RUSTSEC-2026-0300 (GHSA-X6J6-3FFP-QRFR)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-02 12:00 – Updated: 2026-09-22 07:35 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Use-after-free in `clear` and `retain` when an element's `Drop` panics
Details

SkipList::clear drops the node chain and only then resets tail and len. The drop runs each element's Drop, and T carries no bounds excluding a panicking one. If it unwinds, tail still points at the freed node while len stays non-zero.

back(), back_mut(), last_key_value() and last() dereference tail through unsafe, so reading the container after the unwind is a use-after-free (CWE-416). Drop for SkipList calls Box::from_raw on self.head, which clear already destroyed, so dropping the container is a double free (CWE-415).

retain, retain_mut and dedup_by reach the same state through Node::filter_rebuild, which frees nodes and runs a user predicate before the caller commits tail and len. There the head links are left partially rewired, so traversal can also reach freed nodes.

Mitigation

Update to 1.1.1.

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::clear",
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::dedup_by",
            "skiplist::ordered_skip_list::OrderedSkipList::retain",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::clear",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::dedup_by",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::retain",
            "skiplist::skip_list::SkipList::retain_mut",
            "skiplist::skip_map::SkipMap::clear",
            "skiplist::skip_map::SkipMap::retain"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "skiplist",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/skiplist"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-x6j6-3ffp-qrfr"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`SkipList::clear` drops the node chain and only then resets `tail` and `len`.\nThe drop runs each element\u0027s `Drop`, and `T` carries no bounds excluding a\npanicking one. If it unwinds, `tail` still points at the freed node while `len`\nstays non-zero.\n\n`back()`, `back_mut()`, `last_key_value()` and `last()` dereference `tail`\nthrough `unsafe`, so reading the container after the unwind is a use-after-free\n(CWE-416). `Drop for SkipList` calls `Box::from_raw` on `self.head`, which\n`clear` already destroyed, so dropping the container is a double free\n(CWE-415).\n\n`retain`, `retain_mut` and `dedup_by` reach the same state through\n`Node::filter_rebuild`, which frees nodes and runs a user predicate before the\ncaller commits `tail` and `len`. There the head links are left partially\nrewired, so traversal can also reach freed nodes.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpdate to 1.1.1.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0300",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T07:35:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/skiplist"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0300.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JP-Ellis/rust-skiplist/pull/334"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Use-after-free in `clear` and `retain` when an element\u0027s `Drop` panics"
}



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