OESA-2026-4359 (CVE-2026-53115)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-16 11:59 – Updated: 2026-10-16 11:59 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: fsl-mc: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. 1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. 1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: Shut down rtpoll_timer in psi_cgroup_free()
psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() is called locklessly from the scheduler hotpath and can race psi_trigger_destroy() taking down the last rtpoll trigger under rtpoll_trigger_lock:
psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() psi_trigger_destroy()
rcu_read_lock(); task = rcu_dereference(rtpoll_task); rcu_assign_pointer(rtpoll_task, NULL); timer_delete(&rtpoll_timer); mod_timer(&rtpoll_timer, ...); rcu_read_unlock(); synchronize_rcu(); kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);
The group can then be freed with the re-armed timer still pending, and poll_timer_fn() runs on freed memory.
461daba06bdc ("psi: eliminate kthread_worker from psi trigger scheduling mechanism") deleted the timer synchronously after the synchronize_rcu(), which prevented this but raced trigger creation instead: the deletion could cancel the timer that a new trigger set armed during the grace period and, as creation also reinitialized the timer at the time, corrupt it. 8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy") moved the initialization into group_init() and the deletion into the locked section, trading the creation races for the window above.
Neither placement in the destruction path works. A pending timer firing while the group is alive is harmless though. poll_timer_fn() just wakes the rtpoll waitqueue and doesn't re-arm itself. Bind the timer to the group's lifetime instead and shut it down in psi_cgroup_free(). Nothing can arm it by then. timer_shutdown_sync() because the timer is never armed again.(CVE-2026-74594)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria
When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB), BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP (with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).
However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp") loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:
- skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head, causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header.
- It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q / ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
- It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark, allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate beyond 64KB.
Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce: - NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP - Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation) - Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6 - If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)
Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without dropping.
This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like 6.18.y.(CVE-2026-80725)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-extra-modules-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-headers-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0-145.3.35.166.oe2403sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbus: fsl-mc: use generic driver_override infrastructure\n\nWhen a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus\u0026apos; match()\ncallback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the\ndriver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.\n\nFix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking\ncare of proper locking internally.\n\nNote that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock\nheld is intentional. [1](CVE-2026-53115)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvdpa: use generic driver_override infrastructure\n\nWhen a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus\u0026apos; match()\ncallback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the\ndriver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.\n\nFix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking\ncare of proper locking internally.\n\nNote that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock\nheld is intentional. [1](CVE-2026-53118)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/psi: Shut down rtpoll_timer in psi_cgroup_free()\n\npsi_schedule_rtpoll_work() is called locklessly from the scheduler hotpath\nand can race psi_trigger_destroy() taking down the last rtpoll trigger under\nrtpoll_trigger_lock:\n\n psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() psi_trigger_destroy()\n\n rcu_read_lock();\n task = rcu_dereference(rtpoll_task);\n rcu_assign_pointer(rtpoll_task, NULL);\n timer_delete(\u0026amp;rtpoll_timer);\n mod_timer(\u0026amp;rtpoll_timer, ...);\n rcu_read_unlock();\n synchronize_rcu();\n kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);\n\nThe group can then be freed with the re-armed timer still pending, and\npoll_timer_fn() runs on freed memory.\n\n461daba06bdc (\u0026quot;psi: eliminate kthread_worker from psi trigger scheduling\nmechanism\u0026quot;) deleted the timer synchronously after the synchronize_rcu(),\nwhich prevented this but raced trigger creation instead: the deletion could\ncancel the timer that a new trigger set armed during the grace period and,\nas creation also reinitialized the timer at the time, corrupt it.\n8f91efd870ea (\u0026quot;psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy\u0026quot;) moved the\ninitialization into group_init() and the deletion into the locked section,\ntrading the creation races for the window above.\n\nNeither placement in the destruction path works. A pending timer firing\nwhile the group is alive is harmless though. poll_timer_fn() just wakes the\nrtpoll waitqueue and doesn\u0026apos;t re-arm itself. Bind the timer to the group\u0026apos;s\nlifetime instead and shut it down in psi_cgroup_free(). Nothing can arm it\nby then. timer_shutdown_sync() because the timer is never armed again.(CVE-2026-74594)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria\n\nWhen GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),\nBIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP\n(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).\n\nHowever, commit b1a78b9b9886 (\u0026quot;net: add support for ipv4 big tcp\u0026quot;)\nloosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:\n\n1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space\n before the MAC header (p-\u0026gt;mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes\n mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check\n with p-\u0026gt;mac_header \u0026lt; 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the\n temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb-\u0026gt;head,\n causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb-\u0026gt;mac_header.\n2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /\n ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because\n p-\u0026gt;protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.\n3. It checked p-\u0026gt;encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;encap_mark,\n allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate\n beyond 64KB.\n\nFix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:\n- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;proto == IPPROTO_TCP\n- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)-\u0026gt;encap_mark \u0026amp;\u0026amp; !p-\u0026gt;encapsulation)\n- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6\n- If ETH_P_IPV6, p-\u0026gt;mac_header must be at least\n sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)\n\nReturning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot\nbecome BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at \u0026lt;= 64KB and delivered intact without\ndropping.\n\nThis issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was\nrewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 (\u0026quot;net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX\nside\u0026quot;), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like\n6.18.y.(CVE-2026-80725)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4359",
"modified": "2026-10-16T11:59:45Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T11:59:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4359"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53115"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53118"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74594"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80725"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-53115",
"CVE-2026-53118",
"CVE-2026-74594",
"CVE-2026-80725"
]
}
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