SSA-185638
Vulnerability from csaf_siemens - Published: 2022-08-09 00:00 - Updated: 2022-08-09 00:00| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -25/+70°C
Siemens / CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -25/+70°C
|
6MF2101-0AB10-0AA0
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
No Fix Planned
|
|
CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -40/+70°C
Siemens / CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -40/+70°C
|
6MF2101-1AB10-0AA0
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
No Fix Planned
|
|
CP-8021 MASTER MODULE
Siemens / CP-8021 MASTER MODULE
|
6MF2802-1AA00
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
No Fix Planned
|
|
CP-8022 MASTER MODULE WITH GPRS
Siemens / CP-8022 MASTER MODULE WITH GPRS
|
6MF2802-2AA00
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
No Fix Planned
|
{
"document": {
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Disclosure is not limited.",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE"
}
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "A vulnerability was identified in the web server module used in the\nSICAM A8000 CP-8000, CP-8021 and CP-8022 devices\u0027 protocol firmwares.\n- AGPMT0 (AGP Master) - DNPiT1 (DNP3 TCP/IP Server) - DNPiT2 (DNP3\nTCP/IP Client) - DNPMT0 (DNP3 Master seriell) - DNPST0 (DNP3 Slave\nseriell) - ET83 (61850 Ed.1) - ET85 (61850 Ed.2) - MBCiT0 (MODBUS\nTCP/IP Client) - MBSiT0 (MODBUS TCP/IP Server) - MODMT2 (MODBUS\nMaster seriell) - OPUPT0 (OPCUA Pub/Sub) - OPUPT1 (Mindconnect)\nThe vulnerability could allow unauthenticated access to the web\ninterface of the affected web server module. The module is used for\ndiagnostic purposes as well as commissioning and has to be activated\nmanually within the protocol firmwares. For this reason the protocol\nfirmwares are secure by default. Siemens updated the manual to make\nthe situation transparent and raise awareness for operators.\nSiemens recommends countermeasures for products where updates are not,\nor not yet available.",
"title": "Summary"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Operators of critical power systems (e.g. TSOs or DSOs) worldwide are\nusually required by regulations to build resilience into the power\ngrids by applying multi-level redundant secondary protection schemes.\nIt is therefore recommended that the operators check whether\nappropriate resilient protection measures are in place. The risk of\ncyber incidents impacting the grid\u0027s reliability can thus be minimized\nby virtue of the grid design.\n\nSiemens strongly recommends applying the provided security updates\nusing the corresponding tooling and documented procedures made\navailable with the product. If supported by the product, an automated\nmeans to apply the security updates across multiple product instances\nmay be used. Siemens strongly recommends prior validation of any\nsecurity update before being applied, and supervision by trained staff\nof the update process in the target environment.\n\nAs a general security measure Siemens strongly recommends to protect\nnetwork access with appropriate mechanisms (e.g. firewalls,\nsegmentation, VPN). It is advised to configure the environment\naccording to our operational guidelines in order to run the devices in\na protected IT environment.\n\nRecommended security guidelines can be found at:\n\nhttps://www.siemens.com/gridsecurity",
"title": "General Recommendations"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "For further inquiries on security vulnerabilities in Siemens products and solutions, please contact the Siemens ProductCERT: https://www.siemens.com/cert/advisories",
"title": "Additional Resources"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "Siemens Security Advisories are subject to the terms and conditions contained in Siemens\u0027 underlying license terms or other applicable agreements previously agreed to with Siemens (hereinafter \"License Terms\"). To the extent applicable to information, software or documentation made available in or through a Siemens Security Advisory, the Terms of Use of Siemens\u0027 Global Website (https://www.siemens.com/terms_of_use, hereinafter \"Terms of Use\"), in particular Sections 8-10 of the Terms of Use, shall apply additionally. In case of conflicts, the License Terms shall prevail over the Terms of Use.",
"title": "Terms of Use"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "vendor",
"contact_details": "productcert@siemens.com",
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT",
"namespace": "https://www.siemens.com"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-185638: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in SICAM A8000 Web Server Module - PDF Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-185638.pdf"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-185638: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in SICAM A8000 Web Server Module - TXT Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/txt/ssa-185638.txt"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-185638: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in SICAM A8000 Web Server Module - CSAF Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/csaf/ssa-185638.json"
}
],
"title": "SSA-185638: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in SICAM A8000 Web Server Module",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2022-08-09T00:00:00Z",
"generator": {
"engine": {
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT CSAF Generator",
"version": "1"
}
},
"id": "SSA-185638",
"initial_release_date": "2022-08-09T00:00:00Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2022-08-09T00:00:00Z",
"legacy_version": "1.0",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Publication Date"
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -25/+70\u00b0C",
"product_id": "1",
"product_identification_helper": {
"model_numbers": [
"6MF2101-0AB10-0AA0"
]
}
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -25/+70\u00b0C"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -40/+70\u00b0C",
"product_id": "2",
"product_identification_helper": {
"model_numbers": [
"6MF2101-1AB10-0AA0"
]
}
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "CP-8000 MASTER MODULE WITH I/O -40/+70\u00b0C"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "CP-8021 MASTER MODULE",
"product_id": "3",
"product_identification_helper": {
"model_numbers": [
"6MF2802-1AA00"
]
}
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "CP-8021 MASTER MODULE"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "CP-8022 MASTER MODULE WITH GPRS",
"product_id": "4",
"product_identification_helper": {
"model_numbers": [
"6MF2802-2AA00"
]
}
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "CP-8022 MASTER MODULE WITH GPRS"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Siemens"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2021-46304",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-284",
"name": "Improper Access Control"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "The component allows to activate a web server module which provides unauthenticated access to its web pages. This could allow an attacker to retrieve debug-level information from the component such as internal network topology or connected systems.",
"title": "Summary"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "Operate the affected web server module only when required and consider\nthe security instructions provided in the updated manual (see also\nAdditional Information chapter)",
"product_ids": [
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
]
},
{
"category": "no_fix_planned",
"details": "Currently no fix is planned",
"product_ids": [
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
]
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"1",
"2",
"3",
"4"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2021-46304"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.