PYSEC-2026-3572

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36
VLAI
Details

Summary

Numerous HTTP-emitting modules (core.api.http_get, core.api.http_post, graphql.query/graphql.mutation, monitor.http_check, communication.slack_send, notification.{discord,slack,teams}.send_message, ai.vision_analyze [anthropic path], verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, and the agent/llm inline base_url branch) perform outbound requests to a fully client-controlled URL without calling the project's own SSRF guard (validate_url_with_env_config) that their sibling modules apply. An authenticated workflow-author can point the URL at the cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254), a loopback/RFC1918 host, or any internal host and read the response, yielding cloud-metadata credential theft and internal service read/write.

Root Cause

The SSRF guard is per-module (there is NO global egress interception). Each module must call validate_url_with_env_config before issuing a request. The listed modules never call it — they only carry an ssrf_protected metadata tag string which enforces nothing. Exemplar: src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py — grepping for validate_url|ssrf|is_private in requests.py returns 0 guard calls; session.get(url) fires at :85 (HTTPGetModule) and session.post at :188 (HTTPPostModule). SECURITY.md incorrectly lists api.http_get as SSRF-protected.

Impact

Readable SSRF: full {status_code, headers, body} returned to the caller (requests.py:96-108). Enables theft of cloud IAM credentials from the metadata endpoint and read/write access to internal-only APIs. Scope Changed (S:C) — the request crosses into cloud-metadata / internal-network authority the workflow layer does not otherwise have.

Proof of Concept

Verified live this session: core.api.http_get with url pointed at a loopback internal server returned the internal body INTERNAL-SECRET-IAM-CREDENTIALS, while the guarded sibling http.get returned NETWORK_ERROR: Hostname blocked: 127.0.0.1 on the same input — proving the branch-asymmetry is real (not a port artifact).

POST /mcp {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"execute_module",
  "arguments":{"module_id":"core.api.http_get",
  "params":{"url":"http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}}}}

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: authenticated MCP client → POST /mcp execute_module core.api.http_get, url set to the cloud metadata endpoint. Guard: require_auth (mcp.py:71). Bypass proof: passes with a valid workflow-author bearer token (PR:L).
  2. Check: capability denylist / enforce_module_policy (base.py:240). Bypass proof: core.api.* not in _DEFAULT_DENYLIST (module_policy.py:45-67) → is_allowed=True (runtime-registration verified: core.api.http_get -> HTTPGetModule).
  3. Check: SSRF validation. Bypass proof: requests.py has ZERO validate_url/ssrf calls — only the ssrf_protected tag string at :23/:116. session.get(url) fires at :85.
  4. Sink: aiohttp GET/POST to the cloud metadata IP.
  5. Impact: full response body returned → IAM credential theft, internal read/write.

Bypass Evidence

Grepping validate_url|ssrf|is_private in requests.py → 0 guard calls (2 hits are both the inert tag string). Live PoC returned internal body directly; guarded sibling blocked the same input. Direct IP works — no IPv6 transition trick needed (AC:L), unlike the seed CVE-2026-55787.

Affected Versions

<= 2.26.6 — code present on latest release tag v2.26.6 (requests.py:19,112).

Suggested Fix

Call validate_url_with_env_config(url) in each listed module before issuing the outbound request, matching the guarded siblings (e.g. ai.model:157, http.get). Best: route all outbound HTTP through a single guarded client wrapper so new modules inherit the guard.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Impacted products
Name purl
flyto-core pkg:pypi/flyto-core

