UBUNTU-CVE-2026-53059 (CVE-2026-53059)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-06-24 17:17 – Updated: 2026-11-09 23:39 – Source website
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to region_count overflow The local variable region_count in create_log_context() is declared as unsigned int (32-bit), but dm_sector_div_up() returns sector_t (64-bit). When a device-mapper target has a sufficiently large ti->len with a small region_size, the division result can exceed UINT_MAX. The truncated value is then used to calculate bitset_size, causing clean_bits, sync_bits, and recovering_bits to be allocated far smaller than needed for the actual number of regions. Subsequent log operations (log_set_bit, log_clear_bit, log_test_bit) use region indices derived from the full untruncated region space, causing out-of-bounds writes to kernel heap memory allocated by vmalloc. This can be reproduced by creating a mirror target whose region_count overflows 32 bits: dmsetup create bigzero --table '0 8589934594 zero' dmsetup create mymirror --table '0 8589934594 mirror \ core 2 2 nosync 2 /dev/mapper/bigzero 0 \ /dev/mapper/bigzero 0' The status output confirms the truncation (sync_count=1 instead of 4294967297, because 0x100000001 was truncated to 1): $ dmsetup status mymirror 0 8589934594 mirror 2 254:1 254:1 1/4294967297 ... This leads to a kernel crash in core_in_sync: BUG: scheduling while atomic: (udev-worker)/9150/0x00000000 RIP: 0010:core_in_sync+0x14/0x30 [dm_log] CR2: 0000000000000008 Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! Fix by widening the local region_count to sector_t and adding an explicit overflow check before the value is assigned to lc->region_count.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
N/A (UNKNOWN)
low
References
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-53059 REPORT
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53059 REPORT
https://git.kernel.org/linus/c20e36b7631d83e75358… REPORT
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8566-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8568-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8569-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8567-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8593-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8596-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8576-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8603-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8606-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8607-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8608-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8609-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8575-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8610-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8618-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8574-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8595-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8619-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-3 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8620-4 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8663-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8664-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8665-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-1 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8668-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-2 ADVISORY
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8728-3 ADVISORY
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