lists +----------------------------------
warning Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.
Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of networks. Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The iACL example below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will help protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range:
!---
!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)
!---
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123
!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP broadcast client
!--- via the interface command "ntp broadcast client"
!--- then broadcast and directed broadcasts must be
!--- filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- an infrastructure address space of 192.168.0.X
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 192.168.0.255 eq ntp
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 255.255.255.255 eq ntp
!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP multicast client
!--- via the interface command "ntp multicast client"
!--- then multicast IP packets to the mutlicast group must
!--- be filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- a NTP multicast group of 239.0.0.1 (Default is
!--- 224.0.1.1)
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 239.0.0.1 eq ntp
!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny udp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123
!--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in
!--- accordance with existing security policies and
!--- configurations. Permit all other traffic to transit the
!--- device.
access-list 150 permit ip any any
!--- Apply access-list to all interfaces (only one example
!--- shown)
interface fastEthernet 2/0
ip access-group 150 in
The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists and is available at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml
Control Plane Policing +---------------------
Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.
Control Plane Policing (CoPP) can be used to block untrusted UDP traffic to the device. CoPP can be configured on a device to help protect the management and control planes and minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic that is sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. The CoPP example below should be included as part of the deployed CoPP, which will help protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range.
!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)
access-list 150 deny udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 123
!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to the device control plane.
access-list 150 permit udp any any eq 123
!--- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and
!--- Layer4 traffic in accordance with existing security policies
!--- and configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent
!--- to infrastructure devices
!--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by
!--- the CoPP feature
class-map match-all drop-udp-class
match access-group 150
!--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device.
policy-map drop-udp-traffic
class drop-udp-class
drop
!--- Apply the Policy-Map to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device
control-plane
service-policy input drop-udp-traffic
In the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs) that match the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Please note that the policy-map syntax is different in the 12.2S and 12.0S Cisco IOS Software trains:
policy-map drop-udp-traffic
class drop-udp-class
police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found in the documents, "Control Plane Policing Implementation Best Practices" and "Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2 S - Control Plane Policing" at the following links:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html
and
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco when handling customer support calls.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
- comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-September-23 | public | | | | release | +----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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TITLE: Cisco IOS Multiple Vulnerabilities
SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA36835
VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/36835/
DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco IOS, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service), bypass certain security restrictions, disclose sensitive information, or compromise a vulnerable device.
1) An error exists in the login section of the Extension Mobility feature of the Cisco Unified CME (Communications Manager Express) component. This can be exploited to cause a buffer overflow via specially crafted HTTP requests.
Successful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary code.
2) An error in the IKE implementation can be exploited to allocate all available Phase 1 SAs and prevent new IPSec sessions from being established.
Successful exploitation requires that the IKE certificate based authentication method is used.
3) Multiple errors exist in the IP tunnelling implementation when switching network packets. These can be exploited to trigger a device reload via specially crafted packets.
Successful exploitation requires that the device is configured for PPTP, GRE, IPinIP, Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6, or IPv6 over IP tunnels, and Cisco Express Forwarding.
4) An error in the implementation of the Object Groups for ACLs feature can be exploited to bypass access control policies.
5) An error in the H.323 implementation can be exploited to trigger a device reload via specially crafted TCP packets.
Successful exploitation requires that H.323 is enabled (disabled by default).
6) An error in the SIP implementation related to the Cisco Unified Border Element feature can be exploited to trigger a device reload.
For more information: SA36836
7) An error in the SSLVPN, SSH, and IKE Encrypted Nonces features can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted packets sent to TCP ports 22 (for SSH) or 443 (for SSLVPN), or UDP ports 500 and 4500 (for IKE Encrypted Nonces).
8) A race condition error exists in the Authentication Proxy for HTTP(S), Web Authentication, and consent features. This can be exploited to bypass the authentication proxy services and the consent accept web page if a successfully authenticated session or accepted consent session exists.
9) An error exists in the Cisco IOS Zone-Based Policy Firewall SIP inspection feature. This can be exploited to reload a device via a specially crafted SIP transit packet.
SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version (please see the vendor's advisories for details).
PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1, 3-10) Reported by the vendor. 2) Reported to the vendor by a customer.
ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-cme.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ipsec.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-tunnels.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-acl.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-h323.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-sip.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-tls.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-auth-proxy.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ios-fw.shtml http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml
OTHER REFERENCES: SA36836: http://secunia.com/advisories/36836/
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"data": "Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco IOS 12.2XNA, 12.2XNB, 12.2XNC, 12.2XND, 12.4MD, 12.4T, 12.4XZ, and 12.4YA allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted NTPv4 packet, aka Bug IDs CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948. Cisco IOS Is NTPv4 Insufficient packet processing, causing service disruption (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948 It is a problem.Cleverly crafted NTPv4 Service disruption due to packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco IOS is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. \nAn attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. \nThis issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA1\n\nCisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Network Time Protocol\nPacket Vulnerability\n\nAdvisory ID: cisco-sa-20090923-ntp\n\nRevision 1.0\n\nFor Public Release 2009 September 23\n\n+---------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nSummary\n=======\n\nCisco IOS\\xae Software with support for Network Time Protocol (NTP)\nversion (v4) contains a vulnerability processing specific NTP packets\nthat will result in a reload of the device. This results in a remote\ndenial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device. \n\nCisco has released free software updates that address this\nvulnerability. \n\nWorkarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. \n\nThis advisory is posted at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml\n\nNote: The September 23, 2009, Cisco IOS Security Advisory bundled\npublication includes eleven Security Advisories. Each advisory lists the releases that correct the\nvulnerability or vulnerabilities detailed in the advisory. The\nfollowing table lists releases that correct all Cisco IOS Software\nvulnerabilities that have been published on September 23, 2009, or\nearlier. \n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-bundle.shtml\n\nIndividual publication links are in \"Cisco Event Response: Semiannual\nCisco IOS Software Advisory Bundled Publication\" at the following\nlink:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/Cisco_ERP_sep09.html\n\nAffected Products\n=================\n\nVulnerable Products\n+------------------\n\nCisco IOS Software devices are vulnerable if they support NTPv4 and\nare configured for NTP operations. NTP is not enabled in Cisco IOS\nSoftware by default. \n\nTo see if a device supports NTPv4, log into the device and via\nconfiguration mode of the command line interface (CLI), enter the\ncommand \"ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?\". If the output has the number \"4\"\nas an option, then the device supports NTPv4. The following example\nidentifies a Cisco device that is running a Cisco IOS Software\nrelease that does support NTPv4:\n\n Router#configure terminal\n Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?\n \u003c2-4\u003e NTP version number\n\nThe following example identifies a Cisco device that is running a\nCisco IOS Software release that does not support NTPv4:\n\n Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?\n \u003c1-3\u003e NTP version number\n\nTo see if a device is configured with NTP, log into the device and\nissue the CLI command \"show running-config | include ntp\". If the\noutput returns either of the following commands listed then the\ndevice is vulnerable:\n\n ntp master \u003cany following commands\u003e\n ntp peer \u003cany following commands\u003e\n ntp server \u003cany following commands\u003e\n ntp broadcast client\n ntp multicast client\n\nThe following example identifies a Cisco device that is configured\nwith NTP:\n\n router#show running-config | include ntp\n ntp peer 192.168.0.12\n\nThe following example identifies a Cisco device that is not\nconfigured with NTP:\n\n router#show running-config | include ntp\n router#\n\nTo determine the Cisco IOS Software release that is running on a\nCisco product, administrators can log in to the device and issue the \n\"show version\" command to display the system banner. The system banner\nconfirms that the device is running Cisco IOS Software by displaying\ntext similar to \"Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software\" or\n\"Cisco IOS Software.\" The image name displays in parentheses,\nfollowed by \"Version\" and the Cisco IOS Software release name. Other\nCisco devices do not have the \"show version\" command or may provide\ndifferent output. \n\nThe following example identifies a Cisco product that is running\nCisco IOS Software Release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of\nC2500-IS-L:\n\n Router#show version\n Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software\n IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)\n Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport\n Copyright \\xa9) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc. \n Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih\n \n \u003coutput truncated\u003e\n\nThe following example shows a product that is running Cisco IOS\nSoftware release 12.4(20)T with an image name of\nC1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M:\n\n Router#show version\n Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3)\n Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport\n Copyright \\xa9) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. \n Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team\n \n \u003coutput truncated\u003e\n\nAdditional information about Cisco IOS Software release naming\nconventions is available in \"White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide\"\nat the following link:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html\n\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\n+--------------------------------\n\nThe following products and features are not affected by this\nvulnerability:\n\n * Cisco IOS Software devices without support for NTPv4\n * Cisco IOS Software devices configured with only Simple NTP (SNTP)\n feature\n * Cisco IOS XE Software\n * Cisco IOS XR Software\n\nNo other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this\nvulnerability. