OESA-2025-1447 (CVE-2022-49493)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2025-04-25 11:08 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:08 – Source websiteThe Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.
Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt5645: Fix errorenous cleanup order
There is a logic error when removing rt5645 device as the function rt5645_i2c_remove() first cancel the &rt5645->jack_detect_work and delete the &rt5645->btn_check_timer latter. However, since the timer handler rt5645_btn_check_callback() will re-queue the jack_detect_work, this cleanup order is buggy.
That is, once the del_timer_sync in rt5645_i2c_remove is concurrently run with the rt5645_btn_check_callback, the canceled jack_detect_work will be rescheduled again, leading to possible use-after-free.
This patch fix the issue by placing the del_timer_sync function before the cancel_delayed_work_sync.(CVE-2022-49493)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: jack: Access input_dev under mutex
It is possible when using ASoC that input_dev is unregistered while calling snd_jack_report, which causes NULL pointer dereference. In order to prevent this serialize access to input_dev using mutex lock.(CVE-2022-49538)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: prevent opcode speculation
sqe->opcode is used for different tables, make sure we santitise it against speculations.(CVE-2025-21863)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"bpftool-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-source-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python2-perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"kernel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"bpftool-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-devel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-source-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python2-perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.19.90-2504.4.0.0325.oe2003sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: rt5645: Fix errorenous cleanup order\n\nThere is a logic error when removing rt5645 device as the function\nrt5645_i2c_remove() first cancel the \u0026amp;rt5645-\u0026gt;jack_detect_work and\ndelete the \u0026amp;rt5645-\u0026gt;btn_check_timer latter. However, since the timer\nhandler rt5645_btn_check_callback() will re-queue the jack_detect_work,\nthis cleanup order is buggy.\n\nThat is, once the del_timer_sync in rt5645_i2c_remove is concurrently\nrun with the rt5645_btn_check_callback, the canceled jack_detect_work\nwill be rescheduled again, leading to possible use-after-free.\n\nThis patch fix the issue by placing the del_timer_sync function before\nthe cancel_delayed_work_sync.(CVE-2022-49493)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: jack: Access input_dev under mutex\n\nIt is possible when using ASoC that input_dev is unregistered while\ncalling snd_jack_report, which causes NULL pointer dereference.\nIn order to prevent this serialize access to input_dev using mutex lock.(CVE-2022-49538)\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: prevent opcode speculation\n\nsqe-\u0026gt;opcode is used for different tables, make sure we santitise it\nagainst speculations.(CVE-2025-21863)",
"id": "OESA-2025-1447",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:08:32Z",
"published": "2025-04-25T11:08:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-1447"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49493"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49538"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21863"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kernel security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2022-49493",
"CVE-2022-49538",
"CVE-2025-21863"
]
}
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