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flyto-core",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/flyto-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.26.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.0.3",
        "1.0.4",
        "1.0.5",
        "1.0.6",
        "1.0.7",
        "1.0.8",
        "1.0.9",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.1.1",
        "1.11.0",
        "1.12.0",
        "1.13.0",
        "1.14.0",
        "1.14.1",
        "1.14.2",
        "1.15.0",
        "1.16.0",
        "1.16.1",
        "1.16.10",
        "1.16.2",
        "1.16.3",
        "1.16.4",
        "1.16.5",
        "1.16.6",
        "1.16.7",
        "1.16.8",
        "1.16.9",
        "1.2.0",
        "1.3.0",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.5.0",
        "1.5.1",
        "1.5.2",
        "1.5.4",
        "1.6.0",
        "1.6.1",
        "1.6.2",
        "1.6.3",
        "1.6.4",
        "1.6.5",
        "1.7.0",
        "1.7.1",
        "1.7.2",
        "1.7.3",
        "1.7.4",
        "1.7.5",
        "1.7.6",
        "1.7.7",
        "1.7.8",
        "1.7.9",
        "1.8.0",
        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.10",
        "1.8.11",
        "1.8.12",
        "1.8.13",
        "1.8.14",
        "1.8.15",
        "1.8.16",
        "1.8.17",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.8.3",
        "1.8.4",
        "1.8.5",
        "1.8.6",
        "1.8.7",
        "1.8.8",
        "1.8.9",
        "1.9.0",
        "2.0.0",
        "2.0.1",
        "2.0.2",
        "2.0.3",
        "2.0.4",
        "2.0.5",
        "2.1.0",
        "2.1.1",
        "2.1.2",
        "2.1.3",
        "2.1.4",
        "2.10.0",
        "2.11.0",
        "2.12.0",
        "2.12.1",
        "2.12.13",
        "2.12.15",
        "2.12.16",
        "2.12.17",
        "2.12.18",
        "2.12.19",
        "2.12.2",
        "2.12.20",
        "2.12.21",
        "2.12.22",
        "2.12.23",
        "2.12.24",
        "2.12.25",
        "2.12.26",
        "2.12.27",
        "2.12.28",
        "2.12.3",
        "2.12.4",
        "2.12.5",
        "2.12.6",
        "2.13.0",
        "2.13.1",
        "2.13.2",
        "2.13.3",
        "2.13.4",
        "2.14.0",
        "2.15.0",
        "2.15.1",
        "2.15.2",
        "2.15.3",
        "2.16.1",
        "2.16.3",
        "2.16.4",
        "2.17.0",
        "2.17.1",
        "2.17.2",
        "2.17.3",
        "2.17.4",
        "2.17.5",
        "2.17.6",
        "2.17.7",
        "2.17.8",
        "2.18.0",
        "2.18.1",
        "2.18.10",
        "2.18.11",
        "2.18.2",
        "2.18.3",
        "2.18.4",
        "2.18.5",
        "2.18.6",
        "2.18.8",
        "2.18.9",
        "2.19.0",
        "2.2.0",
        "2.2.1",
        "2.2.2",
        "2.20.0",
        "2.20.1",
        "2.20.2",
        "2.20.3",
        "2.20.4",
        "2.23.0",
        "2.23.1",
        "2.23.2",
        "2.23.3",
        "2.24.0",
        "2.24.1",
        "2.24.2",
        "2.24.3",
        "2.24.4",
        "2.25.0",
        "2.25.1",
        "2.25.10",
        "2.25.11",
        "2.25.12",
        "2.25.13",
        "2.25.14",
        "2.25.15",
        "2.25.16",
        "2.25.17",
        "2.25.18",
        "2.25.19",
        "2.25.2",
        "2.25.20",
        "2.25.21",
        "2.25.22",
        "2.25.23",
        "2.25.24",
        "2.25.25",
        "2.25.26",
        "2.25.27",
        "2.25.3",
        "2.25.4",
        "2.25.5",
        "2.25.6",
        "2.25.7",
        "2.25.8",
        "2.25.9",
        "2.26.0",
        "2.26.1",
        "2.26.2",
        "2.26.3",
        "2.26.4",
        "2.26.5",
        "2.3.0",
        "2.3.1",
        "2.4.0",
        "2.4.1",
        "2.4.2",
        "2.4.3",
        "2.4.4",
        "2.4.5",
        "2.4.6",
        "2.4.7",
        "2.5.0",
        "2.5.1",
        "2.5.2",
        "2.6.0",
        "2.6.1",
        "2.7.0",
        "2.7.1",
        "2.7.2",
        "2.7.3",
        "2.7.4",
        "2.7.5",
        "2.7.6",
        "2.8.0",
        "2.9.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67428",