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nThe Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol designed to\ntime-synchronize a network of machines. NTP runs over UDP, which in\nturn runs over IP. NTPv3 is documented in RFC1305 leavingcisco.com . \nNTPv4 is a significant revision of the NTP standard, and is the\ncurrent development version, but has not been formalized into an RFC\nat the time of publication of this advisory. NTPv4 is currently\ndocumented in draft-ietf-ntp-ntpv4-proto-11 leavingcisco.com\n\nWhen a Cisco IOS Software device supporting NTPv4 receives a specific\nNTP packet it will crash while creating the NTP reply packet. The NTP\npacket can be sent from any remote device, and does not require\nauthentication. Cisco IOS devices supporting NTPv4 and configured\nwith NTP peer authentication are still vulnerable. The device does\nnot have to be explicitly configured for NTPv4 peers. For example a\ndevice configured with all NTP peers being explicitly labeled as\nversion 2 would still be vulnerable, as shown in the following\nexample:\n\n Router#show running-config | include ntp\n ntp peer 192.168.0.254 version 2\n ntp peer 192.168.0.1 version 2\n Router#\n\nFor further information on the Cisco implementation of NTP, consult\nthe configuration guide \"Cisco IOS and NX-OS Software - Performing\nBasic System Management\" at the following link:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1001170\n\nThis vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: \nCSCsu24505 and CSCsv75948 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities\nand Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2009-2869. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n=============================\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at:\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\nCSCsu24505, CSCsv75948 - Cisco IOS Software NTP Packet Vulnerability\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\nAccess Vector - Network\nAccess Complexity - Low\nAuthentication - None\nConfidentiality Impact - None\nIntegrity Impact - None\nAvailability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\nExploitability - Functional\nRemediation Level - Official-Fix\nReport Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in a reload\nof the device. The vulnerability could be repeatedly exploited to\ncause an extended DoS condition. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\n\nand any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete\nupgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nEach row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS\nrelease train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the\nearliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the\nanticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed\nin the \"First Fixed Release\" column of the table. The \"Recommended\nRelease\" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the\npublished vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device\nrunning a release in the given train that is earlier than the release\nin a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to\nbe vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or\nlater than the release in the \"Recommended Releases\" column of the\ntable. \n\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| Major | Availability of Repaired Releases |\n| Release | |\n|------------+------------------------------------------------------|\n| Affected | | Recommended |\n| 12.0-Based | First Fixed Release | Release |\n| Releases | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| There are no affected 12.0 based releases |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Affected | | Recommended |\n| 12.1-Based | First Fixed Release | Release |\n| Releases | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| There are no affected 12.1 based releases |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Affected | | Recommended |\n| 12.2-Based | First Fixed Release | Release |\n| Releases | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| There are no affected 12.2 based releases |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Affected | | Recommended |\n| 12.3-Based | First Fixed Release | Release |\n| Releases | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| There are no affected 12.3 based releases |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Affected | | Recommended |\n| 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release | Release |\n| Releases | | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4 | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4GC | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JA | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JDA | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JDC | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JDD | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JK | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JL | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JMA | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JMB | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4JX | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| | Releases prior to 12.4(22)MD are not | |\n| 12.4MD | vulnerable, vulnerability was first | 12.4(22)MD1 |\n| | introduced in 12.4(22)MD, first fixed | |\n| | in 12.4(22)MD1. | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4MDA | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4MR | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4SW | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| | Releases prior to 12.4(20)T are not | |\n| | vulnerable. | |\n| | | 12.4(20)T4 |\n| | 12.4(20)T and 12.4(20)T1 are | |\n| | vulnerable, vulnerability is first | 12.4(22)T3 |\n| 12.4T | fixed in 12.4(20)T2. | |\n| | | 12.4(24)T2; |\n| | 12.4(22)T is vulnerable, | Available on |\n| | vulnerability is first fixed in 12.4 | 23-OCT-2009 |\n| | (22)T1 | |\n| | | |\n| | 12.4(24)T is not vulnerable. | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XA | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XB | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XC | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XD | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XE | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XF | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XG | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XJ | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XK | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XL | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XM | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XN | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XP | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XQ | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XR | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XT | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XV | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XW | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4XY | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| | | 12.4(20)T4 |\n| | | |\n| | | 12.4(22)T3 |\n| 12.4XZ | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | |\n| | | 12.4(24)T2; |\n| | | Available on |\n| | | 23-OCT-2009 |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| | | 12.4(20)T4 |\n| | | |\n| | | 12.4(22)T3 |\n| 12.4YA | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | |\n| | | 