RUSTSEC-2026-0434
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-31 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-02 11:17 – Source websiteant-releases downloads and unpacks release archives from the safe_network / autonomi repositories. When it extracts an archive, it builds each output path by joining the archive entry's own name onto the destination directory, with no check
for .. or absolute components — a classic "zip-slip" path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). A crafted archive can therefore create or overwrite files outside the intended extraction directory.
In extract_release_archive (src/lib.rs), the ZIP branch does:
let out_path = dest_dir_path.join(file.name()); // raw zip entry name, no containment check
if file.name().ends_with('/') {
std::fs::create_dir_all(&out_path)?; // dir created outside dest_dir
} else {
let mut outfile = std::fs::File::create(&out_path)?; // file written outside dest_dir
std::io::copy(&mut file, &mut outfile)?;
}
Proof of concept
A one-entry ZIP whose entry name is ../foo_pwned.txt, passed to AntReleaseRepoActions::extract_release_archive (obtained via the crate's public <dyn AntReleaseRepoActions>::default_config()), writes foo_pwned.txt as a sibling of
the destination directory, outside it. Confirmed against the published 0.4.3 crate.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"code-execution"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"ant_releases::AntReleaseRepoActions::extract_release_archive"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "ant-releases",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/ant-releases"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`ant-releases` downloads and unpacks release archives from the `safe_network` / `autonomi` repositories. When it extracts an archive, it builds each output path by joining the archive entry\u0027s **own name** onto the destination directory, with no check\nfor `..` or absolute components \u2014 a classic \"zip-slip\" path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). A crafted archive can therefore create or overwrite files outside the intended extraction directory.\n\nIn `extract_release_archive` (`src/lib.rs`), the ZIP branch does:\n\n```rust\nlet out_path = dest_dir_path.join(file.name()); // raw zip entry name, no containment check\nif file.name().ends_with(\u0027/\u0027) {\n std::fs::create_dir_all(\u0026out_path)?; // dir created outside dest_dir\n} else {\n let mut outfile = std::fs::File::create(\u0026out_path)?; // file written outside dest_dir\n std::io::copy(\u0026mut file, \u0026mut outfile)?;\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA one-entry ZIP whose entry name is `../foo_pwned.txt`, passed to `AntReleaseRepoActions::extract_release_archive` (obtained via the crate\u0027s public `\u003cdyn AntReleaseRepoActions\u003e::default_config()`), writes `foo_pwned.txt` as a sibling of\nthe destination directory, outside it. Confirmed against the published `0.4.3` crate.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0434",
"modified": "2026-11-02T11:17:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-31T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/ant-releases"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0434.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/maidsafe/ant-releases"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "`ant-releases`: extracting a release archive can write files outside the destination directory (path traversal / zip-slip)"
}
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