RUSTSEC-2026-0428 (GHSA-XCC6-F2JQ-43X6)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-30 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-30 11:12 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
BLAKE2b produces wrong tag when using `reset()` with a different-length key
Details

Summary

hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::reset() does not correctly reset the state when a key is supplied that has a different length than the one used upon initialization with hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::new(), because it errorneously uses a cached length.

Impact

Initialization hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b with a key of some length N, followed by a reset with a key of length != N will produce an incorrect BLAKE2b tag, causing hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::verify() to fail. This means under honest protocol conditions, parties could experience failing tag verifications.

Resolution

Upgrade to v0.17.16 or v0.18.1.

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "orion::hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::reset"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "orion",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/orion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.16"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.18.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-xcc6-f2jq-43x6"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::reset()` does not correctly reset the state when a key is supplied that has a different length than the one used upon initialization with `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::new()`, because it errorneously uses a cached length. \n\n## Impact\n\nInitialization `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b` with a key of some length `N`, followed by a reset with a key of length `!= N` will produce an incorrect BLAKE2b tag, causing `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::verify()` to fail. This means under honest protocol conditions, parties could experience failing tag verifications.\n\n## Resolution\n\nUpgrade to `v0.17.16` or `v0.18.1`.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0428",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T11:12:39Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/orion"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0428.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/orion-rs/orion/pull/690"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "BLAKE2b produces wrong tag when using `reset()` with a different-length key"
}



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