OESA-2026-4623 (CVE-2026-5917)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-29 09:03 – Updated: 2026-10-29 09:03 – Source websitelibgit2 is a portable, pure C implementation of the Git core methods provided as a re-entrant linkable library with a solid API, allowing you to write native speed custom Git applications in any language which supports C bindings.
Security Fix(es):
libgit2 versions before 1.8.7 and 1.9.0 before 1.9.7 built with the libssh2 SSH backend (USE_SSH=libssh2) contain a shell command injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on an SSH server by supplying a repository path containing unescaped shell metacharacters such as single quotes, semicolons, or pipes. The gen_proto() function in ssh_libssh2.c inserts the repository path directly into a shell command string without escaping special characters before passing it to libssh2_channel_exec(), enabling an attacker to craft a malicious submodule URL in a .gitmodules file that, when processed during a recursive clone, causes the remote server's shell to interpret injected commands under the victim's SSH user account.(CVE-2026-5917)
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bu… | ADVISORY |
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5917 | ADVISORY |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4 |
libgit2
pkg:rpm/openEuler/libgit2&distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4
|
Affected: < 1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"libgit2-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libgit2-debuginfo-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libgit2-debugsource-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libgit2-devel-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"libgit2-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"libgit2-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libgit2-debuginfo-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libgit2-debugsource-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libgit2-devel-1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "libgit2",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/libgit2\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.2-3.oe2403sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "libgit2 is a portable, pure C implementation of the Git core methods provided as a re-entrant linkable library with a solid API, allowing you to write native speed custom Git applications in any language which supports C bindings.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nlibgit2 versions before 1.8.7 and 1.9.0 before 1.9.7 built with the libssh2 SSH backend (USE_SSH=libssh2) contain a shell command injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on an SSH server by supplying a repository path containing unescaped shell metacharacters such as single quotes, semicolons, or pipes. The gen_proto() function in ssh_libssh2.c inserts the repository path directly into a shell command string without escaping special characters before passing it to libssh2_channel_exec(), enabling an attacker to craft a malicious submodule URL in a .gitmodules file that, when processed during a recursive clone, causes the remote server\u0026apos;s shell to interpret injected commands under the victim\u0026apos;s SSH user account.(CVE-2026-5917)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4623",
"modified": "2026-10-29T09:03:42Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T09:03:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4623"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5917"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "libgit2 security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-5917"
]
}
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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