12.4(24)T2; |\n| | | Available on |\n| | | 23-OCT-2009 |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4YB | Not Vulnerable | |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4YD | 12.4(22)YD1 | 12.4(22)YD1 |\n|------------+---------------------------------------+--------------|\n| 12.4YE | 12.4(22)YE1 | 12.4(22)YE1 |\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nThere are no workarounds other than disabling NTP on the device. The\nfollowing mitigations have been identified for this vulnerability;\nonly packets destined for any configured IP address on the device can\nexploit this vulnerability. Transit traffic will not exploit this\nvulnerability. \n\nNote: NTP peer authentication is not a workaround and is still a\nvulnerable configuration. \n\nNTP Access Group\n+---------------\n\nWarning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes\nUDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender\u0027s IP address,\nwhich may defeat access control lists (ACLs) that permit\ncommunication to these ports from trusted IP addresses. Unicast\nReverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) should be considered to be used\nin conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution. \n\n \n !--- Configure trusted peers for allowed access\n \n \n access-list 1 permit 171.70.173.55\n \n \n !--- Apply ACE to the NTP configuration\n \n \n ntp access-group 1\n\nFor additional information on NTP access control groups, consult the\ndocument titled \"Performing Basic System Management\" at the following\nlink:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1034942\n\nInfrastructure Access Control Lists\n+----------------------------------\n\nwarning Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes\nUDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender\u0027s IP address,\nwhich may defeat ACLs that permit communication to these ports from\ntrusted IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in\nconjunction to offer a better mitigation solution. \n\nAlthough it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a\nnetwork, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be\nallowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic at\nthe border of networks. Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are a network\nsecurity best practice and should be considered as a long-term\naddition to good network security as well as a workaround for this\nspecific vulnerability. The iACL example below should be included as\npart of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will help\nprotect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP\naddress range:\n\n \n !---\n !--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)\n !---\n \n \n access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD \n INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123\n \n \n !--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP broadcast client\n !--- via the interface command \"ntp broadcast client\"\n !--- then broadcast and directed broadcasts must be \n !--- filtered as well. The following example covers\n !--- an infrastructure address space of 192.168.0.X\n \n \n access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD \n host 192.168.0.255 eq ntp\n access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD \n host 255.255.255.255 eq ntp\n \n \n !--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP multicast client\n !--- via the interface command \"ntp multicast client\"\n !--- then multicast IP packets to the mutlicast group must\n !--- be filtered as well. The following example covers\n !--- a NTP multicast group of 239.0.0.1 (Default is\n !--- 224.0.1.1)\n \n \n access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD \n host 239.0.0.1 eq ntp\n \n \n !--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined\n !--- to infrastructure addresses. \n \n \n access-list 150 deny udp any \n INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123\n \n \n !--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in\n !--- accordance with existing security policies and\n !--- configurations. Permit all other traffic to transit the\n !--- device. \n \n \n access-list 150 permit ip any any\n \n \n !--- Apply access-list to all interfaces (only one example\n !--- shown)\n \n \n interface fastEthernet 2/0\n ip access-group 150 in\n\nThe white paper entitled \"Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure\nProtection Access Control Lists\" presents guidelines and recommended\ndeployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists and\nis available at the following link:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml\n\nControl Plane Policing\n+---------------------\n\nWarning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a\ntransport, it is possible to spoof the sender\u0027s IP address, which may\ndefeat ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP\naddresses. Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction\nto offer a better mitigation solution. \n\nControl Plane Policing (CoPP) can be used to block untrusted UDP\ntraffic to the device. CoPP can be\nconfigured on a device to help protect the management and control\nplanes and minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct\ninfrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized\ntraffic that is sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with\nexisting security policies and configurations. The CoPP example below\nshould be included as part of the deployed CoPP, which will help\nprotect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP\naddress range. \n\n \n !--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)\n \n \n access-list 150 deny udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD\n any eq 123\n \n \n !--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined\n !--- to the device control plane. \n \n \n access-list 150 permit udp any any eq 123\n \n \n !--- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and \n !--- Layer4 traffic in accordance with existing security policies\n !--- and configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent\n !--- to infrastructure devices\n !--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by\n !--- the CoPP feature\n \n \n class-map match-all drop-udp-class\n match access-group 150\n \n \n !--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the\n !--- Control-Plane of the device. \n \n \n policy-map drop-udp-traffic\n class drop-udp-class\n drop\n \n \n !--- Apply the Policy-Map to the \n !