UBUNTU-CVE-2026-53304 (CVE-2026-53304)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-06-26 20:17 – Updated: 2026-11-06 10:32 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: sg: Resolve soft lockup issue when opening /dev/sgX The parameter def_reserved_size defines the default buffer size reserved for each Sg_fd and should be restricted to a range between 0 and 1,048,576 (see https://tldp.org/HOWTO/SCSI-Generic-HOWTO/proc.html). Although the function sg_proc_write_dressz enforces this limit, it is possible to bypass it by directly modifying the module parameter as shown below, which then causes a soft lockup: echo -1 > /sys/module/sg/parameters/def_reserved_size exec 4<> /dev/sg0 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 26 seconds! [bash:537] Modules loaded: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 537 Command: bash, kernel version 6.19.0-rc3+ #134, PREEMPT disabled Hardware: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS version 1.16.1-2.fc37 dated 04/01/2014 ... Call Trace: sg_build_reserve+0x5c/0xa0 sg_add_sfp+0x168/0x270 sg_open+0x16e/0x340 chrdev_open+0xbe/0x230 do_dentry_open+0x175/0x480 vfs_open+0x34/0xf0 do_open+0x265/0x3d0 path_openat+0x110/0x290 do_filp_open+0xc3/0x170 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0xe0 __x64_sys_openat+0x6d/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x310 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The fix is to use module_param_cb to validate and reject invalid values assigned to def_reserved_size.

Severity
References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-53304 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53304 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/linus/d06a310b45e153872033… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1afd963fcd963db0d… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d74e0654ac908c65… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9676ca7b1ef31a3a6… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c47ccfb3d80dfed52… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5f4a211e82d04ccc… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d06a310b45e153872… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe671d3c84ffb1b76… REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/feade299e932967de… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8566-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8568-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8569-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8567-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8593-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8596-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8603-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8606-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8607-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8608-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8609-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8610-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8618-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8619-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-4 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8663-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8664-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8665-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-3 ADVISORY

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