RUSTSEC-2026-0405
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-16 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-02 09:18 – Source websiteInBuffer's fields are public, so safe code can set pos past the end of
src. The position was passed to the C library unchecked, and
ZSTD_seekable_compressStream, unlike the other streaming functions, does
not validate it: it read past the end of the input slice, by up to the
frame size, and compressed that memory into the output.
The flaw was corrected by checking the position before every call into the C library.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-exposure"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": "unsound"
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"zstd_safe::seekable::SeekableCStream::compress_stream"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "zstd-safe",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/zstd-safe"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "7.4.0"
},
{
"introduced": "8.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.2.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`InBuffer`\u0027s fields are public, so safe code can set `pos` past the end of\n`src`. The position was passed to the C library unchecked, and\n`ZSTD_seekable_compressStream`, unlike the other streaming functions, does\nnot validate it: it read past the end of the input slice, by up to the\nframe size, and compressed that memory into the output.\n\nThe flaw was corrected by checking the position before every call into the\nC library.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0405",
"modified": "2026-11-02T09:18:23Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/zstd-safe"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0405.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gyscos/zstd-rs/commit/20d397c0d68d8b4300c5493875ebfa10e355fcdd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gyscos/zstd-rs/pull/384"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Out-of-bounds read with an out-of-range `InBuffer::pos`"
}
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