--- Control-Plane of the device\n \n \n control-plane\n service-policy input drop-udp-traffic\n\nIn the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs)\nthat match the potential exploit packets with the \"permit\" action\nresult in these packets being discarded by the policy-map \"drop\"\nfunction, while packets that match the \"deny\" action (not shown) are\nnot affected by the policy-map drop function. Please note that the\npolicy-map syntax is different in the 12.2S and 12.0S Cisco IOS\nSoftware trains:\n\n policy-map drop-udp-traffic\n class drop-udp-class\n police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop\n\nAdditional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP\nfeature can be found in the documents, \"Control Plane Policing\nImplementation Best Practices\" and \"Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2\nS - Control Plane Policing\" at the following links:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html\n\nand\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html\n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that address these\nvulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should\nconsult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature\nset compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\nby the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html\n\nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml\n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\nis deployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through\ntheir point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco\nTechnical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to\na free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be\nrequested through the TAC. \n\nRefer to:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html\n\nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various\nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory. \n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Cisco when handling customer\nsupport calls. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an\nuncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain\nfactual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on\nmailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are\nencouraged to check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+----------------------------------------+\n| Revision | | Initial |\n| 1.0 | 2009-September-23 | public |\n| | | release |\n+----------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html\n\nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security\nnotices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\niD8DBQFKukGW86n/Gc8U/uARAjmYAJ0f6SVZp7qLXI0HFG5I0cYzxtFfAACeIvG2\njuvYatuemQrQUj8hfg2v0lQ=\n=KnSP\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n. ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nDo you have VARM strategy implemented?\n\n(Vulnerability Assessment Remediation Management) \n\nIf not, then implement it through the most reliable vulnerability\nintelligence source on the market. \n\nImplement it through Secunia. \n\nFor more information visit:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/\n\nAlternatively request a call from a Secunia representative today to\ndiscuss how we can help you with our capabilities contact us at:\nsales@secunia.com\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nTITLE:\nCisco IOS Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nSECUNIA ADVISORY ID:\nSA36835\n\nVERIFY ADVISORY:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/36835/\n\nDESCRIPTION:\nSome vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco IOS, which can be\nexploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service),\nbypass certain security restrictions, disclose sensitive information,\nor compromise a vulnerable device. \n\n1) An error exists in the login section of the Extension Mobility\nfeature of the Cisco Unified CME (Communications Manager Express)\ncomponent. This can be exploited to cause a buffer overflow via\nspecially crafted HTTP requests. \n\nSuccessful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary code. \n\n2) An error in the IKE implementation can be exploited to allocate\nall available Phase 1 SAs and prevent new IPSec sessions from being\nestablished. \n\nSuccessful exploitation requires that the IKE certificate based\nauthentication method is used. \n\n3) Multiple errors exist in the IP tunnelling implementation when\nswitching network packets. These can be exploited to trigger a device\nreload via specially crafted packets. \n\nSuccessful exploitation requires that the device is configured for\nPPTP, GRE, IPinIP, Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6, or IPv6 over IP\ntunnels, and Cisco Express Forwarding. \n\n4) An error in the implementation of the Object Groups for ACLs\nfeature can be exploited to bypass access control policies. \n\n5) An error in the H.323 implementation can be exploited to trigger a\ndevice reload via specially crafted TCP packets. \n\nSuccessful exploitation requires that H.323 is enabled (disabled by\ndefault). \n\n6) An error in the SIP implementation related to the Cisco Unified\nBorder Element feature can be exploited to trigger a device reload. \n\nFor more information:\nSA36836\n\n7) An error in the SSLVPN, SSH, and IKE Encrypted Nonces features can\nbe exploited to reload a device via specially crafted packets sent to\nTCP ports 22 (for SSH) or 443 (for SSLVPN), or UDP ports 500 and 4500\n(for IKE Encrypted Nonces). \n\n8) A race condition error exists in the Authentication Proxy for\nHTTP(S), Web Authentication, and consent features. This can be\nexploited to bypass the authentication proxy services and the consent\naccept web page if a successfully authenticated session or accepted\nconsent session exists. \n\n9) An error exists in the Cisco IOS Zone-Based Policy Firewall SIP\ninspection feature. This can be exploited to reload a device via a\nspecially crafted SIP transit packet. \n\nSOLUTION:\nUpdate to a fixed version (please see the vendor\u0027s advisories for\ndetails). \n\nPROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY:\n1, 3-10) Reported by the vendor. \n2) Reported to the vendor by a customer. \n\nORIGINAL ADVISORY:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-cme.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ipsec.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-tunnels.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-acl.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-h323.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-sip.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-tls.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-auth-proxy.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ios-fw.shtml\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.shtml\n\nOTHER REFERENCES:\nSA36836:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/36836/\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nAbout:\nThis Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help\neverybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest\nvulnerabilities. \n\nSubscribe:\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/\n\nDefinitions: (Criticality, Where etc.)\nhttp://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/\n\n\nPlease Note:\nSecunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by\nclicking the link. \nSecunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. \nSecunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only\nuse those supplied by the vendor. \n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nUnsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories\nhttp://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.