RUSTSEC-2026-0450
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-30 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-06 14:42 – Source websiteWhen ocipkg unpacks an OCI archive, the destination directory is derived from the
image name, which ocipkg reads from the archive's own index.json
(org.opencontainers.image.ref.name). That name is attacker-controlled, and
ImageName::parse accepts a hostname of .., so the computed destination escapes the
local image store. A "zip-slip"-style path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). This is esclatable to code execution.
In Artifact::unpack (src/image/artifact.rs), the destination is
image_dir(name) = data_dir().join(name.as_path()) (src/local/mod.rs:31), where the
name comes from get_name_from_index (src/image/layout.rs:114-124):
let image_name = self.base.get_name()?; // from the archive's index.json ref.name
let dest = image_dir(&image_name)?; // data_dir().join(name.as_path()); hostname ".." escapes
if dest.exists() {
if overwrite {
fs::remove_dir_all(&dest)?; // deletes a directory OUTSIDE the store
}
}
fs::create_dir_all(&dest)?;
// ... each tar layer is then unpacked under `dest` (also outside the store)
The fix
Fixed in ocipkg 0.4.1 by PR #223. The leading
reference component is validated against the org.opencontainers.image.ref.name grammar from OCI
Image Specification 1.1.1 on parse and deserialization, and local::image_dir revalidates the name
and rejects any non-normal path component (e.g. ..) before any filesystem mutation, so a crafted
archive can no longer escape the local image store.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"code-execution"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"ocipkg::image::load"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "ocipkg",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/ocipkg"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "When `ocipkg` unpacks an OCI archive, the destination directory is derived from the\nimage name, which `ocipkg` reads from the archive\u0027s **own** `index.json`\n(`org.opencontainers.image.ref.name`). That name is attacker-controlled, and\n`ImageName::parse` accepts a hostname of `..`, so the computed destination escapes the\nlocal image store. A \"zip-slip\"-style path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). This is esclatable to code execution.\n\nIn `Artifact::unpack` (`src/image/artifact.rs`), the destination is\n`image_dir(name) = data_dir().join(name.as_path())` (`src/local/mod.rs:31`), where the\nname comes from `get_name_from_index` (`src/image/layout.rs:114-124`):\n\n```rust\nlet image_name = self.base.get_name()?; // from the archive\u0027s index.json ref.name\nlet dest = image_dir(\u0026image_name)?; // data_dir().join(name.as_path()); hostname \"..\" escapes\nif dest.exists() {\n if overwrite {\n fs::remove_dir_all(\u0026dest)?; // deletes a directory OUTSIDE the store\n }\n}\nfs::create_dir_all(\u0026dest)?;\n// ... each tar layer is then unpacked under `dest` (also outside the store)\n```\n\n## The fix\n\nFixed in `ocipkg` 0.4.1 by [PR #223](https://github.com/termoshtt/ocipkg/pull/223). The leading\nreference component is validated against the `org.opencontainers.image.ref.name` grammar from OCI\nImage Specification 1.1.1 on parse and deserialization, and `local::image_dir` revalidates the name\nand rejects any non-normal path component (e.g. `..`) before any filesystem mutation, so a crafted\narchive can no longer escape the local image store.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0450",
"modified": "2026-11-06T14:42:53Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/ocipkg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0450.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/termoshtt/ocipkg/issues/222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/termoshtt/ocipkg/pull/223"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "`ocipkg`: unpacking an OCI archive can write and delete files outside the local image store (path traversal)"
}
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