UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64655 (CVE-2026-64655)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-08-06 22:18 – Updated: 2026-08-13 00:13 – Source website
VLAI
Details

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  .  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  .  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "gh",
            "binary_version": "2.4.0+dfsg1-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
        "name": "gh",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/gh@2.4.0+dfsg1-2?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.4.0+dfsg1-1",
        "2.4.0+dfsg1-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "gh",
            "binary_version": "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3+esm3"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "gh",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/gh@2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3+esm3?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.27.0+dfsg1-1build1",
        "2.30.0-2",
        "2.35.0-1",
        "2.40.1+dfsg1-1",
        "2.42.1-1",
        "2.43.1-1",
        "2.44.1-1",
        "2.44.1-2",
        "2.45.0-1",
        "2.45.0-1build1",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.1",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm1",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.2+esm2",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3+esm1",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3+esm2",
        "2.45.0-1ubuntu0.3+esm3"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "gh",
            "binary_version": "2.46.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "gh",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/gh@2.46.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.46.0-3",
        "2.46.0-4",
        "2.46.0-4ubuntu0.26.04.1~esm1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub\u2019s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify\u00a0 builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow\u00a0 flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as \u00a0`.`\u00a0 in organization, repository, and workflow path names and \u00a0`.`\u00a0 is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example\u00a0github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64655",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T00:13:01Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T22:18:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-64655"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-64655"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/commit/55dbb4dc6b7edb10b48e3d7fc5bccd32318d1b55"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/tag/v2.97.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-64655"
  ]
}



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