PYSEC-2021-322
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2021-09-17 20:15 - Updated: 2021-09-17 22:30Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly & WASI. Wasmtime before version 0.30.0 is affected by a type confusion vulnerability. As a Rust library the wasmtime crate clearly marks which functions are safe and which are unsafe, guaranteeing that if consumers never use unsafe then it should not be possible to have memory unsafety issues in their embeddings of Wasmtime. An issue was discovered in the safe API of Linker::func_* APIs. These APIs were previously not sound when one Engine was used to create the Linker and then a different Engine was used to create a Store and then the Linker was used to instantiate a module into that Store. Cross-Engine usage of functions is not supported in Wasmtime and this can result in type confusion of function pointers, resulting in being able to safely call a function with the wrong type. Triggering this bug requires using at least two Engine values in an embedding and then additionally using two different values with a Linker (one at the creation time of the Linker and another when instantiating a module with the Linker). It's expected that usage of more-than-one Engine in an embedding is relatively rare since an Engine is intended to be a globally shared resource, so the expectation is that the impact of this issue is relatively small. The fix implemented is to change this behavior to panic!() in Rust instead of silently allowing it. Using different Engine instances with a Linker is a programmer bug that wasmtime catches at runtime. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.30.0. If you cannot upgrade Wasmtime and are using more than one Engine in your embedding it's recommended to instead use only one Engine for the entire program if possible. An Engine is designed to be a globally shared resource that is suitable to have only one for the lifetime of an entire process. If using multiple Engines is required then code should be audited to ensure that Linker is only used with one Engine.
| Name | purl | wasmtime | pkg:pypi/wasmtime |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wasmtime",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/wasmtime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "b39f087414f27ae40c44449ed5d1154e03449bff"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime",
"type": "GIT"
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.30.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.1",
"0.0.2",
"0.11.0",
"0.12.0",
"0.15.0",
"0.15.1",
"0.16.0",
"0.16.1",
"0.17.0",
"0.18.0",
"0.18.1",
"0.18.2",
"0.19.0",
"0.20.0",
"0.21.0",
"0.22.0",
"0.23.0",
"0.24.0",
"0.25.0",
"0.26.0",
"0.27.0",
"0.28.0",
"0.28.1",
"0.29.0",
"0.9.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39219",
"GHSA-q879-9g95-56mx"
],
"details": "Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly \u0026 WASI. Wasmtime before version 0.30.0 is affected by a type confusion vulnerability. As a Rust library the `wasmtime` crate clearly marks which functions are safe and which are `unsafe`, guaranteeing that if consumers never use `unsafe` then it should not be possible to have memory unsafety issues in their embeddings of Wasmtime. An issue was discovered in the safe API of `Linker::func_*` APIs. These APIs were previously not sound when one `Engine` was used to create the `Linker` and then a different `Engine` was used to create a `Store` and then the `Linker` was used to instantiate a module into that `Store`. Cross-`Engine` usage of functions is not supported in Wasmtime and this can result in type confusion of function pointers, resulting in being able to safely call a function with the wrong type. Triggering this bug requires using at least two `Engine` values in an embedding and then additionally using two different values with a `Linker` (one at the creation time of the `Linker` and another when instantiating a module with the `Linker`). It\u0027s expected that usage of more-than-one `Engine` in an embedding is relatively rare since an `Engine` is intended to be a globally shared resource, so the expectation is that the impact of this issue is relatively small. The fix implemented is to change this behavior to `panic!()` in Rust instead of silently allowing it. Using different `Engine` instances with a `Linker` is a programmer bug that `wasmtime` catches at runtime. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.30.0. If you cannot upgrade Wasmtime and are using more than one `Engine` in your embedding it\u0027s recommended to instead use only one `Engine` for the entire program if possible. An `Engine` is designed to be a globally shared resource that is suitable to have only one for the lifetime of an entire process. If using multiple `Engine`s is required then code should be audited to ensure that `Linker` is only used with one `Engine`.",
"id": "PYSEC-2021-322",
"modified": "2021-09-17T22:30:49.947373Z",
"published": "2021-09-17T20:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/wasmtime"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/commit/b39f087414f27ae40c44449ed5d1154e03449bff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-q879-9g95-56mx"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.