RUSTSEC-2026-0045 (CVE-2026-3337)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-03-02 12:00 – Updated: 2026-03-21 06:45 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Timing Side-Channel in AES-CCM Tag Verification in AWS-LC
Details

Observable timing discrepancy in AES-CCM decryption in AWS-LC allows an unauthenticated user to potentially determine authentication tag validity via timing analysis.

The impacted implementations are through the EVP CIPHER API: EVP_aes_128_ccm, EVP_aes_192_ccm, and EVP_aes_256_ccm.

Customers of AWS services do not need to take action. aws-lc-sys contains code from AWS-LC. Applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release of aws-lc-sys.

Workarounds

In the special cases of using AES-CCM with (M=4, L=2), (M=8, L=2), or (M=16, L=2), applications can workaround this issue by using AES-CCM through the EVP AEAD API using implementations EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth, EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8, and EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_matter respectively.

Otherwise, there is no workaround and applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "aws-lc-sys",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/aws-lc-sys"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.14.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.38.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-3337",
    "GHSA-65p9-r9h6-22vj",
    "GHSA-frmv-5gcm-jwxh"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Observable timing discrepancy in AES-CCM decryption in AWS-LC allows an\nunauthenticated user to potentially determine authentication tag validity\nvia timing analysis.\n\nThe impacted implementations are through the EVP CIPHER API:\n`EVP_aes_128_ccm`, `EVP_aes_192_ccm`, and `EVP_aes_256_ccm`.\n\nCustomers of AWS services do not need to take action. `aws-lc-sys` contains\ncode from AWS-LC. Applications using `aws-lc-sys` should upgrade to the most\nrecent release of `aws-lc-sys`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIn the special cases of using AES-CCM with (M=4, L=2), (M=8, L=2), or\n(M=16, L=2), applications can workaround this issue by using AES-CCM through\nthe EVP AEAD API using implementations `EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth`,\n`EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_bluetooth_8`, and `EVP_aead_aes_128_ccm_matter`\nrespectively.\n\nOtherwise, there is no workaround and applications using `aws-lc-sys` should\nupgrade to the most recent release.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0045",
  "modified": "2026-03-21T06:45:35Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/aws-lc-sys"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0045.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-005-AWS"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-lc-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-65p9-r9h6-22vj"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Timing Side-Channel in AES-CCM Tag Verification in AWS-LC"
}



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