PYSEC-2026-1711
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-07 14:34 - Updated: 2026-07-07 17:24Impact
JupyterHub < 5.0, when used with GlobusOAuthenticator, could be configured to allow all users from a particular institution only. The configuration for this would look like:
# Require users to be using the "foo.horse" identity provider, often an institution or university
c.GlobusAuthenticator.identity_provider = "foo.horse"
# Allow everyone who has that identity provider to log in
c.GlobusAuthenticator.allow_all = True
This worked fine prior to JupyterHub 5.0, because allow_all did not take precedence over identity_provider.
Since JupyterHub 5.0, allow_all does take precedence over identity_provider. On a hub with the same config, now all users will be allowed to login, regardless of identity_provider. identity_provider will basically be ignored.
This is a documented change in JupyterHub 5.0, but is likely to catch many users by surprise.
Patches
OAuthenticator 16.3.1 fixes the issue with JupyterHub 5.0, and does not affect previous versions.
Workarounds
Do not upgrade to JupyterHub 5.0 when using GlobusOAuthenticator in the prior configuration.
| Name | purl | oauthenticator | pkg:pypi/oauthenticator |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "oauthenticator",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/oauthenticator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "16.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.10.0",
"0.11.0",
"0.12.0",
"0.12.1",
"0.12.2",
"0.12.3",
"0.13.0",
"0.2.0",
"0.3.0",
"0.4.0",
"0.4.1",
"0.5.0",
"0.5.1",
"0.6.0",
"0.6.1",
"0.6.2",
"0.7.0",
"0.7.1",
"0.7.2",
"0.7.3",
"0.8.0",
"0.8.1",
"0.8.2",
"0.9.0",
"14.0.0",
"14.1.0",
"14.2.0",
"15.0.0",
"15.0.1",
"15.1.0",
"16.0.0",
"16.0.1",
"16.0.2",
"16.0.3",
"16.0.4",
"16.0.5",
"16.0.6",
"16.0.7",
"16.1.0",
"16.1.1",
"16.2.0",
"16.2.1",
"16.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37300",
"GHSA-gprj-3p75-f996"
],
"details": "### Impact\n\nJupyterHub \u003c 5.0, when used with `GlobusOAuthenticator`, could be configured to allow all users from a particular institution only. The configuration for this would look like:\n\n```python\n# Require users to be using the \"foo.horse\" identity provider, often an institution or university\nc.GlobusAuthenticator.identity_provider = \"foo.horse\"\n# Allow everyone who has that identity provider to log in\nc.GlobusAuthenticator.allow_all = True\n```\n\nThis worked fine prior to JupyterHub 5.0, because `allow_all` *did not* take precedence over `identity_provider`.\n\nSince JupyterHub 5.0, `allow_all` *does* take precedence over `identity_provider`. On a hub with the same config, now **all** users will be allowed to login, regardless of `identity_provider`. `identity_provider` will basically be ignored.\n\nThis is a [documented change](https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/stable/howto/upgrading-v5.html#authenticator-allow-all-and-allow-existing-users) in JupyterHub 5.0,\nbut is likely to catch many users by surprise.\n\n### Patches\n\nOAuthenticator 16.3.1 fixes the issue with JupyterHub 5.0, and does not affect previous versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not upgrade to JupyterHub 5.0 when using `GlobusOAuthenticator` in the prior configuration.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-1711",
"modified": "2026-07-07T17:24:52.830700Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T14:34:34.721678Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/oauthenticator/security/advisories/GHSA-gprj-3p75-f996"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/oauthenticator/commit/d1aea05fa89f2beae15ab0fa0b0d071030f79654"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterhub/oauthenticator"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/stable/howto/upgrading-v5.html#authenticator-allow-all-and-allow-existing-users"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/oauthenticator"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gprj-3p75-f996"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Globus `identity_provider` restriction ignored when used with `allow_all` in JupyterHub 5.0"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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