UBUNTU-CVE-2026-105280 (CVE-2026-105280)

Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu – Published: 2026-10-12 16:17 – Updated: 2026-10-28 17:50 – Source website
VLAI
Details

Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in hexpm hex allows a package mirror to substitute the tarball that mix hex.package fetch PACKAGE VERSION --output - writes to standard output. Hex compares a fetched tarball's inner and outer checksums with the repository's signed registry before writing it to a file or unpacking it. The standard output branch of mix hex.package fetch writes the bytes returned by Hex.SCM.fetch/3 without that comparison, and Hex.SCM.fetch/3 doesn't verify freshly downloaded tarballs itself. When a mirror configured with HEX_MIRROR_URL or mirror_url serves altered bytes, the command prints them and exits successfully, while the same fetch with --output FILE fails with a checksum mismatch. Hex also prints diagnostics to standard output while the command runs: the body of a failed HTTP response from the update check or a registry fetch, and API warnings from the x-hex-message header. A mirror that answers one of those requests with an error whose body is a tar archive gets that archive written to standard output ahead of the verified tarball, so a pipeline that unpacks standard output extracts the mirror's files. This happens even when the checksum check then fails, because the archive is already on standard output. This issue affects hex: from 0.20.2 before 2.5.2.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N
N/A (UNKNOWN)
medium
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "erlang-hex",
            "binary_version": "2.0.5-1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
        "name": "erlang-hex",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/erlang-hex@2.0.5-1?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.0.5-1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "erlang-hex",
            "binary_version": "2.5.1-2"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.10",
        "name": "erlang-hex",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/erlang-hex@2.5.1-2?arch=source\u0026distro=stonking"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.0.6-2build1",
        "2.5.1-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "erlang-hex",
            "binary_version": "2.0.6-2build1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
        "name": "erlang-hex",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/erlang-hex@2.0.6-2build1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.0.6-2",
        "2.0.6-2build1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in hexpm hex allows a package mirror to substitute the tarball that mix hex.package fetch PACKAGE VERSION --output - writes to standard output. Hex compares a fetched tarball\u0027s inner and outer checksums with the repository\u0027s signed registry before writing it to a file or unpacking it. The standard output branch of mix hex.package fetch writes the bytes returned by Hex.SCM.fetch/3 without that comparison, and Hex.SCM.fetch/3 doesn\u0027t verify freshly downloaded tarballs itself. When a mirror configured with HEX_MIRROR_URL or mirror_url serves altered bytes, the command prints them and exits successfully, while the same fetch with --output FILE fails with a checksum mismatch. Hex also prints diagnostics to standard output while the command runs: the body of a failed HTTP response from the update check or a registry fetch, and API warnings from the x-hex-message header. A mirror that answers one of those requests with an error whose body is a tar archive gets that archive written to standard output ahead of the verified tarball, so a pipeline that unpacks standard output extracts the mirror\u0027s files. This happens even when the checksum check then fails, because the archive is already on standard output. This issue affects hex: from 0.20.2 before 2.5.2.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-105280",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T17:50:30Z",
  "published": "2026-10-12T16:17:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-105280"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-105280"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-105280.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/69489f8b74213f03db10169e6e5407e6d5fee512"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/8a14632ca6ba8a8afd2a3f2098bc267c13e13d93"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/d1f5a085d9d4748e1f7d195e4bc39ebd77c28d9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex/security/advisories/GHSA-98jr-23pm-vj7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-105280"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-105280"
  ]
}



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