    "GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\nNumerous HTTP-emitting modules (`core.api.http_get`, `core.api.http_post`, `graphql.query`/`graphql.mutation`, `monitor.http_check`, `communication.slack_send`, `notification.{discord,slack,teams}.send_message`, `ai.vision_analyze` [anthropic path], `verify.visual_diff`, `browser.proxy_rotate`, and the `agent`/`llm` inline base_url branch) perform outbound requests to a fully client-controlled URL **without calling the project\u0027s own SSRF guard** (`validate_url_with_env_config`) that their sibling modules apply. An authenticated workflow-author can point the URL at the cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254), a loopback/RFC1918 host, or any internal host and read the response, yielding cloud-metadata credential theft and internal service read/write.\n\n## Root Cause\nThe SSRF guard is per-module (there is NO global egress interception). Each module must call `validate_url_with_env_config` before issuing a request. The listed modules never call it \u2014 they only carry an `ssrf_protected` **metadata tag string** which enforces nothing. Exemplar: `src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py` \u2014 grepping for `validate_url|ssrf|is_private` in requests.py returns 0 guard calls; `session.get(url)` fires at `:85` (HTTPGetModule) and `session.post` at `:188` (HTTPPostModule). SECURITY.md incorrectly lists `api.http_get` as SSRF-protected.\n\n## Impact\nReadable SSRF: full `{status_code, headers, body}` returned to the caller (requests.py:96-108). Enables theft of cloud IAM credentials from the metadata endpoint and read/write access to internal-only APIs. Scope Changed (S:C) \u2014 the request crosses into cloud-metadata / internal-network authority the workflow layer does not otherwise have.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nVerified live this session: `core.api.http_get` with `url` pointed at a loopback internal server returned the internal body `INTERNAL-SECRET-IAM-CREDENTIALS`, while the guarded sibling `http.get` returned `NETWORK_ERROR: Hostname blocked: 127.0.0.1` on the same input \u2014 proving the branch-asymmetry is real (not a port artifact).\n```\nPOST /mcp {\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"execute_module\",\n  \"arguments\":{\"module_id\":\"core.api.http_get\",\n  \"params\":{\"url\":\"http://\u003ccloud-metadata-ip\u003e/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"}}}}\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: authenticated MCP client \u2192 `POST /mcp` execute_module `core.api.http_get`, url set to the cloud metadata endpoint. Guard: `require_auth` (mcp.py:71). Bypass proof: passes with a valid workflow-author bearer token (PR:L).\n2. Check: capability denylist / `enforce_module_policy` (base.py:240). Bypass proof: `core.api.*` not in `_DEFAULT_DENYLIST` (module_policy.py:45-67) \u2192 `is_allowed=True` (runtime-registration verified: `core.api.http_get -\u003e HTTPGetModule`).\n3. Check: SSRF validation. Bypass proof: `requests.py` has ZERO `validate_url`/ssrf calls \u2014 only the `ssrf_protected` tag string at :23/:116. `session.get(url)` fires at :85.\n4. Sink: aiohttp GET/POST to the cloud metadata IP.\n5. Impact: full response body returned \u2192 IAM credential theft, internal read/write.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nGrepping `validate_url|ssrf|is_private` in requests.py \u2192 0 guard calls (2 hits are both the inert tag string). Live PoC returned internal body directly; guarded sibling blocked the same input. Direct IP works \u2014 no IPv6 transition trick needed (AC:L), unlike the seed CVE-2026-55787.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 2.26.6` \u2014 code present on latest release tag v2.26.6 (`requests.py:19,112`).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nCall `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` in each listed module before issuing the outbound request, matching the guarded siblings (e.g. `ai.model:157`, `http.get`). Best: route all outbound HTTP through a single guarded client wrapper so new modules inherit the guard.\n\n## Credit\n\nVulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3572",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:18.753670Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T11:34:45.633302Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67428"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/0a0a528520ec18f5a21f1ddf858a71cc1edfb6e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/flyto-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flyto2 Core: Multiple HTTP-family modules fetch client-controlled URLs without the SSRF guard their siblings apply (SSRF to internal/metadata)"
}



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