RUSTSEC-2026-0147 (CVE-2026-46695)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-05-16 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-12 17:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Read-only volume remount bypass via guest CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Details

Affected versions of boxlite mount host directories shared via virtiofs as guest-side read-only by setting MS_RDONLY from the guest. Because the default guest capability set included CAP_SYS_ADMIN, untrusted code running inside a sandbox could execute mount -o remount,rw <path> to re-flag the share as read-write and then write through to the host filesystem — fully escaping the read-only contract boxlite advertised to callers.

The fix in v0.9.0 enforces read-only at the hypervisor level via krun_add_virtiofs3 (so the guest's MS_RDONLY is no longer the authoritative gate) and drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN from the default guest capability set (matching Docker's defaults).

This is a sandbox-escape bug: boxlite is a sandboxing runtime, so the read-only invariant is part of its security contract. CVSS rated 10.0 by the upstream advisory.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "privilege-escalation"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "boxlite",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/boxlite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46695",
    "GHSA-g6ww-w5j2-r7x3"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `boxlite` mount host directories shared via virtiofs\nas guest-side read-only by setting `MS_RDONLY` from the guest. Because the\ndefault guest capability set included `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, untrusted code\nrunning inside a sandbox could execute `mount -o remount,rw \u003cpath\u003e` to\nre-flag the share as read-write and then write through to the host\nfilesystem \u2014 fully escaping the read-only contract `boxlite` advertised\nto callers.\n\nThe fix in v0.9.0 enforces read-only at the hypervisor level via\n`krun_add_virtiofs3` (so the guest\u0027s `MS_RDONLY` is no longer the\nauthoritative gate) and drops `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` from the default guest\ncapability set (matching Docker\u0027s defaults).\n\nThis is a sandbox-escape bug: `boxlite` is a sandboxing runtime, so the\nread-only invariant is part of its security contract. CVSS rated 10.0 by\nthe upstream advisory.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0147",
  "modified": "2026-10-12T17:47:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-16T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/boxlite"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0147.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/454"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Read-only volume remount bypass via guest CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
}



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