PYSEC-2026-4046
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-10-01 16:38 - Updated: 2026-10-01 17:10Impact
The WebSocket handle_mount and ViewRuntime._build_request rebuild an HttpRequest via RequestFactory().get(...) with no HTTP_HOST, so request.get_host() defaulted to "testserver" on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain TenantResolvers then misresolved the tenant — None on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With STRICT_MODE=False the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).
Patches
Fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against ALLOWED_HOSTS (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's split_domain_port so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.
Workarounds
No workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with STRICT_MODE=False.
| Name | purl | djust | pkg:pypi/djust |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.3",
"0.1.4",
"0.1.5",
"0.1.6",
"0.1.7",
"0.1.8",
"0.1.9",
"0.2.0",
"0.2.1",
"0.2.2",
"0.3.0",
"0.3.1",
"0.3.2",
"0.3.4",
"0.3.5",
"0.3.6",
"0.3.7",
"0.3.8",
"0.4.0",
"0.4.1",
"0.4.2",
"0.4.3",
"0.4.4",
"0.9.0",
"0.9.1",
"0.9.2",
"0.9.4",
"0.9.5",
"0.9.6",
"0.9.7",
"1.0.0",
"1.0.0rc11",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.2",
"1.0.3",
"1.0.4",
"1.0.5",
"1.0.6"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61589",
"GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r"
],
"details": "### Impact\nThe WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `\"testserver\"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant \u2014 `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (**cross-tenant disclosure**); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django\u0027s `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated \u2014 with the TLS scheme \u2014 into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-4046",
"modified": "2026-10-01T17:10:21.892430Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T16:38:32.088865Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/djust"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61589"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djust: WebSocket/runtime reconstructed request omits the client Host, causing host/subdomain TenantResolvers to misresolve the tenant on the live path"
}
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