RUSTSEC-2026-0480 (CVE-2026-40693)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-10 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-11 08:37 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Panic on a GCP launch endorsement without TDX measurements
Details

GcpTdxHost::verify_launch_endorsement(), available with the host-gcp-tdx feature, read uefi_golden.tdx.measurements[0] without checking that the golden measurement contains a TDX measurement. If a launch endorsement's golden measurement had no TDX measurements, the call panicked with an index out of bounds instead of returning an error.

The panic is reached only after the endorsement's signing certificate and signature have been verified. Triggering it therefore requires a correctly signed endorsement that lacks TDX measurements.

Intel describes the issue as improper input validation and classifies it as denial of service, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.7, in INTEL-SA-01520.

The flaw was corrected in #87, released in 0.2.0. The function now returns Error::ParseError when the TDX measurement structure is missing or empty.

Reported by Borys Tsyrulnikov.

Severity
5.7 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "tdx_workload_attestation::gcp::GcpTdxHost::verify_launch_endorsement"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "tdx_workload_attestation",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/tdx_workload_attestation"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40693",
    "GHSA-gwf2-8595-qw97"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`GcpTdxHost::verify_launch_endorsement()`, available with the `host-gcp-tdx`\nfeature, read `uefi_golden.tdx.measurements[0]` without checking that the\ngolden measurement contains a TDX measurement. If a launch endorsement\u0027s\ngolden measurement had no TDX measurements, the call panicked with an index\nout of bounds instead of returning an error.\n\nThe panic is reached only after the endorsement\u0027s signing certificate and\nsignature have been verified. Triggering it therefore requires a correctly\nsigned endorsement that lacks TDX measurements.\n\nIntel describes the issue as improper input validation and classifies it as\ndenial of service, with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.7, in INTEL-SA-01520.\n\nThe flaw was corrected in\n[#87](https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/pull/87), released\nin 0.2.0. The function now returns `Error::ParseError` when the TDX\nmeasurement structure is missing or empty.\n\nReported by [Borys Tsyrulnikov](https://borystsyrulnikov.dev).",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0480",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T08:37:09Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/tdx_workload_attestation"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0480.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01520.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/pull/87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IntelLabs/tdx-workload-attestation/releases/tag/v0.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Panic on a GCP launch endorsement without TDX measurements"
}



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