PYSEC-2020-314
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2020-09-25 19:15 - Updated: 2021-12-09 06:35In Tensorflow before version 2.3.1, the RaggedCountSparseOutput does not validate that the input arguments form a valid ragged tensor. In particular, there is no validation that the splits tensor has the minimum required number of elements. Code uses this quantity to initialize a different data structure. Since BatchedMap is equivalent to a vector, it needs to have at least one element to not be nullptr. If user passes a splits tensor that is empty or has exactly one element, we get a SIGABRT signal raised by the operating system. The issue is patched in commit 3cbb917b4714766030b28eba9fb41bb97ce9ee02 and is released in TensorFlow version 2.3.1.
| Name | purl | tensorflow-gpu | pkg:pypi/tensorflow-gpu |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3cbb917b4714766030b28eba9fb41bb97ce9ee02"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow",
"type": "GIT"
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.12.0",
"0.12.1",
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.1.0",
"1.10.0",
"1.10.1",
"1.11.0",
"1.12.0",
"1.12.2",
"1.12.3",
"1.13.1",
"1.13.2",
"1.14.0",
"1.15.0",
"1.15.2",
"1.15.3",
"1.15.4",
"1.15.5",
"1.2.0",
"1.2.1",
"1.3.0",
"1.4.0",
"1.4.1",
"1.5.0",
"1.5.1",
"1.6.0",
"1.7.0",
"1.7.1",
"1.8.0",
"1.9.0",
"2.0.0",
"2.0.1",
"2.0.2",
"2.0.3",
"2.0.4",
"2.1.0",
"2.1.1",
"2.1.2",
"2.1.3",
"2.1.4",
"2.2.0",
"2.2.1",
"2.2.2",
"2.2.3",
"2.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-15199",
"GHSA-x5cp-9pcf-pp3h"
],
"details": "In Tensorflow before version 2.3.1, the `RaggedCountSparseOutput` does not validate that the input arguments form a valid ragged tensor. In particular, there is no validation that the `splits` tensor has the minimum required number of elements. Code uses this quantity to initialize a different data structure. Since `BatchedMap` is equivalent to a vector, it needs to have at least one element to not be `nullptr`. If user passes a `splits` tensor that is empty or has exactly one element, we get a `SIGABRT` signal raised by the operating system. The issue is patched in commit 3cbb917b4714766030b28eba9fb41bb97ce9ee02 and is released in TensorFlow version 2.3.1.",
"id": "PYSEC-2020-314",
"modified": "2021-12-09T06:35:13.149576Z",
"published": "2020-09-25T19:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-x5cp-9pcf-pp3h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v2.3.1"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/3cbb917b4714766030b28eba9fb41bb97ce9ee02"
}
]
}
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