PYSEC-2026-3621
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36Summary
Thumbor's filters:proportion(<value>) filter does not enforce an upper bound on <value> and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.
Details
- Filter implementation:
thumbor/filters/proportion.py valueis parsed as a float (BaseFilter.DecimalNumber) with no maximum.- The filter computes
new_width = source_width * valueandnew_height = source_height * valueand then callsengine.resize(new_width, new_height). - Execution phase:
proportionruns in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g.,MAX_WIDTH/MAX_HEIGHTapplied toreq.width/req.height).
Documentation states the percentage argument should be 0.0 to 1.0 (docs/proportion.rst), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.
PoC
Preconditions
- The
proportionfilter is enabled (it is enabled by default viaBUILTIN_FILTERS). - Either:
/unsafe/URLs are allowed (ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True, common default in some deployments), OR/unsafe/is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).
Example request 1 (signed URL)
The following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion:
http://<host>:<port>/<url-sign>/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg
Example request 2 (/unsafe/)
If /unsafe/ is enabled:
http://<host>:<port>/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg
Impact
- Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill).
- Exploitability depends on deployment:
- If
/unsafe/is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS. - If
/unsafe/is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs.
Suggested remediation
- Enforce a strict bound on the
proportionparameter (e.g.,0.0 < value <= 1.0as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics.
| Name | purl | thumbor | pkg:pypi/thumbor |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "thumbor",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/thumbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.1.3",
"4.10.0",
"4.10.1",
"4.10.2",
"4.10.3",
"4.11.0",
"4.11.1",
"4.12.0",
"4.12.1",
"4.12.2",
"4.4.1",
"4.5.3",
"4.5.4",
"4.6.0",
"4.7.0",
"4.7.1",
"4.8.0",
"4.8.1",
"4.8.2",
"4.8.3",
"4.8.4",
"4.8.5",
"4.8.6",
"4.9.0",
"4.9.1",
"5.0.0",
"5.0.0rc1",
"5.0.0rc2",
"5.0.1",
"5.0.2",
"5.0.3",
"5.0.4",
"5.0.5",
"5.0.6",
"5.1.0",
"5.2.0",
"5.2.1",
"6.0.0",
"6.0.0b1",
"6.0.0b2",
"6.0.0b3",
"6.0.0b4",
"6.0.0b5",
"6.0.1",
"6.0.2",
"6.1.0",
"6.1.1",
"6.1.2",
"6.1.3",
"6.1.4",
"6.1.5",
"6.2.0",
"6.2.1",
"6.3.0",
"6.3.1",
"6.3.2",
"6.4.0",
"6.4.1",
"6.4.2",
"6.4.3",
"6.5.0",
"6.5.1",
"6.5.2",
"6.6.0",
"6.6.1",
"6.7.0",
"6.7.1",
"6.7.2",
"6.7.3",
"6.7.4",
"6.7.5",
"6.7.6",
"7.0.0",
"7.0.0a1",
"7.0.0a2",
"7.0.0a3",
"7.0.0a4",
"7.0.0a5",
"7.0.0b1",
"7.0.1",
"7.0.10",
"7.0.11",
"7.0.12",
"7.0.2",
"7.0.3",
"7.0.5",
"7.0.6",
"7.0.7",
"7.0.8",
"7.0.9",
"7.1.0",
"7.1.1",
"7.1.2",
"7.2.0",
"7.2.1",
"7.3.0",
"7.3.1",
"7.3.2",
"7.4.0",
"7.4.1",
"7.4.2",
"7.4.3",
"7.4.4",
"7.4.5",
"7.4.6",
"7.4.7",
"7.5.0",
"7.5.1",
"7.5.2",
"7.6.0",
"7.7.0",
"7.7.1",
"7.7.2",
"7.7.3",
"7.7.4",
"7.7.5",
"7.7.6",
"7.7.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53505",
"GHSA-phj3-59pf-cp83"
],
"details": "### Summary\nThumbor\u0027s `filters:proportion(\u003cvalue\u003e)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `\u003cvalue\u003e` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.\n\n### Details\n- Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py`\n - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum.\n - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`.\n- Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`).\n\nDocumentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.\n\n### PoC\n#### Preconditions\n- The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`).\n- Either:\n - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR\n - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).\n\n#### Example request 1 (signed URL)\nThe following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion:\n\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/\u003curl-sign\u003e/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg`\n\n#### Example request 2 (/unsafe/)\nIf `/unsafe/` is enabled:\n\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg`\n\n### Impact\n- Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill).\n- Exploitability depends on deployment:\n - If `/unsafe/` is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS.\n - If `/unsafe/` is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n- Enforce a strict bound on the `proportion` parameter (e.g., `0.0 \u003c value \u003c= 1.0` as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3621",
"modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:38.365832Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T11:34:46.455208Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/security/advisories/GHSA-phj3-59pf-cp83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/commit/2c716119de986cfc68c7071af52a98187e006023"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/releases/tag/7.8.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/thumbor"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-phj3-59pf-cp83"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53505"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS"
}
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