PYSEC-2026-2488

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:02 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:04
VLAI
Details

Summary

The ConformityCheck class in giskard-checks rendered the rule parameter through Jinja2's default Template() constructor. Because the rule string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.

giskard-checks is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the rule parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.

However, the implicit template evaluation of the rule parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system.

Affected Component

conformity.py, line 59:

from jinja2 import Template
...
formatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)

Affected Versions

giskard-checks < 1.0.2b1

Patched Version

giskard-checks >= 1.0.2b1 (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)

Remediation

Upgrade to giskard-checks >= 1.0.2b1. The template rendering has been removed from rule evaluation.

Credit

Giskard-AI thanks @dhabaleshwar for identifying the unsandboxed template usage.

Impacted products
Name purl
giskard-checks pkg:pypi/giskard-checks

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "giskard-checks",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/giskard-checks"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.2b1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.1a1",
        "1.0.1a2",
        "1.0.1b1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40320",
    "GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n \nThe `ConformityCheck` class in `giskard-checks` rendered the `rule` parameter through Jinja2\u0027s default `Template()` constructor. Because the `rule` string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.\n\n`giskard-checks` is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the `rule` parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.\n\nHowever, the implicit template evaluation of the `rule` parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system. \n\n## Affected Component\n \n`conformity.py`, line 59:\n```python\nfrom jinja2 import Template\n...\nformatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)\n```\n \n## Affected Versions\n \n`giskard-checks` \u003c 1.0.2b1\n \n## Patched Version\n \n`giskard-checks` \u003e= **1.0.2b1** (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)\n \n## Remediation\n \nUpgrade to `giskard-checks` \u003e= 1.0.2b1. The template rendering has been removed from rule evaluation.\n \n## Credit\n \nGiskard-AI thanks @dhabaleshwar for identifying the unsandboxed template usage.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2488",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:07.565990Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:02:47.672303Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss/security/advisories/GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40320"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss/releases/tag/giskard-checks%2Fv1.0.2b1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/giskard-checks"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Giskard has Unsandboxed Jinja2 Template Rendering in ConformityCheck"
}



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