RUSTSEC-2026-0481 (CVE-2026-42067)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-10 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-11 08:37 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
`verify_x509_cert` does not check the certificate validity period
Details

tdx_workload_attestation::verification::x509::verify_x509_cert(), available with the host-verification feature, checked that issuer_cert issued cert and verified the certificate signature. It did not check the certificate's validity period, so it accepted expired and not-yet-valid certificates.

With the host-gcp-tdx feature, this function validates the GCP launch endorsement signing certificate against the GCE confidential-computing TCB root certificate. A signing certificate outside its validity period was therefore still accepted during launch endorsement verification.

Intel describes the issue as improper certificate validation and classifies it as escalation of privilege, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.9, in INTEL-SA-01520.

The flaw was corrected in #86, released in 0.2.0. The function now returns Ok(false) when the current time is outside the certificate's notBefore/notAfter range.

Reported by Borys Tsyrulnikov.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "tdx_workload_attestation::verification::x509::verify_x509_cert"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "tdx_workload_attestation",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/tdx_workload_attestation"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42067",
    "GHSA-w4mf-755j-wjwc"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`tdx_workload_attestation::verification::x509::verify_x509_cert()`, available\nwith the `host-verification` feature, checked that `issuer_cert` issued `cert`\nand verified the certificate signature. It did not check the certificate\u0027s\nvalidity period, so it accepted expired and not-yet-valid certificates.\n\nWith the `host-gcp-tdx` feature, this function validates the GCP launch\nendorsement signing certificate against the GCE confidential-computing TCB\nroot certificate. A signing certificate outside its validity period was\ntherefore still accepted during launch endorsement verification.\n\nIntel describes the issue as improper certificate validation and classifies\nit as escalation of privilege, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.9, in\nINTEL-SA-01520.\n\nThe flaw was corrected in\n[#86](https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/pull/86), released\nin 0.2.0. The function now returns `Ok(false)` when the current time is\noutside the certificate\u0027s `notBefore`/`notAfter` range.\n\nReported by [Borys Tsyrulnikov](https://borystsyrulnikov.dev).",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0481",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T08:37:09Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/tdx_workload_attestation"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0481.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01520.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/pull/86"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/releases/tag/v0.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`verify_x509_cert` does not check the certificate validity period"
}



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