SSA-159454
Vulnerability from csaf_siemens - Published: 2026-10-13 00:00 - Updated: 2026-10-13 00:00A BIOS vendor test key is present in the UEFI Secure Boot key database. This could allow a local attacker with physical or administrative access to the device to boot an operating system or UEFI application signed with that test key, bypassing UEFI Secure Boot protections even when Secure Boot is enabled, potentially leading to a full loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the device.
| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
SIMATIC IPC BX-21A < V31.01.13
Siemens / SIMATIC IPC BX-21A
|
vers:intdot/<31.01.13 |
Mitigation
Mitigation
Vendor Fix
fix
|
|
|
SIMATIC IPC RW-543A < V1.1.4
Siemens / SIMATIC IPC RW-543A
|
vers:intdot/<1.1.4 |
Mitigation
Mitigation
Vendor Fix
fix
|
|
|
SIMATIC IPC227G / IPC277G / IPC277G PRO / IPC327G / IPC377G < V28.01.15
Siemens / SIMATIC IPC227G / IPC277G / IPC277G PRO / IPC327G / IPC377G
|
vers:intdot/<28.01.15 |
Mitigation
Mitigation
Vendor Fix
fix
|
{
"document": {
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Disclosure is not limited. (TLPv2: TLP:CLEAR)",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE"
}
},
"lang": "en",
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "The products listed below contain a vulnerability that could allow an attacker to boot an operating system or UEFI application signed with that test key, bypassing UEFI Secure Boot protections even when Secure Boot is enabled.\n\nSiemens has released new versions for the affected products and recommends to update to the latest versions.",
"title": "Summary"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "As a general security measure, Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. In order to operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends to configure the environment according to Siemens\u0027 operational guidelines for Industrial Security (Download: https://www.siemens.com/cert/operational-guidelines-industrial-security), and to follow the recommendations in the product manuals.\nAdditional information on Industrial Security by Siemens can be found at: https://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity",
"title": "General Recommendations"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "For further inquiries on security vulnerabilities in Siemens products and solutions, please contact the Siemens ProductCERT: https://www.siemens.com/cert/advisories",
"title": "Additional Resources"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "The use of Siemens Security Advisories is subject to the terms and conditions listed on: https://www.siemens.com/productcert/terms-of-use.",
"title": "Terms of Use"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "vendor",
"contact_details": "productcert@siemens.com",
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT",
"namespace": "https://www.siemens.com"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-159454: Hard-coded Key Vulnerability in SIMATIC IPCs - HTML Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-159454.html"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-159454: Hard-coded Key Vulnerability in SIMATIC IPCs - CSAF Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/csaf/ssa-159454.json"
}
],
"title": "SSA-159454: Hard-coded Key Vulnerability in SIMATIC IPCs",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2026-10-13T00:00:00.000Z",
"generator": {
"engine": {
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT CSAF Generator",
"version": "1"
}
},
"id": "SSA-159454",
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-13T00:00:00.000Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2026-10-13T00:00:00.000Z",
"legacy_version": "1.0",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Publication Date"
}
],
"status": "interim",
"version": "1"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:intdot/\u003c31.01.13",
"product": {
"name": "SIMATIC IPC BX-21A \u003c V31.01.13",
"product_id": "1"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SIMATIC IPC BX-21A"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:intdot/\u003c1.1.4",
"product": {
"name": "SIMATIC IPC RW-543A \u003c V1.1.4",
"product_id": "2"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SIMATIC IPC RW-543A"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:intdot/\u003c28.01.15",
"product": {
"name": "SIMATIC IPC227G / IPC277G / IPC277G PRO / IPC327G / IPC377G \u003c V28.01.15",
"product_id": "3"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SIMATIC IPC227G / IPC277G / IPC277G PRO / IPC327G / IPC377G"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Siemens"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2026-72895",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-1394",
"name": "Use of Default Cryptographic Key"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "description",
"text": "A BIOS vendor test key is present in the UEFI Secure Boot key database. This could allow a local attacker with physical or administrative access to the device to boot an operating system or UEFI application signed with that test key, bypassing UEFI Secure Boot protections even when Secure Boot is enabled, potentially leading to a full loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the device.",
"title": "CVE Description"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"1",
"2",
"3"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "\u003cbr/\u003eNote: After upgrading to the fixed BIOS version, users must load the BIOS default settings. If Secure Boot keys were already provisioned, they must be provisioned again afterwards.",
"product_ids": [
"1",
"2"
]
},
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "\u003cbr/\u003eNote: After upgrading to the fixed BIOS version, users must load the BIOS default settings. If Secure Boot keys were already provisioned, they must be provisioned again afterwards.",
"product_ids": [
"3"
]
},
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "As a temporary mitigation, users can manually remove the test key from the database (e.g., \"DO NOT TRUST - AMI Test PK\" for RW-543A or \"insyde-ElkhartLake\" for IPC227G/277G/327G/377G and BX-21A). Note: Loading default settings will restore the test key, so upgrading remains recommended.",
"product_ids": [
"1",
"2",
"3"
]
},
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "Update to V1.1.4 or later version",
"product_ids": [
"2"
],
"url": "https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109763408/"
},
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "Update to V28.01.15 or later version",
"product_ids": [
"3"
],
"url": "https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109763408/"
},
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "Update to V31.01.13 or later version",
"product_ids": [
"1"
],
"url": "https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109763408/"
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"1",
"2",
"3"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2026-72895"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.