RUSTSEC-2026-0302

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-22 12:00 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
`stack-graphs` C API exports are safe `extern "C"` functions
Details

stack_graphs::c is a public module. From 0.0.3 through the current crates.io release 0.14.1, its pointer-taking entry points are pub extern "C" fn rather than unsafe fn. Safe Rust can call them.

sg_stack_graph_free frees the pointer with Box::from_raw. sg_stack_graph_free(std::ptr::null_mut()) is immediate undefined behavior. The same shape is used by the other *_free exports and by getters and mutators that dereference the caller-supplied pointer or pass it to from_raw_parts (sg_stack_graph_nodes, sg_stack_graph_add_edges, and the rest of the pointer-taking functions in src/c.rs). Constructors that take no pointer are not part of this issue.

The upstream repository is archived, so a fix cannot be filed there and no patched release exists. The soundness fix is to make every pointer-taking export unsafe extern "C" fn, with a safety comment that the pointer is non-null and, for free, came from the matching constructor.

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": "unsound"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "stack_graphs::c::sg_stack_graph_free"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "stack-graphs",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/stack-graphs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.3-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`stack_graphs::c` is a public module. From 0.0.3 through the current crates.io release 0.14.1, its pointer-taking entry points are `pub extern \"C\" fn` rather than `unsafe fn`. Safe Rust can call them.\n\n`sg_stack_graph_free` frees the pointer with `Box::from_raw`. `sg_stack_graph_free(std::ptr::null_mut())` is immediate undefined behavior. The same shape is used by the other `*_free` exports and by getters and mutators that dereference the caller-supplied pointer or pass it to `from_raw_parts` (`sg_stack_graph_nodes`, `sg_stack_graph_add_edges`, and the rest of the pointer-taking functions in `src/c.rs`). Constructors that take no pointer are not part of this issue.\n\nThe upstream repository is archived, so a fix cannot be filed there and no patched release exists. The soundness fix is to make every pointer-taking export `unsafe extern \"C\" fn`, with a safety comment that the pointer is non-null and, for `free`, came from the matching constructor.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0302",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:47:48Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/stack-graphs"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0302.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/issues/3241"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/stack-graphs"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "`stack-graphs` C API exports are safe `extern \"C\"` functions"
}



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