OESA-2026-1340 (CVE-2023-54284)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-02-13 11:10 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:10 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
kernel security update
Details

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: av7110: prevent underflow in write_ts_to_decoder()

The buf[4] value comes from the user via ts_play(). It is a value in the u8 range. The final length we pass to av7110_ipack_instant_repack() is "len - (buf[4] + 1) - 4" so add a check to ensure that the length is not negative. It's not clear that passing a negative len value does anything bad necessarily, but it's not best practice.

With the new bounds checking the "if (!len)" condition is no longer possible or required so remove that.(CVE-2023-54284)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup

On the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp before connections with valid cp->app pointers are flushed, leading to a use-after-free.

Fix this by introducing a global exiting_module flag, set to true in ip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In __ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns cleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to __ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections are flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp immediately.(CVE-2025-40018)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()

The wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client receiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is received. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install a new map immediately after freeing the old one

kfree(monc->monmap);
monc->monmap = monmap;

ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc->osdmap);
osdc->osdmap = newmap;

under client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock respectively, but because neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it's possible for client->monc.monmap->epoch and client->osdc.osdmap->epoch arms in

client->monc.monmap && client->monc.monmap->epoch &&
    client->osdc.osdmap && client->osdc.osdmap->epoch;

condition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be reproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70
ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290
ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>

Allocated by task 13305:
ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130
ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0
ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190
create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0
ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0
path_mount+0x6dd/0x730
do_mount+0x99/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Freed by task 9475:
kfree+0x212/0x290
handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0
ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590
mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0
ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760
ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650
process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0
process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90
worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0
kthread+0x2ec/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Rewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While at it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be exceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than once) and access client->auth_err under client->monc.mutex to match how it's set in finish_auth().

monmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before accessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()

Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations as spotted by syzbot [1].

Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull().

[1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729 __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860 ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903 gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397 tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485 tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586 __alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995 tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline] tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025(CVE-2026-23003)

Severity
7.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

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  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
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          "bpftool-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
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          "kernel-devel-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-source-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
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          "python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
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        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "bpftool-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
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      "package": {
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        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.19.90-2602.2.0.0362.oe2003sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
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    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: av7110: prevent underflow in write_ts_to_decoder()\n\nThe buf[4] value comes from the user via ts_play().  It is a value in\nthe u8 range.  The final length we pass to av7110_ipack_instant_repack()\nis \u0026quot;len - (buf[4] + 1) - 4\u0026quot; so add a check to ensure that the length is\nnot negative.  It\u0026apos;s not clear that passing a negative len value does\nanything bad necessarily, but it\u0026apos;s not best practice.\n\nWith the new bounds checking the \u0026quot;if (!len)\u0026quot; condition is no longer\npossible or required so remove that.(CVE-2023-54284)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup\n\nOn the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp\nbefore connections with valid cp-\u0026gt;app pointers are flushed, leading to a\nuse-after-free.\n\nFix this by introducing a global `exiting_module` flag, set to true in\nip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In\n__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns\ncleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to\n__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections\nare flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp\nimmediately.(CVE-2025-40018)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map()\n\nThe wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client\nreceiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is\nreceived.  Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install\na new map immediately after freeing the old one\n\n    kfree(monc-\u0026gt;monmap);\n    monc-\u0026gt;monmap = monmap;\n\n    ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap);\n    osdc-\u0026gt;osdmap = newmap;\n\nunder client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock respectively, but\nbecause neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it\u0026apos;s possible for\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch and client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch arms in\n\n    client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;monc.monmap-\u0026gt;epoch \u0026amp;\u0026amp;\n        client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap \u0026amp;\u0026amp; client-\u0026gt;osdc.osdmap-\u0026gt;epoch;\n\ncondition to dereference an already freed map.  This happens to be\nreproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n    Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305\n    CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266\n    ...\n    Call Trace:\n    \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n    have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70\n    ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290\n    ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680\n    vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n    do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n    path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n    do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n    __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n    do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n    \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\n\n    Allocated by task 13305:\n    ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130\n    ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0\n    ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190\n    create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0\n    ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680\n    vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180\n    do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0\n    path_mount+0x6dd/0x730\n    do_mount+0x99/0xe0\n    __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180\n    do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100\n    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n    Freed by task 9475:\n    kfree+0x212/0x290\n    handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0\n    ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590\n    mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0\n    ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0\n    ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760\n    ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650\n    process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0\n    process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90\n    worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0\n    kthread+0x2ec/0x300\n    ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40\n    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nRewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with\nclient-\u0026gt;monc.mutex and client-\u0026gt;osdc.lock taken as appropriate.  While\nat it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be\nexceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than\nonce) and access client-\u0026gt;auth_err under client-\u0026gt;monc.mutex to match\nhow it\u0026apos;s set in finish_auth().\n\nmonmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before\naccessing the map as well.(CVE-2025-68285)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()\n\nBlamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations\nas spotted by syzbot [1].\n\nUse skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull().\n\n[1]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]\n BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321\n  __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]\n  INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]\n  IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321\n  ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729\n  __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860\n  ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903\n gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1\n  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438\n  ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489\n  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]\n  ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500\n  ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590\n  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]\n  ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79\n  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]\n  ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311\n  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline]\n  __netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252\n  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline]\n  netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397\n  tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485\n  tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953\n  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999\n  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]\n  vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686\n  ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]\n  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]\n  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746\n  x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2\n  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nUninit was created at:\n  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline]\n  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]\n  kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315\n  kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586\n  __alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690\n  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]\n  alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712\n  sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995\n  tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline]\n  tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794\n  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999\n  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]\n  vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686\n  ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]\n  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]\n  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746\n  x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2\n  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025(CVE-2026-23003)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-1340",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:10:22Z",
  "published": "2026-02-13T11:10:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1340"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54284"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40018"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68285"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23003"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kernel security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2023-54284",
    "CVE-2025-40018",
    "CVE-2025-68285",
    "CVE-2026-23003"
  ]
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.