RUSTSEC-2020-0098 (CVE-2020-36206)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2020-12-18 12:00 – Updated: 2023-06-13 13:10 – Source websiteAffected versions of rusb did not require UsbContext to implement Send
and Sync. However, through Device and DeviceHandle it is possible to use
UsbContexts across threads.
This issue allows non-thread safe UsbContext types to be used concurrently
leading to data races and memory corruption.
The issue was fixed by adding Send and Sync bounds to UsbContext.
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-corruption",
"thread-safety"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"informational": "unsound"
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rusb",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/rusb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36206",
"GHSA-9mxw-4856-9cm5"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `rusb` did not require `UsbContext` to implement `Send`\nand `Sync`. However, through `Device` and `DeviceHandle` it is possible to use\n`UsbContext`s across threads.\n\nThis issue allows non-thread safe `UsbContext` types to be used concurrently\nleading to data races and memory corruption.\n\nThe issue was fixed by adding `Send` and `Sync` bounds to `UsbContext`.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2020-0098",
"modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
"published": "2020-12-18T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/rusb"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0098.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/a1ien/rusb/issues/44"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "UsbContext trait did not require implementers to be Send and Sync."
}
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