RUSTSEC-2026-0292
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-09-04 12:00 – Updated: 2026-09-21 09:04 – Source websiteChunk::{clear, drop_left, drop_right} and InlineArray::{clear, truncate} drop the removed elements before updating the metadata that records which slots hold live values — the left/right index pair for Chunk, the length field for InlineArray. If an element's Drop panics during the drop, that update is never reached, so the collection still treats the already-dropped elements as live. When the collection is later dropped (its destructor walks the range described by the stale metadata), or a subsequent operation touches the same slots, those elements are dropped a second time — a double free (CWE-415) / use-after-free (CWE-416) reachable from safe Rust.
The stale field is left and right for Chunk::clear, left for drop_left, right for drop_right, and the length field for both InlineArray methods.
Mitigation
Upgrade to imbl-sized-chunks 0.2.0 or later, which commits the metadata before dropping any element (fixed in jneem/imbl-sized-chunks#14, released in 0.2.0).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-corruption"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"imbl_sized_chunks::inline_array::InlineArray::clear",
"imbl_sized_chunks::inline_array::InlineArray::truncate",
"imbl_sized_chunks::sized_chunk::Chunk::clear",
"imbl_sized_chunks::sized_chunk::Chunk::drop_left",
"imbl_sized_chunks::sized_chunk::Chunk::drop_right"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "imbl-sized-chunks",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/imbl-sized-chunks"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`Chunk::{clear, drop_left, drop_right}` and `InlineArray::{clear, truncate}` drop the removed elements before updating the metadata that records which slots hold live values \u2014 the `left`/`right` index pair for `Chunk`, the length field for `InlineArray`. If an element\u0027s `Drop` panics during the drop, that update is never reached, so the collection still treats the already-dropped elements as live. When the collection is later dropped (its destructor walks the range described by the stale metadata), or a subsequent operation touches the same slots, those elements are dropped a second time \u2014 a double free (CWE-415) / use-after-free (CWE-416) reachable from safe Rust.\n\nThe stale field is `left` and `right` for `Chunk::clear`, `left` for `drop_left`, `right` for `drop_right`, and the length field for both `InlineArray` methods.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to `imbl-sized-chunks` 0.2.0 or later, which commits the metadata before dropping any element (fixed in jneem/imbl-sized-chunks#14, released in 0.2.0).",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0292",
"modified": "2026-09-21T09:04:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/imbl-sized-chunks"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0292.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jneem/imbl-sized-chunks/pull/14"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Double free / use-after-free in `Chunk` and `InlineArray` removal methods when an element\u0027s `Drop` panics"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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